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THE POSTHUMAN CURRICULUM AND THE TEACHER
by
JOHN COOK
(Under the Direction of John Weaver)
ABSTRACT
The intent of this document is to explore education through a posthumanist lens.
More specifically, elements of posthumanism will be used to better understand
today’s teachers, to provide several overarching educational goals and curricular
imperatives, and to inform pedagogical practice. Several posthumanist themes in
particular will serve to unify this rather broad consideration of education at
varying levels. One such theme is that of blurring boundaries, calling into
question distinctions that have been the source of declines in the health of our
bodies, our species, and the life systems of which we are constitutive parts.
Distinctions too often lead to hierarchies, and hence to exploitation. The
humanist distinction between man and nature has for example bolstered the idea
that man should rightfully rule nature, as well as justified oppression and
enslavement of the “less human” or “savage”. Another unifying posthumanist
theme is that of impermanence or flux. What it means to be human changes as
our environment and our technologies change. The roles of teacher and learner
are frequently changing and we are always some measure of each, more of one
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and less of the other depending on the environment and circumstance. A final
posthumanist theme that permeates this text is that of decentering the human.
Posthumanism is in part a rejection of anthropocentrism, and this rejection
informs much of the following considerations of teachers, curricula, pedagogy,
and education.

INDEX WORDS: Curriculum, Education, Posthuman, Posthumanism, Humanism,
Pedagogy, Ecopedagogy, Culture, Media, Technology
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CHAPTER 1
WE ARE POSTHUMAN
Introduction
The following pages will serve as an exploration of the intersection of the
posthuman, curriculum theory, and the teaching profession. What sort of
curriculum should be prescribed for posthumans? What does it mean to teach a
posthuman, and how should one go about it? -These questions will drive my
inquiry. The primary goals of this work will be to make the case for and sketch
out the foundations of a posthuman curriculum and pedagogy. I intend to begin
this dissertation by exploring an iteration of posthumanism, endeavoring both to
outline its boundaries and to alter them here and there. Though posthumanism
means different things to different people, I will adopt and elaborate on two
particular conceptions of the term. The first conception includes a rejection of
certain assumptions of Renaissance humanism, including the primacy of the
individual human over groups of humans, and the primacy of the human species
over other species and entities. Also rejected is the idea that the human should
endeavor to distance herself from the “brutish” through the study of
communicative arts, in which Rennaisance humanists included rhetoric, poetry,
moral philosophy, and others. This conception of posthumanism does not
necessarily find fault in scholasticism or in developing facility with human
language, but rather rejects Western conceptions of human that marginalize
those that fail to meet Eurocentric ideals, or that oppose humans and nature to
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one another. Instead of opposing nature and the humanities, this conception of
posthumanism would seek to bring them in concert with one another.

To espouse posthumanism is to reject or in some ways to seek to move
past humanism. Such a proposition is compounded by the struggles of
marginalized peoples who have fought and died to be recognized as human, and
to enjoy the privileges accorded to those deemed sufficiently human. Many
African Americans, members of the LGBT community and others have been
inspired by humanist sentiments such as the idea that all men are created equal.
Any work to move beyond humanism must keep in mind that distinctions of race,
sex, sexual preference, gender and others continue to be used as markers for a
hierarchy with those deemed “most human” at the top, and that the
Enlightenment ideal of the human was one of European descent, white, straight,
male, and “educated”. Legal, educational, economic and political structures,
among others, all have and continue to reinforce this notion of the superiority of
this Enlightenment ideal. Essentially the effort to move beyond humanism must
be recognized in part as an effort to dismantle the harmful hierarchy that has
accompanied it, with white men at the top, “lesser humans” further down, and the
natural world at the bottom. It is not enough for those in privileged positions to tell
everyone else to stop trying to climb the ladder, to stop trying to be part of the
"human club". Rather, the ladder must itself be dismantled. This is urgent work, it
must be noted, as we see the legacy of humanism in, for one (pressing)
example, the disproportionate number of blacks incarcerated, killed, beaten, and
harassed by police in America today.
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Another conception of posthumanism to be explored in this work argues
that the boundaries of what constitutes “human” have become increasingly
blurry. The disembodiment of information accompanying the computer revolution
has, as Katherine Hayles has pointed out, made the human body seem almost
superfluous, like a rather uninteresting shell for the mind. Further, instead of
using the functionalities our bodies provide to obtain what we need, today we
increasingly turn to technological prostheses. The tools we use to make our way
through the world (whether of bodily origin or not) contribute greatly to our sense
of identity. Today, software is one such tool, though it is one that changes more
rapidly than we are accustomed to our tools changing. As the tools we use begin
to change more rapidly, maintaining a stable identity becomes less feasible. We
increasingly face the world with a digital self that often bears little relation to our
body. Douglas Kellner (1995) writes, “Identity today…becomes a freely chosen
game, a theatrical presentation of the self, in which one is able to present oneself
in a variety of roles, images, and activities…” (p. 246). If we ever were the
autonomous individuals Rennaisance humanists had in mind when they called us
“human”, it seems that we have sufficiently deviated from that “ideal” to warrant a
new moniker: posthuman.
This chapter will serve as an exploration of the idea of the posthuman as a
mixture of animal and machine, and to argue for this animal/machine hybrid as a
worthy and necessary replacement of the human in its historical role as
theoretical focal point. Like hermit crabs, three quarters of the world’s
[post]human population now carry around semi-permanent appendages that
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fundamentally inform how we interact with the world. Importantly, this chapter will
attempt to shake the foundations of individuality, as the legacies of individual
freedom and individual thought have historically been most hazardous to life
systems. In addition to breaking down the boundaries of the human, this chapter
will posit the humanimal/computer hybrid, or posthuman, as a potential
replacement for the human as both theoretical focal point and subject to be
educated. Perhaps the biggest theoretical implication of this shift of focus is the
decentering of the individual by the group. The posthuman, I will argue, is and
must recognize itself as a biotic component of greater (as in larger) entities. In
place of the ideal of absolute human autonomy put forth by humanism, a
posthuman has obligations to the entities of which it is a part.
Having outlined a particular articulation of posthumanism, chapter two will
describe the posthuman teacher. The common conception of the teacher, and
focal point for much educational debate, is that of the teacher as an autonomous
individual human. This conception and the debates surrounding it will be
problematized here. Conceptions of the teacher as cyborg and as components of
cybernetic systems will be posited as replacement focal points in education.
Component parts that help constitute the cyborg teacher will be examined,
including language, the written word, desks, the school building, the computer
and others. An important suggestion of this chapter is that the cyborg teacher’s
constitutive technologies contribute to a vicious circle of influence that leads to a
conservatism of practice. Teacher technologies including such seemingly
mundane elements as desks and desk layouts, chalkboards or projector screens,
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textbooks, etc., grant teachers a measure of authority while they limit methods of
educational inquiry.
Chapter three will serve as an exploration of the American child’s
competing curricula. Since the proliferation of cell phones, I will argue, curricular
imperatives have shifted at a foundational level. A life lived increasingly through
screens brings challenges to the health of bodies and ecosystems. The tangible
world, including the body, can become seemingly less important. Also, where
information once was scarce, today it is abundant. Today’s youth commonly
“switch channels” between flows of information, such as from the teacher’s voice
to their Twitter feed to conversations via text message. Children are inevitably
exposed to a number of competing curricula through these and other outlets,
including those furnished by the state (and shaped by teachers), the market,
friends and loved ones, and strangers. Of central importance in this chapter are
notions of identity and embodiment.
Curriculum theory must continually evolve along with the learner’s
environment. Chapter four will seek to provide a framework for a curriculum for
our young that is informed by our present milieu. As we are posthuman, both
animal and machine, curricular imperatives lie both in the tangible and
cyberspace realms. Such curricula, I argue, could be built from five curricular
imperatives. The first of these is critical media literacy, which involves learning
the languages of today’s media, in part through creating within those media. An
education in critical media literacy should involve training and practice in
interpreting and creating in the realms of audiovisual media, social networking,
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advertising, and others. A second curricular imperative is what James Gee
(2013) has termed “mining skills”, or the ability to obtain the information we need,
when we need it, often from the Internet (Chapter 22, Section 3, para. 14). The
Internet Telecommunication Union (2015) estimates that about forty percent of
the world’s population is connected to the Internet, and that this fraction is rapidly
rising, with many of the biggest gains in the developing world. As communities
become more connected, mining skills stand to positively influence the social,
political, and economic spheres of our lives. A third curricular imperative, critical
cultural studies, seeks to fix the cultural blind spots young people face as a result
of technology-facilitated segregation. Our tools today allow us, perhaps more
than any other time in our existence, to serve as gatekeepers deciding whom we
will grant interpersonal access to. This affordance has had the undesirable effect
of the proliferation of self-same groups. Rather than interact with those whose
views challenge our own, we all too often retreat to friend and acquaintance
groups that largely mirror ourselves in appearance, opinion, culture, etc. Giving
students the tools they need to foster and maintain healthy bodies is the fourth
curricular imperative. As we rely less on our bodies, tending to view them as
afterthoughts, we increasingly fail to tend to them. Further, the ubiquitousness of
cheap, unhealthy foods (and advertising for same) makes proper habits of diet
even more difficult to engender. Humanists often forget the reflexive relationship
between mind and body, tending instead to place the mind on a pedestal.
Posthumanism serves as a corrective here, recognizing that the body exerts
influence over the mind. A final curricular imperative for posthumans is the
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engendering of biophilia, or affection for all life systems. There are parallels here
between disregard for the body and disregard for the environment. When
disembodied information takes precedence, both body and environment become
neglected. Just as body and mind have a reflexive relationship, so posthumans
have a reflexive relationship with the life systems they encompass and the ones
that encompass them. That our tools allow us to take from the environment,
without regard for, or knowledge of, the effects of our taking, makes the
engendering of biophilia all the more important. Such an education, it is hoped,
might serve as a corrective to the blind spots raised by our technologies. Though
different from one another, these five curricular imperatives share a focus on
selective permeability. Each, in some form, seeks to educate the posthuman in
what she might take in or absorb, and produce or excrete.
The final chapter will explore the teacher’s role in the 21st Century. As
competitors to the school curricula have never been more numerous, nor more
ready to hand (quite literally, since the advent of cell phones), the teacher no
longer appears to command the center. Still, there remain roles for teachers no
less vital than those of teachers past. That said, teachers must relinquish their
self-identification as “the ones who impart information”. As curricula for most
classes are now furnished by the state, and as “accountability” measures
increasingly tie teachers (and students) to these curricula, teacher agency is
undoubtedly constrained. The teacher, however, is still capable of framing the
state’s curriculum, as well as providing the light through which it is gleaned. The
foundational pillars above can, separately or in concert, serve to “frame” the
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state-prescribed curricula. A key endeavor in this chapter will be to give specific
examples of this framing, using actual state-mandated curricula.

What’s In A Name?
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet

When is a name change in order? To name something is to ascribe
permanence to it, in the mind if not in reality. We often confuse the permanence
of names with the things they name, especially in the cases of things that change
slowly. I look much the same from yesterday to today, and tend to forget that my
body changes. We often become alarmed when we are presented with evidence
of our changing bodies, like gray hair, sagging skin, wrinkles, etc. We like to
name things, and we take comfort in the illusion of permanence. Many people
reject the theory of evolution, perhaps in part because they are uncomfortable
with the constant flux it implies. As with the appearance of gray hair, when we
consult the fossil record we are faced with impermanence. There are no fixed
lines between Homo habilis and Homo erectus, nor between Homo erectus and
Homo sapien. These names refer to points, but in between these points is a blur.
Homo habilis is a place marker, and can be distinguished from Homo
erectus; another place marker. Homo erectus had measurably larger brains and
smaller teeth than Homo habilis. This illustrates the convenience if not the
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primary function of names, which is to denote difference-to distinguish one from
another. To say, “Watch out, a mouse!” is different from saying, “Watch out, a
lion!” Names here display a function that seems likely to have an evolutionary
origin, as they allow us to convey precise information that can impact subsequent
decisions and survival. Crows have vocalizations for raising alarms that can be
distinguished from their other calls, and many other animals have evolved
methods of communication.
A name provides a snapshot of that to which it refers, freezing it in time.
We call zebras zebras, but given enough time what was once referred to as
zebra will have changed. The zebra might one day lose its stripes in the course
of evolutionary adaptation. It is doubtful, should that day come, that it would still
be referred to as a zebra. Just as there is resistance to the idea that humans
once were something different, so there is (perhaps even more) resistance to the
idea that humans will become something different in the future. Indeed, we may
now be something sufficiently different already to warrant another name than
“human”. We might be like the yet unnamed creature of the future, descended
from the zebra but free of the stripes we (today) associate so closely with zebrahood. Ultimately, it should be acknowledged, the name itself is, in a sense, trivial.
As long as we recognize something for what it is, what we call it doesn’t matter-to
paraphrase Shakespeare. Ultimately, whether a name is changed or not is much
less important than that which compels the name change, which is to say how we
are different from what we once were. As long as we are humans, human
institutions have a chance of working. To recognize that we are no longer the
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humans we once were is a prerequisite for acknowledging the need to revise our
institutions and our aims. Much as we are guilty of clinging to our antiquated
conceptions of “human”, so we too often adhere to conventional notions of
curriculum and pedagogy.
I seek, in the pages that follow, to illustrate the ways in which we have
recently changed, and to suggest that a name change could be in order. We are,
I argue, posthuman, and it is important to recognize how we are substantively
different even from the humans of a hundred years ago. These differences are
not the result of an evolution of body, which is to say that we might still be called
homo sapiens. Instead, the differences lie in our means of interacting with the
world. Most definitions of “human” include tool use, and herein lies perhaps the
best case for a name change, as homo sapiens of today are less tool users and
more tool-used. As our smart technologies become smarter, posthumans come
more and more to resemble symbionts.

Technology’s One-Way Conversation
Humans are descended from social creatures that lived and hunted in
groups. Like all living things, we are equipped with nature’s tools, developed
through evolution. Foraging humans used their hands and teeth to take from
nature, and their feet and legs to move through her, and their ears to hear her,
etc. The use of each and all of our natural capabilities can be said to constitute
our part of a conversation between the natural world and ourselves. Technology
use, whether natural or technologically facilitated, is always a conversation.
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Norbert Weiner (1954) writes, “The commands through which we exercise our
control over our environment are a kind of information which we impart to it” (p.
17). The communication of nature’s various and varied technologies is what
directs the evolutionary process. Successful hunts lead to faster, more intelligent,
and/or more aware prey. A reflexivity of influence occurs both between nature’s
creatures, and between levels of biological organization, as natural selection
moves eventually, albeit slowly and with occasional (and sometimes disastrous)
detours, towards equilibrium.
Now consider the use of primitive tools such as spears, bows and arrows.
These technologies communicate also, but their communication is much more
one-way. Using a spear to catch fish in shallow water is a great leap forward in
efficiency from attempting the same task with one’s “natural tools” only (eyes,
hands, legs to move, etc.). The fish, through ongoing communication with the
natural world, evolved sophisticated technologies for survival. Humans suddenly
developed a technique that greatly enhanced their own survival to the detriment
of the fish. Instead of the incremental give and take of natural selection, which
leads to the continued enhancement of both parties, humans found a “short cut”.
This communication is one that is less reflexive, and less open to a “response” by
the earth. There is more “take” and less “give”, more speaking and less hearing.
Such unreflexive communications occur in other beings as well, it must be
admitted (as with invasive species, for example). Also, humans sometimes find
themselves in positions in which the tables have been turned, where they are
subjected to some short cut or other against which they cannot successfully
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contend; think of pandemics like the black plague. Indeed, every communication
in the natural world involves one party taking more than it gives for a time. The
natural world is never perfectly “in” equilibrium so much as it always eventually
moves towards it. I may take more today, only to find I must give more tomorrow.
The advantage of the cheetahs today is the antelopes’ advantage tomorrow,
having evolved greater speed in tandem with the cheetahs (their slower relatives
having died off in the exchange). This is the story of life. However, the brain
size/tool development feedback loop allowed for technology development by
humans at a rate for which natural selection was unprepared.
Humans now develop new technologies in a process separate from and
much faster than natural selection. As such, it is not technology itself that is the
problem, as nature’s own arms races have occurred as long as life has existed
on this planet. Instead, the human rate of technological advance has given us the
capacity (at least for now) to dominate many of the life systems with which we
come in direct contact, and further, to hijack the larger systems of which we are
constituent parts. As tools began to become more sophisticated, human
communication with the world became less and less reflexive. The
communication became increasingly one-way, with humans talking but not
listening, with more taking and less giving. As invasive species, humans are akin
to influenza, a virus capable of sudden reassortments that vastly change its
properties. When the old pesticides no longer work, we develop new ones. This,
certainly, helps to explain the length of our dominion. We cannot cure the flu,
because the flu rapidly mutates. Just so, nature has not yet come up with a cure
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for the human, as our technologies mutate at a rate that far exceeds that of
natural selection.

Animality and the Oppressed
The concept of human has been from the beginning set in opposition to
nature, and has also been (and continues to be) used to justify enslavement,
exploitation, and oppression over those considered less human, or “savage”.
Plato (trans. 1888), a father of humanism, noted that, “Even in good men there
is…an irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep” (Book IX, para. 1).
Plato posited that we are all born beastly, and that through education and
contemplation we might become human. To transition from beast to human was
to become more god-like such that one could walk the path from
beasthumangod. Having, through good breeding and education, finally
mastered our beastly natures, we might then (like God) be fit to rule. Many years
after Plato, noted humanist Francis Bacon (1620) wrote that it was “wholesome”
and “noble” for a man to “endeavor to establish and extend the power and
dominion of the human race…over the universe” (p. 63). Western thinkers thus
provided a philosophical basis for colonialism, enslavement, patriarchy (notice
Plato and Bacon both specifically refer to men), exploitation of the environment,
etc. Everything not fitting with the (European, male, white, straight, “educated”)
notions of what constituted human was fated to be ruled by those more
“civilized”. This helps explain the alarm felt when entities considered less human
display more human qualities. Pettman (2011), for example notes that, “an
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animal that mimics a human to perfection is intolerable” (Chapter 1, section 4,
para. 7).
Donna Haraway (1991) argues convincingly that the human/animal
boundary was “thoroughly breached” by the late 20th century (p. 274). Many
capabilities once thought to be uniquely human have been discovered in other
life forms. These include language, tool use, emotions, logic and others. Humans
might have a more advanced system of language than any other species on
earth, and more advanced tools, etc., but the possession even of primitive forms
of these capabilities serves to problematize the human/animal boundary. Most
iterations of posthumanism stress the unavoidable animality of (post)humans. No
measure of whiteness or maleness or education can rid us of our beastly
natures, nor should it. A potential aim of posthumanism is a (re)union with nature,
the removal of boundaries, and even to, as Haraway advocates, “take pleasure in
the confusion of [such] boundaries” (p. 272). A potential aim of posthumanism,
then, might be to seek homeostasis rather than dominion, and to muddle
boundaries rather than strictly police and enforce them.

Cells
As more focus in the life sciences is granted to the cell, and less to the
body, the human moniker becomes increasingly problematized. A number of
issues are at play here. Most obviously, if not most importantly, the very
recognition that we are composed of distinct biotic components is a challenge to
the notion of the autonomous human. That we are made up of organs which are
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in turn made up of cells implies that we ourselves are component parts to larger
entities: populations, communities, ecosystems, etc. We are not simply life forms,
but are ourselves collections of life forms, as Morton (2013) notes, “life forms do
not simply live alongside us: they are within us, so much so that on many levels
the host–parasite distinction collapses” (Part 2, section 2, para. 16). We so often
think of ourselves as separate from nature, though we draw all manner of
sustenance from it. Study of cells reveals a trait common among biotic
components, which is that they not only take from their environments, but tend
also to benefit them. The (post)human, through the study of the cell, discovers
principles of how to comport herself in her milieu. Cells, organs, species, etc. do
not seek “freedom” or “happiness” as ends in themselves, but rather an existence
that is beneficial not just to them, but to their environment also. Specialized cells
serve vital functions in organs, which serve vital functions in bodies, etc., each
working towards a state of homeostasis.
Other aspects of the cell that challenge ideas of the human include
hybridity and plasticity. Hybridity can be said to involve the ability of cells to
combine with other cells, while plasticity refers to the ability of cells to change,
adapt and survive. Evidence suggests that many organelles were once
themselves cells, suggesting that many cells today resulted from the combining
of primitive cells. It has also been theorized that the double wall of many cells
could be the result of combination and symbiosis between cells. The semipermeable wall of the cell allows foreign elements in that can change the cell’s
constitution and function in surprising ways. Haraway (2008) writes on hybridity

25
within cells that, “human genomes can be found in only 10 percent of all the cells
that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent are filled
with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists and such, some of which play in a
symphony necessary to my being alive at all…To be one is to always become
with many” (p. 3).
Researchers have successfully removed cells from bodies, and today farm
cultures of them in laboratories. Hannah Landecker (2007) points out that when
cells of different species are placed in the same place, they do not necessarily
recognize one another as foreign, noting an absence of, “intracellular
mechanisms for recognizing incompatibility between individuals or species”(p.
184). Might humans be analogous to cells in some ways? If so, surely the joining
of humans and intelligent machines resembles the hybridization of cells. As
hybridity and symbiosis between cells has led to new forms of life, so it seems
that the hybridity of humans and computers has led to the posthuman.

Machines
So far we have explored several challenges to the notion of an
autonomous human from the realms of the animal and the microscopic. The urge
to distinguish human from animal, it has been argued, is so prevalent in Western
thought because it helps justify oppression (by those who deem themselves
human) of those deemed less human and exploitation of the natural world. Cells
challenge notions of human autonomy by revealing life to be analogous to a
series of Russian nesting dolls, of which the human body is one of the dolls in the
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middle. This, in turn, challenges notions of human exceptionalism at the same
time as it reminds us of our connections with forms of life that exceed our ability
to directly observe them. In the paragraphs that follow, I hope to challenge the
human by exposing the (growing) fault lines in the human/machine distinction.
In 1748 La Mettrie, in Man a Machine, notes the machine-like nature of the
body’s functions: “Is it not by mechanical means that the pores of the skin close
in winter so that the cold cannot penetrate to the interior of the blood vessels,
and that the stomach vomits when it is irritated by poison…? That the heart, the
arteries and the muscles contract in sleep as well as in waking hours, that the
lungs serve as bellows continually in exercise? Is it not the case that the
sphincters of the rectum and bladder act mechanically” (p. 46)? In much the
same way, humans themselves might be conceived as fulfilling machine-like
functions for the larger systems of which we are parts. Those who object that
machines cannot be of flesh and blood might be alarmed at the work presently
being done in the fields of biotechnology, genetics and others, in which life is
being bent to ever more elaborate ends. As Landecker (2007) notes, an,
“assumption of living matter as technological matter is constitutive of life today…”
(p. 2).
In the past, bodily integrity has maintained the illusion of separateness
from the technologies we have employed. This perceived integrity is breaking
down, however, as modern technologies are increasingly attached to, inserted in,
and morphing our bodies. The hermit crab carries around its shell at all times,
and typical depictions of the creature include the shell. We see the hermit crab
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with its shell as a singular entity. By this logic we might well begin to think of the
human with their smart phone as a distinct entity. Any alien scientist worth her
salt would surely note the attachment of humans to their phones. Pacemakers,
artificial limbs and organs, and many others actually breach the bodily integrity
we believe to separate us from machines in a meaningful way. Wearable
technology, though still in its infancy, could obliterate the human/machine
boundary once and for all, as computers become attached to our wrists, eyes,
brains, etc. There is no body that possesses an impermeable shell. Our bodies
and the cells in our bodies can be entered, and we like all things change as our
constitution changes. In 1991 Donna Haraway declared, “…we are cyborgs”, and
we have only become more entangled with machines since those words were
written (p. 150).

Consciousness
There is a tendency to emphasize consciousness as a defining marker of
the human. Consciousness is believed to grant us the capacity for rational
thought, and is thereby used to justify anthropocentrism. It provides us with the
illusion that our minds are distinct from our bodies. As such, a critique of
consciousness is not out of place here, where we have already problematized
the human/animal and human/machine distinctions. As Hayles (1999) notes, “the
posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human
identity in the Western tradition…as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary
upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor
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sideshow” (p. 2). The illusion of a mind/body distinction has led to a hierarchy of
mind over body, from which follows the anthropocentric notion that the human
mind should rightfully rule over all bodies, and that the natural world (including
one’s own body) is inferior to the mind.
It is a common belief that information is funneled through our senses to
our minds, where we are at liberty to consider all of the evidence and make
rational decisions. Even if our bodies are restrained, we often feel as though our
minds are free, often in an absolute sense. We believe that we are capable of
seeing the world clearly, and thinking what we wish to think. Neuroscience over
the last several decades, however, suggests that this view of consciousness may
be misleading. Neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene (2014) writes that, “the course
of human actions is driven by a broad array of mechanisms that are inaccessible
to introspection, from sensorimotor reflexes to unaware motives and hidden
desires” (Chapter 2, section 2, para. 4). Consciousness, according to this view,
often takes a back seat in the direction of behavior. This is not the only challenge
to conventional notions of consciousness, however. It is now generally accepted
that our brains process much more information than ever reaches the level of
consciousness. Dehaene suggests that the mind is like a bureaucracy with an
army of statisticians in the lower levels crunching numbers and composing briefs,
some limited number of which make it to the executives (consciousness) at the
top, from which some decisions are then made. Education, proclivities,
inclinations, etc. can influence what rises to the level of consciousness and what
does not. Overhearing a conversation in Mandarin, I am not conscious of the
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meaning of the speech. A career musician is surely conscious of elements of
music that go unnoticed by me. We often have more difficulty distinguishing
faces of people of another race from one another than people of our own race.
We each have our own lens through which we view the world, a lens that
obscures some things and distorts others. Thanks to the plasticity of our brains,
we can alter the lens through which we view the world and we can strive for a
“clear” picture, but there will always be information left out from and/or distorted
prior to reaching consciousness.
The idea that consciousness receives heavily filtered information from the
brain challenges the possibility of objective thought. Much as the human cannot
ultimately separate herself from nature, neither can one’s consciousness
separate itself from the mind it springs from. We overestimate the significance of
consciousness to our behavior and decisions possibly because it is the only
aspect of the function of our minds of which we are immediately aware. This is
analogous to a person who mistakenly ascribes more power to the president than
they have in reality because of the president’s relatively prominent visibility. The
other branches of government and the remainder of the executive branch are
sometimes discounted because they are less visible. Not detecting
consciousness (at least of the sort possessed by humans) in other life forms, we
often (mis)take our uniqueness for superiority. Our capability of rational thought,
born of consciousness, is centered as our bodies are marginalized. Exactly as
the human/nature distinction has been used to oppress marginalized peoples
and exploit nature, the mind/body distinction has been used to oppress the body.
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To satiate the desires of the body, we are told, is to submit to one’s baser, animal
nature.

Computers
Our bodies, including our brains, shape our consciousness. The mind
cannot be removed from the body, nor can our minds and bodies be separated
from nature. But this is not all. In addition to recent efforts by neuroscientists that
have had some success in knocking consciousness from its pedestal, 21st
century technologies call into question the notion of consciousness at the
individual level. By 21st century technology I refer chiefly to the globe spanning
and rapidly growing network of computers and sensory devices. The degree to
which these technologies allow our behavior to be coordinated and our thoughts
to be interconnected renders consciousness a more communal affair. Of this
technology Hansen (2015) notes that, “humans become implicated within larger
causal and technical networks in relation to which they can no longer claim any
kind of transcendence. What is crucial about such implication is the way it
expands agency beyond the subject-centered perspective of any delimited entity
or society, thus rendering it a function of the total environment involved in any
given social event” (Chapter 1, section 6, para. 4). By this view, technology
challenges ideas of autonomy as it weaves us into networks of machines,
people, and nature. In some ways this effect of technology is a reversal, as our
tools are what originally gave us the illusion of autonomy to begin with. Tools
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made us believe that we were masters of the natural world, but of late certain of
our tools are increasingly allowing us to hear what the world has to say.
Katherine Hayles (1999) defines the posthuman as the union of humans
and intelligent machines (p. 3). These machines increasingly inform our behavior,
our aims, and our means of understanding the world. Hansen distinguishes 21 st
century media from earlier media based on their orientation towards informing
future behavior. Where a movie or book allows its creator to crystallize a moment
from the past and share it with someone in the future, today’s media allow the
sharing of moments from the present or recent past. Hansen (2015) writes,
“Encompassing everything from social media and data-mining to passive sensing
and environmental microsensors, twenty-first-century media designate media
following their shift from a past-directed recording platform to a data-driven
anticipation of the future” (Introduction, section 2, para. 1). This view ties present
day technology more closely in function to our bodies and bodily senses. The
human eye, for example, works in a feed-forward way much like social media, as
both take in massive amounts of information, shape it (through retinal processing
in the former and algorithms in the latter), and feed a tailored selection of the
information to consciousness. As our technology becomes increasingly designed
for feed-forward functions such as this, and thus comes more to resemble
additional sense organs, it becomes more vital that we take a new account of
who and what we are, what we are capable of, and how we should comport
ourselves given the affordances of our technologies.
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Humanism, Christianity, and Posthumanism
“Humanitas was the opposite of divinitas. The humanities were put in opposition
to theology and theological interest.”
-John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953: 1929-1930, What Humanism Means
to Me, p. 265
While the rise of Humanist thought during the Renaissance was in part a
rejection of Christianity (see Dewey above), humanism retains the same
foundation as Christianity. Both proceed from a mind/matter dualism and both
emphasize human happiness. In the case of Christianity, a soul exists that is
separate from the body. While the soul is immortal, the body is a temporary shell.
Bodily desires in Christianity are to be tempered if not rejected, as the goal is to
become less beastlike and more godlike. Humans alone are in a position to reject
worldly ways for the divine. God may be communicated with through silent
prayer. Those who walk the path will receive a place in heaven after their death,
a place of eternal joy and immense wealth (with streets of gold, gates of pearl,
etc.). Isaiah illustrates a heaven in which residents engage in productive labor for
themselves, and in which there is no longer a natural hierarchy. He writes that
the people in heaven, “shall not build and another inhabit; they shall not plant and
another eat…” (Isaiah 65:22, English Standard Version) and that in heaven, “The
wolf and the lamb shall graze together; the lion shall eat straw like the ox…”
(Isaiah 65:25, English Standard Version). Here, as elsewhere, Christianity taps
into a desire to be free from oppression both from other humans (in heaven one
is no longer compelled to do work for others) and from nature. Humanism seeks
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to indulge these desires also, though while Christianity offers hope of fulfilling
these wishes after death, humanism offers their possibility during life.
There is, both in humanism and Christianity, a turn away from the natural
and embodied, which springs from the mind/body dualism at the core of each
belief system. Though humanism has been influenced by naturalism, it remains
preoccupied with rationality. For Aristotle, Plato, and other forerunners of
humanism, there was the idea that the best of humanity should set themselves
apart from nature, manual labor, socializing, etc., for a life filled with solitary
contemplation, which might from time to time be shared with the [lesser] masses.
Plato even advocated rule by philosopher king. For Christians, prayer is the
analogue to the humanist’s contemplation, and the soul is analogous to the mind.
The most pious avoid bodily temptations, with nuns, monks, priests, etc., vowing
to abstain from sex. The worldly is subordinated to the heavenly, and one is
expected to reject the worldly in life so that one might enjoy the heavenly in
afterlife.
In all major religions, there is some variant on the golden rule, and this
rule is very much in keeping with humanist thought as well. But, “Do unto others
as you would have them do unto you” is too often assumed, both among
Christians and humanists, to be limited to humanity. “Others” is taken to mean
“other humans”. There is a disregard for other life systems in both beliefs, which
is much in need of rectification. Whether faith is placed in God or rationality, there
is danger. Faith itself is hazardous, as it allows the believer to ignore or repress
new information. Some Christians are insensitive to environmental concerns,
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believing that God intended that all life on earth be subordinate to human life.
Some even dismiss concerns over global warming with the belief that the rapture
will take believers before things “get too bad”. Humanists, though generally
recognizing that humans are of nature, often seek advances in human welfare
without consideration of the welfare of other life. Humans are considered, in both
beliefs, to be at the apex of all life. Both, in short, are dangerously
anthropocentric. Humanism at its worst is to the natural world as colonialism is to
the human race.
The similarities in function between religion and humanism are not
coincidental. Lewontin (1991) classes both religion and science as “institutions of
social legitimation” (p. 6). For Lewontin, both function to forestall revolution by
convincing oppressed groups that the current social order is natural and just.
Where Christianity and science diverged was in the scope of focus for agency.
Prior to industrialization and the rise of capitalism, the group was of greater
cultural import than the individual. Lewontin notes that Christianity helped
preserve the hierarchy between groups in a number of ways, including granting
the king rule by divine grace. In this context, the Golden Rule can also be seen to
serve the function of preserving the status quo, as one cannot simultaneously
follow it and engage in a revolution. Industrialization and capitalism imposed a
shift in focus from the group to the individual, which challenged Christianity’s
primacy and led to science rising to take its place. Lewontin writes, “With the
change in social organization that was wrought by developing industrial
capitalism, a whole new view of society has arisen, one in which the individual is
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primary and independent, a kind of autonomous social atom that can move from
place to place and role to role” (p. 11). Following these changes, science came to
be thought of as a process of understanding something by breaking it up into
smaller parts and examining the parts. In this manner biology came to focus on
cells and genes more so than organisms and ecosystems, and economics
became preoccupied with individual actions (Adam Smith’s invisible hand comes
to mind). This shift in focus from the group to the individual helps also to explain
the rise in humanism, which similarly focuses on individual agency with a tunnel
vision that blinds people to their unavoidable connections to other life systems.
Posthumanism differentiates itself from humanism chiefly through decentering the human. Though frequently posited as a rejection of humanism,
posthumanism might also be thought of as a radical extension of it. Latour (2004)
writes, “To limit the discussion to humans, their interests, their subjectivities, and
their rights, will appear as strange a few years from now as having denied the
right to vote of slaves, poor people, or women” (Chapter 2, section 3, para. 14).
Instead of seeking to advance the common good of humans, posthumanism
seeks the common good of all life systems. Posthumanism is a call to listen to
the non-human, and to try to understand what non-humans say and take it into
account, and finally to recognize that we ourselves are not human.
Posthumanism seeks to provide a system of thought that avoids a major
pitfall inherent in both humanism and Christianity: the quest for unbridled
freedom. Both Christianity and humanism seek freedom for freedom’s sake, and
tend to view freedom as something to be had in an absolute sense. The
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happiness striven for by humanists for humans is the happiness of a slave
master, with nature serving as the slave. Some articulations of posthumanism
recognize that nothing is ever free in an absolute sense. We are all life systems
nested in life systems, beholden to other forms of life as they are to us. We have
obligations that we should not ignore, both within our bodies and in the larger
ecosystems we inhabit. Posthumanism benefits from the words of Bersani and
Phillips (2008), who identify what, "may be the most profound mistake inherent in
being human: that of preferring our opposition to the world we live in over our
correspondence, our friendly accord, with it" (p. 127). Similarly, posthumanism
might benefit from drawing on Buddhism and other eastern religions in a focus on
balance as opposed to the freedom and happiness sought after by Christians
and humanists. Further, emphases on impermanence, interconnectedness, and
suffering are all central to Buddhist faith, and could help clarify beliefs associated
with posthumanism.
Macroeconomic theory posits a short-run aggregate supply and demand
that hover around a long-run aggregate supply. The short-run equilibrium might
be above, below, or (rarely) precisely coinciding with long-run equilibrium.
Classical economists argue against fiscal or monetary interventions on the
grounds that the economy will always eventually right itself. By this view,
elements of the economy may temporarily move out of homeostasis, but must
eventually move back towards a long-run equilibrium. While the truth of this
maxim in macroeconomics might be in doubt, an analogy of it always holds in the
natural world. Long-run aggregate supply is roughly analogous here to the
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environment; it is the point around which organisms “hover” evolutionarily,
constantly adjusting in search of harmonious existence. In neither case does flux
cease once homeostasis between macro and micro is achieved. Evolutionary
biologists have a variety of terms for the minute evolutionary changes occurring
in organisms as they constantly adjust and re-adjust to the environment; some
refer to it as “wobbling” and others as “jittering”, for two examples. “If they weren’t
jittering,” Jonathan Weiner (1994) writes, “that would suggest that the processes
that brought them here had finished, that the creation was over, just as the
universe would be moribund or dead if there were no motions to be found in its
atoms” (p. 112). This hovering illustrates a sort of meta-teleology of life, that of
constantly seeking harmony. It is not evolutionarily profitable for organisms to
depart from this meta-teleology, as those that do tend to go extinct. By focusing
on (short-term) happiness and/or “freedom” at the expense of a sustainable
equilibrium, we endanger ourselves and other life systems.

An Articulation of Posthumanism
There are nearly as many posthumanisms as there are posthumanists,
and because this dissertation seeks to explore the implications of posthumanism
for curriculum and teachers, it is necessary to detail a number of common
themes in posthumanist texts. These common themes, somewhat shaped and
amended by my own thoughts, will serve as the lens through which we view the
plight of American education, students, and teachers in the following pages.
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Further, I hope here to outline some conceptions of posthumanism that differ
from the one I am using, so as to avoid confusion.
One clear tenet of critical posthumanism common among theorists in the
field is that of interconnectivity and the blurring of boundaries. As I have
attempted to show in the previous pages, there are no distinct boundaries
delineating the human from nature, nor are there clear boundaries between mind
and body, or human and machine. We are all unavoidably both animal and
cyborg, and we cannot escape from nature. These sentiments share much in
common with, and owe much to, naturalism. However, posthumanism is distinct
from naturalism in welcoming inanimate things, technology and/or machines into
the fold. As Norbert Wiener (1954) notes, “Now that certain analogies of behavior
are being observed between the machine and the living organism, the problem
as to whether the machine is alive or not is, for our purposes, semantic” (p. 32).
Wiener’s cybernetics, it should be noted, have heavily influenced posthumanist
thought.
All of this boundary confusion understandably has and will continue to be
the source of much fear and anxiety. The posthumanist movement generally
follows Haraway’s thought that we should learn to take pleasure in boundary
confusion. Along these lines, Bersani and Phillips advocate “impersonal
intimacy”, which Pettman (2011) describes as “a ‘new relational mode’ that does
not hate or fear otherness and that does not take difference personally” (Chapter
2, section 6, para. 1). At the same time, this need not require the exercise of
absolute hospitality as described by Derrida (2000), a hospitality in which, “I open
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up my home and that I…[give place] to the absolute, unknown, anonymous
other…” (p. 25). Instead of welcoming the unknown other in to our bodies and
minds without question, we might look to the cell wall that exhibits selective
permeability. It is not necessary that we relinquish all agency when confronted
with the other, only that when we encounter the unknown we do not immediately
fear or reject it.
Having explored notions of impermanence, interconnection, and constant
change, in which it appears posthumanism owes no small debt to Buddhism,
consider another recurrent theme in posthumanism that also shares a clear
analogue with Buddhist teaching, the relinquishment of the self. “Life is suffering”
the Buddha said, and this suffering follows directly from impermanence. Only by
giving up self-hood and recognizing one’s implication in and connection with the
universe can one end their suffering. We cling to our agency and identity,
suffering at the thought of our death. So much of what we qualify as happiness is
tied to the accumulation of power-over nature, machines, and other humans.
Instead of happiness then, posthumanism might substitute homeostasis as the
overriding goal of the posthuman. Posthumanism is steadfastly critical of
anthropocentrism, in part because it places humans in disequilibrium with the
natural world. This anthropocentrism has led to widespread environmental
degradation, species extinctions, climate change, ocean acidification, and others.
Latour (Bijker and Law, eds., 1992) writes, “What our ancestors, the founders of
sociology, did a century ago to house the human masses in the fabric of social
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theory, we should do now to find a place in a new social theory for the nonhuman masses that beg us for understanding” (p. 227).
There is so much that we do not understand about the nature of being,
and the privileging of humans over nature has thus far endangered both nonhuman objects and ourselves in ways that we still do not fully grasp. This is the
fundamental precept of a movement related to posthumanism called objectoriented ontology. Timothy Morton (2013), a leading theorist in this movement,
refers to objects as, “sparkling realities withdrawn from access” (Part 2, section 3,
para. 48). Because we cannot ever truly understand them, we should not assume
superiority but instead should seek harmony. Latour (2004) advocates
community building of a sort, in which humans form a collective with nonhumans. He notes that, “lab coats have invented speech prostheses that allow
nonhumans to participate in the discussions of humans” (Chapter 2, section 3,
para. 9). Scientists here would function as translators, helping humans
understand the non-humans.
A number of theorists whose views coincide with posthumanism warn of
erring in the other direction, which is to say placing Nature up on the same
pedestal Human is being knocked off of. Pettman (2011) advocates
“communicating with natures rather than communing with Nature” (Chapter 2,
section 6, para. 18). He takes issue with the idea of “communing with Nature”
because it implies subsuming oneself, relinquishing all capacity to act. Just as
the assumption of absolute freedom is faulty, so to is a dogma of determinism.
Morton (2013) warns of “overmining”, which he describes as, “when one reduces
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a thing ‘upward’ into an effect of some supervenient system (such as Gaia or
consciousness). Since bigger things are more real than smaller things,
incremental steps will never accomplish anything” (Part 2, section 2, para. 59).
We are less cogs in a machine than we are neurons in a brain. Neuronal
plasticity describes individual neurons that are “free” to make new connections
and sever old ones, effectively re-wiring the circuits in our brain. The individual
neuron thus is not a mere functionary of the brain, but enjoys a reflexivity of
brain/neuron influence. The act of learning, it should be noted, takes place via
the exercise of such neuronal “agency”. In a manner analogous to that of
neurons and brains, humans and human society too possess a reflexivity of
influence. Political and economic structures guide human behavior, and vice
versa.
What agency we have comes with responsibility, and it is a “freedom for”
rather than “Freedom, period”. There is thus a measure of asceticism in
Posthumanism, but only a measure. We should use our agency to reject
indulgences that place us in disequilibrium with the life systems we inhabit and/or
our bodies. As Kant (1788) writes, “…the concept of morality and duty [has] to
precede before all regard to this feeling of satisfaction…” (p. 35). Duty must
come before happiness, in other words, and herein perhaps lies the strongest
bond between posthumanism and education, because this sense of duty (unlike
happiness) must be learned. At the same time, homeostasis need not rule out
happiness. Indeed, finding harmony with the life systems to which one is
connected brings a happiness of its own.
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Embodiment
Posthumanism is often conflated with transhumanism, a movement that
advocates the improvement of the species through advances in technology. Such
improvements include but are not limited to bodily augmentation to achieve
things like increased intellectual capacity, longer life spans, better disease
resistance, and others. Transhumanism often serves as an extension of
humanism by using technology as the lever by which to privilege the human over
nature. In contrast, the posthumanism I am seeking to articulate, sometimes
called critical posthumanism, has an entirely different and in many ways contrary
aim. Where transhumanists dive headlong into the possibilities afforded by
cutting edge technology, abandoning, augmenting or supplementing the body
whenever it helps achieve their goals, posthumanism seeks to inform and critique
the present. Posthumanism recognizes a body that is part machine, but it also
seeks to de-center the mind from its privileged position in the mind/body duality.
Just because our bodies are no longer as distinct from machines as we might
have once thought they were does not mean that we should remake our bodies
as we choose. Just as Latour argues that we should cultivate methods of
listening to and understanding non-human objects, so should we learn to listen to
and understand our bodies. This task is made more difficult today due to the
existence of technology that provides the illusion of separating us from nature.
Weaver (2010) puts the matter bluntly, asking, “in the post human world it is
essential to ask what happens to the body when the environment is
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technologically constructed” (p. 25)? Posthumanism reminds us of our
inescapable connection to our bodies at a time when we are most likely to forget.
Baudrillard (1988) writes that, “...as soon as behavior is crystallized on certain
screens and operational terminals, what’s left appears only as a large useless
body, deserted and condemned” (p. 4). We live in climate controlled dwellings
and our lives are increasingly screen mediated. These and other conditions are
far from the ones our bodies are evolved to cope with.
In this screen-mediated age when our bodies seem less useful than ever,
posthumanism’s preoccupation with embodiment deserves some explanation.
Most of us can meet our subsistence requirements without taxing the body as
much as people from earlier times. This, combined with the mental demands of
our information economy, makes a compelling case for the body’s
marginalization. The main fault in this logic is that it insists on two entities, mind
and body, when in actuality there is only one. If we must use the terms mind and
body, as seems almost unavoidable, let us consider them as poles at either end
of a spectrum. Further, it is important to note a reflexive relationship at work in
which each is always influencing the other. In the paragraphs on consciousness
above it was suggested that the embodied brain only presents heavily limited and
augmented information to conscious awareness. Thus the needs of the body, as
well as the always-changing physical structure of the brain (in terms of neuronal
synapses), inform our conscious awareness.
Catherine Bateson (1972) argues for the importance of embodiment when
she writes, “Each person is his own central metaphor” (p. 285). Here Bateson
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suggests that our bodies provide the central metaphor by which we come to
understand the world. Hayles (1999) provides a helpful example, noting that, “if
we had bodies with significantly different physiological structures, for example
exoskeletons rather than endoskeletons or unilateral rather than bilateral
symmetries, the schema underlying pervasive metaphoric networks would also
be radically altered” (p. 206). Perhaps because it is proper to stand upright, we
think up is more proper than down, and thus that higher is better than lower. I
assume that the bodily processes that occur when I become angry or depressed
or excited occur in a comparable way in other entities when they feel those
emotions. Listening to my body in this and other ways fosters empathy for other
entities. To neglect the body in this context is to neglect our first and most
valuable teacher, and to pass up opportunities to learn.
Screen mediated experiences require screens, just as software requires
hardware and the mind requires the body. To this we must add that the body
requires the earth, or at least a reasonable facsimile of it. In this vein, Morton
(2013) argues of the need to, “unground the human [from it’s technologically
constructed environment] by forcing it back onto the ground, which is to say,
standing on a gigantic object called Earth inside a gigantic entity called
biosphere” (Introduction, para. 35). Remembering and tending to our bodies is a
first step towards remembering and tending to the earth, itself a body of which we
are a constituent part. Morton’s words imply the need for a renewed contact
between body and earth. James Gee (2013) writes, “Early humans lived right up
against the world. There were harsh and possibly dire consequences when
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people did not listen to the world’s responses or respond to them intelligently”
(Chapter 2, para. 19). While such contact occurred in early humans without
technological mediation, present technology allows us to listen to the world in
ways that both build on our bodily senses and establish new forms of
communication. Hansen (2015) claims that twenty-first-century media make
possible a greatly “expanded sensory contact with the world” (Introduction,
section 2, para. 4). In the wake of the Industrial Revolution we were often unable
to detect the effect of the growth of industry on the environment. While our
present awareness of these effects today is still lacking, it has greatly increased.
The worldwide electronic network of satellites, sensors of various sorts (that
greatly exceed in breadth and depth our own bodily senses), computers to
interpret the data, etc., serve as new forms of contact between (post)human and
earth. We see carbon dioxide levels rising over time, and ice caps melting away,
and temperatures rising. We are able to sample the water, the air, and the soil for
toxins. The expansion and capabilities of our sensing technologies are beginning
for the first time to catch up with those of our taking technologies. Hansen (2015)
views this turn as a positive one, noting that these technologies “operate to
reground the human on the basis of a non-anthropocentric account of the world
and of the environmental dimension that is at issue in any and every event,
including events involving humans” (Introduction, section 8, para. 7). Note that
Hansen here, like Morton at the beginning of this paragraph, uses “ground” as a
verb. Ground, or reground, is something that we should do. This is a common
posthumanist view, and can be restated as a call for the pendulum to swing both
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from the mind back towards the body, and from the human back towards the
earth. In many ways, to renew contact with the body is to renew contact with the
earth.

Technocracy
We inhabit a technologically constructed environment that like the natural
world is often harsh and oppressive. Marx (trans. 1955) notes that while, “In
handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the
machine makes use of him” (p. 548). Increasingly, the entire world is coming to
resemble a factory and our use by machines less avoidable. Technology thus is
to “humans” what it is to “nature”, a conversant that increasingly talks without
listening and takes without giving. We are part of nature, and therefore should
not be surprised at this development. Indeed, the use of technology to take from
humans is as old as its use to take from nature. Stone axes, spear tips and
arrowheads were used for tribal and interpersonal conflicts as well as for hunting.
Andrew Feenberg (1999) uses the analogy of a system of laws to better
understand technological development. There are just and unjust laws, it must be
admitted, and the powerful are sometimes (if not often or constantly) able to
influence legislation to their benefit and at the cost of society as a whole and the
natural world. Once a law is firmly established, it often comes to be accepted as
a given. The best time to resist an unjust law, therefore, is at its introduction.
Laws are neither in themselves neutral nor is their creation autonomous. In all of
these ways technology has a corollary. Technologies can in themselves be just
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or unjust. Ivan Illich (1973) identifies examples of just technologies (which he
refers to as “convivial tools”) including Mexican markets, telephones, and the
postal service, which all have the potential to maximize liberty. Technologies can
likewise be unjust in themselves, much as Apartheid law in itself is unjust. Such
technologies might include weapons and chemicals harmful to the environment.
Again, like laws, technologies prescribe certain behavior and can therefore in
themselves be just or unjust. As with law, the powerful are frequently able to
direct the development of technologies towards their ends of short-term gains, as
the technocrats are generally on their payrolls. Finally, as with law, meaningful
resistance can be effective, and the best opportunities for resistance frequently
arise early in a new technology’s introduction.
Regarding technological development, Feenberg (1999) advocates, “a
view to constructive change rather than romantic retreat” (p. 179). This is a very
posthumanist idea, and a break from the numerous theorists and philosophers
who see no hope except for (a probably impossible) withdrawal from the
technological environment. However, as in the legal system, resistance faces
numerous obstacles. Perhaps the most formidable of these obstacles to
resistance is complacency resulting from the illusion of choice. Marcuse (1964)
writes of a pervasive “Happy Consciousness” which he defines as, “the belief that
the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods—[and] reflects the new
conformism…” (p. 79). People take pleasure in stability, and come to believe that
the present reality is the right way. We often fail to recognize our oppression as
we focus with tunnel vision on the agency we still retain. Free to choose the color
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of the smartphone, channel on the TV, and toppings on the burger, we fail to see
our loss of agency in other areas. Illich notes that we lack the freedom to build
our own shelters, grow our own food, and provide our own healthcare. Our
freedom in our present environment requires consumption and production within
the market system, which in itself comes at a huge cost of freedom.
A possible silver lining of the increasing rapidity of technological change is
that the lack of stability offers new and powerful paths of resistance. Though
established forms of domination through technology are exceedingly difficult to
change, fighting for justice in the introduction and application of new technologies
can reap significant rewards. A current front on which such resistance is taking
place is in the use of drones. Since the drone industry has not become such a
behemoth as to render all resistance moot, governments at all levels are listening
to citizens and even passing legislation limiting the use of these new
technologies.
Kahn (2010) argues that an imperative raised by our technological
environment is “technoliteracy” (p. 9). We must know about the new technology
in order to know if it is just or not, and in order to better facilitate, adopt, resist, or
avoid it. Surveillance is control, as Foucalt has argued, and today’s technology
allows a degree of surveillance unprecedented in human history. Our locations,
purchases, Internet browsing activity, communication, family status, and others
are all subject to some form of surveillance, often in real time. Algorithms are
used to process the massive amounts of data such surveillance gathers, and the
information often informs advertisements tailor-made for each of us.

49
Technoliteracy and media literacy can help us become more aware of the tools of
surveillance, and make us more aware of attempts at manipulation. These
literacies can also offer paths of resistance that might escape our awareness
otherwise.
Finally, even in arenas where a technology has become firmly established,
resistance need not cease. In the face of such an established technocratic order,
De Certeau (1980) writes: “A thousand ways of playing/ outplaying the other’s
game, that is to say, the space others have instituted, characterize the subtle,
tenacious, resistant activity of groups which, for lack of a base, must maneuver in
a network of established forces and representations” (p. 59). Instead of direct
resistance in such a situation, De Certeau argues for the use of tactics that
subvert the technocratic order from within, often without arousing suspicion. Just
as nature increasingly demands to be heard, and insists on having a say in the
face of technology, so too will the (post)human resist.

Concluding Remarks
The preceding pages are intended as a foundation from which educational
and curricular considerations will follow. I have intended to outline a conception
of posthumanism that emphasizes interconnectivity and blurred boundaries
(between humans and animals, humans and machines, minds and bodies, cells
and bodies, etc.). This view of posthumanism rejects both unlimited individual
autonomy as well as determinism, instead finding a place between these two
poles. Human agency exists and matters, but we do not possess freedom for
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freedom’s sake. Instead, our freedom must be tempered with the responsibility
that comes from our interconnections with other life systems. Posthumanism as it
is envisioned here reminds us of how we are inseparable from our bodies, and
how this embodiment ties us to the tangible earth.
The emphasis on interconnectivity in posthumanism provides a link to the
idea of the posthuman, a hybrid entity of humans and intelligent machines.
Rejecting humanist ideas of human dominion over nature and mind/body
dualism, and reflecting on the educational implications of the posthumanist tenets
above, a number of educational aims, curricular imperatives, and pedagogical
considerations arise. Prior to exploring these, however, the next chapter will
consider the teacher as a posthuman entity. Before outlining what should be
taught and how, it will be helpful to have a nuanced understanding of the teacher
today. Like other posthumans, teachers are hybrids of humans, animals and
machines, and are parts of a technocratic order. They have unique technologies
at their disposal that impact the nature and force of the messages they impart to
students. In the classroom and the school, they are part of a series of
interconnected cybernetic systems in which there is a reflexivity of influence
between teacher and system. These considerations, it is hoped, will provide
justification for the educational, curricular, and pedagogical suggestions that will
follow.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POSTHUMAN TEACHER
Just as educational goals, curricula, and pedagogy must take the
environment into account, so too must they be informed by the capabilities,
talents, and proclivities of the teacher. Where chapter one sketched out a view of
our milieu, the following pages are a consideration of the teacher within this
milieu. I argue here that the teacher today is posthuman-a merging of the human
and the intelligent machine. This chapter will consider the posthuman teacher
from a number of different angles, such as teacher as cyborg, zombie (puppet to
the machine), and animal. Also, the influence of humanism on the teaching
profession will be considered, as its legacy continues to have a significant impact
on teaching. A model, developed by cyberneticist Gregory Bateson for explaining
interactions between cultures in close proximity to one another, will be used to
shed light on the relationship between teachers and computer technologies, and
allow for some conservative predictions. A description of posthuman teachers
who are not affiliated with schools will conclude this chapter, as such teachers
stand to greatly inform the practices of schoolteachers over the coming years. It
is intended that these various ways of conceiving today’s teachers will inform the
posthumanist-guided educational aims, curricula, and pedagogy to be explored in
the final three chapters.
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Cyborg Teachers
The defining trait of the cyborg is its hybridity. When one communicates
with a cyborg, one addresses and is addressed by a mixture of human and
machine. To conceive the teacher as a cyborg is to recognize that her message
is not free of technological imperatives nor of mediation that shape her message
in important ways. Teachers are distinguished from other cyborgs chiefly by the
technology through which they converse and/or exercise control. Following
Wiener (1954), I have “classed communication and control together”. He writes,
“When I control the actions of another person, I communicate a message to him,
and although this message is in the imperative mood, the technique of
communication does not differ from that of a message of fact” (p. 16-17). This
conflation of communication and control is in some ways typified by the teacher,
whose communication is designed to impact student experience to influence
subsequent student thought and action. In this light, the cyborg teacher’s
communication machinery is also and at the same time machinery of control.
Popular conceptions of the teacher today often retain a humanistic bent.
The teacher is a human seeking the betterment of all of her human students, by
this view. Just as humanism’s focal point is the individual human, much
education theory focuses on the individual human teacher. As in the case of
humanism, theoretical focus on the teacher often ignores the technologies to
which they are attached and through which they communicate. These
technologies do more than change the nature of the conversation-they amend
the messages transmitted. In American education, teachers are compelled to
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teach state mandated curricula, but these curricula often fail to acknowledge or
account for the communication/control technologies through which the curricula
will be mediated. Recognizing the teacher as a cyborg and her message as
technologically mediated reveals different, otherwise hidden messages. Here
McLuhan’s (1964) maxim, “…the medium is the message” (p. 7) must be
acknowledged. My goal in the next few paragraphs is to, through a consideration
of the cyborg teacher’s machine parts, reveal some of these hidden messages.
The spoken word is perhaps the first technology employed by the teacher,
and remains of significant importance today. Dewey (1958) refers to language as
“the tool of tools” for its ability to facilitate the creation of other tools (Chapter 5,
para. 4). Though oral instruction does not require machinery (except insofar as
bodily organs qualify as machinery), as a medium it sends messages apart from
the “content” of the speech. Orality privileges the aural over the other senses,
and this privileging continues to inform human interactions today. In addition,
language privileges that which can be communicated through (human) language
over that which cannot. The natural world communicates with and controls us
(and we it) in other ways than through human language. Notably, the lack of
language as “sophisticated” as that of humans in animals is used as evidence of
human superiority over animals. Any lack of eloquence in humans, when
observed, is often thought to make them less human and therefore inferior. The
privileging of human language over other means of communication and, more
generally, the privileging of all human forms of communication over other means
of communication, are exhibitions of anthropocentrism.
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Clothing limits direct physical contact with the outside world, and was first
worn long after humans began to speak. Might the distaste with which people
view public physical contact be informed by our dependence on (colonization by)
the spoken word? Could our orality be linked with disdain for other senses, such
that we often seek to avoid touching or smelling other bodies in general? We
observe the marginalization of smell and touch, and of anything that cannot be
communicated through language, institutionalized in the school. School rules
generally prohibit most physical contact. Teachers are often held accountable for
the smell of their classrooms, as students and visitors generally object to any
smell at all, with the exception of a limited measure of air freshener. I personally
have witnessed a student being ejected from a public high school classroom by
his teacher because of his objectionable (due to being admittedly strong) body
odor.
McLuhan (1964) writes that the adoption of a medium constitutes
autoamputation, whereby we effectively amputate part of our body when we use
the medium (Chapter 4). The privileging of speech and language over other
forms of communication serves to disembody its users. It un-grounds us from our
tangible bodies and the tangible earth, giving the illusion that the mind is
separate from the body. The body then becomes something to be mastered, to
do the mind’s bidding, and often to go unnoticed and neglected. In the
classroom, bodies generally are fixed in space and covered in clothes (with dress
codes ensuring sufficient coverage). Bodies should not have an extreme smell,
nor should they have more than fleeting contact with other bodies, and each

55
body has a specified location depending on the time of day. Other than prison,
where does the body have less agency than in the public school?
Another machinic aspect of the cyborg teacher includes the technology of
the written word. Socrates, among the first people who taught as their chief
vocation, was wary of this new machinery and never wrote anything down. His
student Plato (Jowett trans. 1871), however, recorded some of Socrates’
objections to it, including that it “...will create forgetfulness in the learners’ souls,
because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written
characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have
discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your
disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many
things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will
generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of
wisdom without the reality” (275). Here we detect McLuhan’s autoamputation at
work again, this time taking away memory by functioning in place of memory.
Writing also serves as an example of Derrida’s (1981) pharmakon, the poison
that is its own remedy, for the written word takes our memory at the same time
as it serves as a memory aid (p. 98).
Today, the written word remains the primary medium of American
education. We find its use in textbooks, notebooks, chalkboards, PowerPoint
presentations, handouts, tests, and others. McLuhan (1964) identifies three
“typographic principles” as follows: “uniformity, continuity and lineality” (p. 14).
These principles, according to McLuhan, tend to embed themselves in societies
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that adopt the medium. As a tool of control, the written word conveys the rules
both teachers and students are to follow. In addition to being detrimental to
memory, the written word serves to further disembody the user. Its immutable
quality limits argument, and thus the interpersonal interactions that accompany
debate. Where speech requires (apart from telephones and comparable devices)
close bodily proximity of discussants, writing requires neither that the writer be in
the same place nor the same time as the reader. Where speech invites each
conversant to gaze at the other, the written word requires that one look at the text
(preferably in silent solitude). In most cases, student assessments and their
responses are both in written form. An underlying message here is that if it
cannot be written down, it is not worth knowing. From the word “scholar” (as in
learned person) we get the term scholarship, generally taken to consist of
reading, writing, and silent contemplation. Some view serious scholarship as
requiring that the body be walled off from nature and other people, and that
sensory disturbances excepting the study of the text should be minimized.
Before exploring more recent additions to the machinery of the cyborg
teacher, it is necessary to explore the present conservatism of practice within the
teaching profession. Collins and Halverson (2009) summarize Larry Cuban’s
research as follows: “…the choices available to teachers and leaders are
constrained in terms of 1) school and classroom structures, and 2) a culture of
teaching that arises in response to the stability of structures. These work
together…to restrict the range of innovations realistically open to schools” (p. 33).
Teachers, administrations, textbooks, assessments and divisions of subjects are
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pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, interlocking components that make for a stable
structure. Textbook publishers consult state curricula, and mold their products
accordingly. Teachers frequently specialize in teaching within specific content
areas, and derive authority in the classroom from their knowledge of the
textbook. For these reasons and others, textbooks, teachers, curricula and
assessments are all oriented towards strict subject area distinctions/divisions.
Similarly, the school is oriented towards dividing students by age group (as
opposed to ability level), requiring the physical presence of students in the
classroom, and teacher-led didactic instruction. Also, the reliance on textbooks
leads to a focus on memorization and recall of information, and generally
precludes training in finding or assessing the reliability and/or usefulness of
information.
Teachers often see in computers their own obsolescence. “Computers,”
Collins and Halverson (2009) note, “act to dilute the authority that teachers have
in classrooms- especially the authority over what constitutes legitimate
knowledge” (p. 41). A teacher’s traditional educational technologies can seem to
pale in comparison with computers, both in terms of entertainment value and in
learning potential. While the classroom structure, of which the teacher is part,
remains stable, students increasingly escape this structure through their
smartphones. They can tune out from the day’s lessons and focus on sharing
with their peers through social networking applications, playing games, or
pursuing other interests. Also, the teacher feels threatened at the prospect of
losing her monopoly on knowledge, as students have access to much of her
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knowledge and more at their fingertips. As Collins and Halverson put it, “To the
degree that students are getting their knowledge from computer learning
environments rather than from the teacher, it takes away from the respect and
authority that teachers would gain from sharing their expertise with students” (p.
41). As such, teachers frequently enforce rules restricting cell phone and
computer use during class.
Though networked computers have been the source of immeasurable
changes in industry and private life, their incorporation by the cyborg teacher has
occurred chiefly by molding the new technology to fit in the place of the old.
Thus, the computer replaces the teacher’s grade book, roster, calendar, lesson
book, and others. Used with projector, screen, and the dreaded PowerPoint, the
computer replaces the chalk board as a means of displaying text. Presently,
schools are beginning to adopt electronic personal response devices for students
to use to enter answers on quizzes and tests, replacing pencil and paper, and/or
Scantron answer sheets. In all of these cases, though, the computer is used to
replace an existing function. The abundance of additional functionalities offered
by computers are generally disregarded or discouraged, as they often threaten
the entrenched stability of the classroom structure. The cyborg teacher typically
uses advanced teaching prostheses only when they are molded to resemble and
function like the old. As a result, a time traveler from fifty years ago would
recognize little difference in the workings of the typical classroom. Instead of a
teacher writing on the board, they are seen writing on a pad that is displayed on
a screen. What Friere (1970) termed the banking model remains in place, in
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which, “the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students
patiently receive, memorize, and repeat” (p. 58).
Like all (post)humans, teachers are cyborgs. Though the machine
appendages of cyborg teachers are generally not (yet) surgically attached to the
teacher’s body, flesh and machine are nonetheless firmly attached. The teacher
positions herself near the board, or else has an electronic device in hand for
communicating with the computer/projector/screen. She spends long hours at the
computer grading assignments, entering grades, and composing lessons and
assessments. She is a constituent part of the school building, a highly complex
machine in its own right. State-mandated curricula and increased teacher
accountability measures function to make her perform like a cog in a machine.
Opportunities for creativity are severely hampered in this context.
Karl Polanyi (1944) distinguishes between “good” and “bad” freedoms, of
which the latter includes the freedom to harm others, for example (p. 262). The
cyborg teacher is part of a machine that limits many of her good freedoms. Her
ability to craft curricula is hampered by state mandated curricula and
accountability measures. She has little freedom to develop certain vital skills like
Gee’s (2013) mining skills (which includes the ability to locate relevant
information in cyberspace) or the skill of self–directed learning. At the same time,
she possesses the bad freedom to pass on information from the textbook in a
didactic manner, and without encroaching on other subject areas. Her constituent
technologies, like all technologies, come with what Donald Norman (1988) refers
to as affordances, defined as “relationship[s] between the properties of an object
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and the capabilities of the agent that determine just how the object could possibly
be used” (p. 11). The affordances of the machinery attached to the cyborg
teacher allow for certain behaviors while restricting other behaviors. These
affordances are evidence that technology in itself is not neutral. A combination of
stability in classroom structures and development of educational technology by
powerful interests work together to shape education and influence teacher action.
The tools teachers use impart information to students aside from the “content” of
the lesson. A central problem of many common teacher technologies is that they
greatly diminish the range of acceptable student responses. As with the historical
use of technology in encountering the natural world, these tools permit the
teacher to speak without hearing, and to take without giving. The PowerPoint,
projector, computer, traditional desk alignment, immutable textbook information,
and others all facilitate a one-way flow of information.
Asked to draw a picture of a teacher, how would you proceed? A sketch of
a person in front of a chalkboard could quickly be identified as depicting a
teacher, much as a person on a tractor would be identified as a farmer or a
person in a police car a policeman or a crustacean in a shell a hermit crab. All
are combinations of the animate and inanimate, living and non-living. The
popular conception of the teacher as autonomous human has recently led to
teachers being blamed for the country’s educational troubles. This makes about
as much sense as blaming farmers for a lackluster harvest. Teachers and
farmers do what they are able with the technologies at their disposal. In both
cases, it should be noted, the technologies can damage the environments in
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which they’re used. Looking at the technologies that constitute (and thus are
employed by) the cyborg teacher, affordances are revealed that suggest room for
critique and revision. This path will surely be more fruitful than simply blaming
teachers.

A Legacy of Humanism in the Teaching Profession

“But when a man's pulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a feast
of reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to rest, and
has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his reason,
which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and
heat,—the visions which he has on his bed are least irregular and
abnormal. Even in good men there is such an irregular wild-beast nature,
which peers out in sleep” (Plato, Republic, Book IX, para. 1).

Humanism advocates the betterment of humanity, but this betterment is
often assumed to occur in opposition to nature. Humans are better than nature
by virtue of the ability to rule nature, this line of thinking goes. However, as
Socrates notes, the beast is always within us, peering out. Vigilance and effort
are required, and so is education, for through these we can sup on Socrates’
“feast of reason”. Many teachers subscribe to this general humanist notion of a
human/nature dichotomy. Believing their role to include tamping down natural
instincts and desires, they take on the task of cultivating humans. As such,
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teachers can serve to perpetuate and strengthen the human/nature dichotomy (to
the detriment of society), insofar as students adopt this perspective. Teachers
take on this task in a number of ways, many of which are covert (occasionally
even to the teacher). Students who do not fit the Eurocentric normative ideal of
the human, which is to say those that are not white and/or of European descent,
can appear to their teachers as being more savage and less human than their
white peers, and thus more in need of “correction”. Such marginalized students
find themselves punished more often and more severely for their behavior,
appearance, and speech.
In addition to marginalization on the basis of race and/or sex, teachers
and schools marginalize the body in general. This can be viewed in the
requirement that students remain seated indoors for most of the day, that they
only eat at approved times, and that they go long periods without conversing with
others. Displays or messages of a sexual nature are generally forbidden, as are
instances of physical conflict. During the school day the teacher and student
bodies are generally allowed only fleeting contact with the world outside of the
school building, and sometimes none at all. All of these policies conflict with the
general needs of the body, and can and do have negative effects. Barton and
Pretty (2010) have found that exposure to green environments, especially those
near bodies of water, improves both self-esteem and mood. Sunshine also
entails health benefits, including facilitating the production of vitamin D. The body
was not evolved to sit quietly and immobile in a technologically-constructed
environment for the better part of the day. More generally, placing someone in a
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technology-constructed environment helps to strengthen and perpetuate a
human/nature dichotomy. People fear what they do not know, and the natural
world remains a stranger to so many, young and old.

Teacher Embodiment And Animality
Teachers are concerned with bodies. First, they are concerned with their
own, which undergo intense scrutiny. As an oppressed group, students use what
tools of resistance they have at their disposal, including critiquing teachers’
appearances. Such scrutiny is directly proportional to the degree to which
lessons are teacher-centered. Judith Butler (1993) writes of a “heterosexual
matrix” of power that establishes the “she” through, “an exclusive position as
penetrated” (p. 50). Subjected to the role of the penetrated, the female teacher
(along with other females in society) faces more penetrative critique in regards to
bodily appearance, including attire, hair, makeup, weight, etc. The standard for
what attire is appropriate for female teachers is less clear than it is for males,
mirroring society in general. Many teachers (regardless of gender) dress in as
nondescript a manner as possible, so as to avoid becoming a topic of
conversation and to promote focus on the lesson. Any abnormality in appearance
not related to attire is similarly at risk of student critique, including those over
which the teacher has no control. Some teachers take shelter behind a podium to
hide their bodies. An undersung benefit of the teaching profession is the ability (if
not the requirement) of teachers to be on their feet for most of the day. In this
manner teachers are largely able to avoid the negative health effects of
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remaining seated for long periods. Often, the needs of the teacher’s body are
met in areas separately from those of the students. Faculty typically have their
own restrooms and eating areas. This separation seems to exist for little other
reason than to enforce a hierarchy in which teachers are the power holders.
Teacher restrooms are usually nicer, more private and cleaner, and the teacher’s
lounge often includes amenities not available to students in the cafeteria. For the
same reason that teachers are conscious of their appearances, they also police
their movements. The way one’s body moves or doesn’t move can influence the
message transmitted, apart from the message’s content. Great teachers, and
great communicators, use their body language to enforce their words.
More than in most professions, animality in teachers is repressed or
hidden from view. The teacher is expected to be the human ideal toward which
the “less human” students aspire. Teachers are often complicit participants in this
narrative, reproaching students for animalistic displays, which is to say actions
resulting from natural bodily desires. These might include bodily movements,
“inappropriate” vocalizations, consuming food, bodily contact and others. It is
noteworthy that the presence of non-human animals in the classroom is generally
forbidden. Any expression of a sexual nature by students or teachers is
unacceptable in the classroom. As the teacher enforces these restrictions on
animality, it is no wonder that she must serve as a model for appropriate
behavior. Penalties for teachers who do not sufficiently meet the humanist ideal
are often more severe than for students. A single uncouth outburst by a teacher
could result in dismissal. To be more human and less bestial in this context
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seems to be synonymous with being more machine-like. Teachers are part of the
machine and are expected to function as such.
Teachers are concerned with student bodies in a number of ways. As
Foucault (1975) observes, “The body now serves as an instrument or
intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in
order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as
property. The body…is caught up in a system of constraints and privations,
obligations and prohibitions. Physical pain…is no longer the constituent element
of the penalty. From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has
become an economy of suspended rights” (p. 11). With corporal punishment a
distant memory, Foucault’s economy of suspended rights is as much a part of
today’s schools as it is to our prisons. Attendance must be taken every day, and
all bodies accounted for. Teachers have control, which they frequently exercise,
over where students should locate their bodies. Seats may be assigned, or a
troublesome student could be asked to change desks. Student clothing must
adhere to dress code, and teachers thus often critique student attire. The teacher
may feel threatened, in awe of, attracted to, or repulsed by students’ bodies.
However, the teacher generally is not in a position to acknowledge in any way
how any student’s body makes her feel. At the same time, teachers are in a
position to tend to the bodies of students in a variety of ways. They provide
Band-Aids, hand sanitizer, and Kleenex. They are the first to administer aid in the
event of an injury, and at their discretion can send students to the nurse. They
can grant permission for students to obtain water from the fountain. In some
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schools, teachers can take their classes outdoors, though generally students
must stay together and on school grounds. Teachers typically have some
position with regards to food in the classroom, whether they permit it, permit it
with qualifications, or don’t permit it. Many teachers offer food as a reward or
incentive.
Thus, the teacher is in a precarious position with regards to student
bodies. In some ways these bodies are to be fastidiously ignored while in others
they are to be precisely monitored, controlled and attended to. Such control is
never administered through physical force, but through structural properties of
the educational system itself a la Bentham’s panopticon. The teacher’s body is
subject to panoptic control as well, through mechanisms such as unannounced
and graded observations by administrators, administrator walkthroughs, grade
book inspections, long halls (from which administrators can observe multiple
classrooms), and others.

Bad Freedoms
The machinery of the school facilitates action by teachers that is harmful
to other life systems, including their students. A number of “bad freedoms” are
granted through the technological aspect of the posthuman teacher. Teachers
are often free (and usually bound) to critique student clothing, according to dress
codes that can be sexist. They are free to restrict student movement and speech
beyond a morally acceptable level. They are free to teach via lecture, textbook,
pencil, and paper, but often find their freedom limited to teach via apprenticeship
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and/or more hands-on activities. They are free to teach to the test (and are often
even encouraged to do so) but often find their freedom to teach for greater depth
of understanding limited. A long list of “standards” must all be “covered” before
year-end testing.
Areas of teacher expertise often go untapped and unnoticed in this school
machine of which they are constituent parts. Even when teachers are able to tap
into areas of passion during instructional time, these moments are often fleeting.
A skilled poet works as an English teacher, but can only devote a small portion of
her instructional day to poetry. A teacher with an encyclopedic knowledge of and
unparalleled passion for the Civil War can spend no more than a week on the
topic. An economics teacher who has a nuanced understanding of the events
leading up to the Great Recession finds no place in the curriculum to share this
knowledge. The technology of the posthuman teacher is oriented towards
breadth of instructional content rather than depth. I continue to be surprised at
the skills and knowledge of teachers that schools manage to hide or suppress. A
co-worker gives me a painting as a present and I suddenly realize her talent. I
discover the depth of knowledge a peer has on a topic after a chance
conversation. Without some of the technology, structures, and machinery of the
school, the teacher can be likened to a beautiful tree. In the classroom, however,
the tree has been converted into lumber, molded into means towards ends which
are not necessarily her own, and diminishing both her beauty and her ability to
function as a beneficial component of the life systems to which she is connected.
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A diatribe against all teacher and school technologies is not the intent of
this exploration. Rather, the goal is to outline the dominant teaching and school
technologies, and describe their affordances. Some of these technologies are
unambiguously immoral, such as sexist dress codes. Others are not necessarily
problematic in themselves, but can be used in harmful ways. The combination of
textbook, pencil, paper, board, desk, and lectern can be used for ill or for good. In
excess these technologies serve to pull students away from the natural world. On
the other hand, these technologies can tap into the power of language and the
written word as a means to convey and record information.
Posthuman teachers face a number of challenges. They must question
and take responsibility for the technologies they use, with regards to the effects
these technologies have on students and the outside world. Also, they must
question and take some measure of responsibility for the technologies to which
they are subjected and which impact their actions. They might protest the sexist
student dress code, resist its implementation, and/or neglect to enforce it. Debate
and the exploration of opposing views can accompany the canonical text. As a
posthuman part of the larger school entity, the teacher is not without influence.
Like all posthumans, they must be aware of the effects of their technology use on
other life systems, and exercise restraint when such usage has harmful effects.

Zombie Teachers
Technology can take the place of conscious deliberation as well as
physical activity. Say I decide to make a cup of tea, so I step out to gather wood,
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build a fire, and set the kettle over it. I am conscious, at different points, and at
varying degrees, of the source of the heat, maintaining the heat, and minding the
kettle. If I use an electric stove, I am not conscious of the source of the heat nor
of maintaining it. The machine applies a constant amount of heat without my
attention. All I have to do is mind the kettle until the water boils. Now suppose I
use a microwave. In this case I run water into my cup and place it in the
microwave for a minute, at which point it will be boiling. In this circumstance I am
least conscious of my actions. The microwave is doing things I don’t really
understand or give much thought to. I don’t even have to keep track of the time,
as the microwave will turn off automatically and inform me when it does so.
Perhaps during the minute that the cup sits in the microwave, I play a game on
my cell phone. Focused intently on my game, I become less conscious of my
environment. I look a bit like a zombie, mouth hanging open. As Haraway (1991)
writes, “Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert”
(p. 86).
Teacher technologies can have analogous effects. The textbook and
PowerPoint make me less conscious of the words I use, as the students and I
merely have to read what is written. My classroom makes me less conscious of
the outside world. Multiple-choice assessments make me less conscious of forms
of understanding that cannot be measured with such assessments. Zombie
teachers are those who become subsumed in educational technologies to the
extent that they are effectively more machine than human. They occupy the
students with handouts and worksheets, and invariably teach to the test. They
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teach the same content every year, in the same way, using the same
technologies. They have ready answers to most questions and enforce school
rules without question. They generally fail to show signs of life until they have left
the school. Finally, like other zombies, zombie teachers can have a deleterious
effect on the brains of those with whom they come in contact. The zombie
teacher is closer to the machine end of the animal-machine spectrum, and like
Obi Wan Kenobi says of Darth Vader, “He’s more machine now than man,
twisted and evil” (Return of the Jedi, 1986).

A Cybernetic View of the Teacher
Posthumanism and cybernetics could help shed light on the nature of the
interaction between teachers and technology, as well as offer paths towards
equilibrium between the systems. Gregory Bateson (1972) notes that when two
cultures make sustained contact, this “must theoretically result in one or the other
of the following patterns:
(a) the complete fusion of the originally different groups
(b) the elimination of one or both groups
(c) the persistence of both groups in dynamic equilibrium within one major
community” (p. 65).
Though he declines to provide specific examples, clear instances of each pattern
exist today. The cultures of Americans of European descent have to a great
extent fused in the manner of pattern “a”, as members of these groups today are
more likely to identify as “white” than as Irish, German, etc. The genocide of
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Native Americans in the New World is a clear example of pattern “b”. Switzerland
makes for a good example of pattern “c”, as a number of major linguistic and
cultural groups, including speakers of Italian, French, and German, live together
in homeostasis (more or less) as one nation while retaining their distinct cultural
and linguistic characteristics. While clear examples of each pattern can be
identified, it must also be said that these examples are few. Equilibrium is not a
state in which forms become permanently locked in upon reaching it. Instead, it is
a condition that all systems must eventually move towards, after having been
thrown into disequilibria. Upon reaching equilibrium, forces (external or internal)
will eventually nudge a system into disequilibrium, from which it will eventually
work its way back to (a possibly new and different) homeostasis. Bateson’s three
patterns, then, are snapshots in time rather than final endpoints.
These patterns can be glimpsed not just at the meetings of cultures, but
also at the meeting of humans and technology. Particular jobs can be viewed as
resembling or moving towards one of Bateson’s patterns. Structural
unemployment frequently occurs as a result of some new technology rendering
another job obsolete. This resembles pattern “b” and there are countless
examples of people whose jobs have been eliminated, including blacksmiths,
elevator operators, typewriter repairmen, etc. Pattern “c” (persistence of both
groups in dynamic equilibrium) might be glimpsed in the hairstylist profession, in
which computers are used chiefly in billing and scheduling appointments, while
the hairstylist himself does not find his job threatened, as the computer remains
peripheral to the service rendered (at least as of this writing). Today soldiers
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seem headed for either pattern “a” or “b”. Already, soldiers frequently seem
joined to their technologies in cyborgian ways, what with helmet mounted
electronic displays, speakers, microphones, “smart” weapons and vehicles, etc.
However, unmanned aerial vehicles, aka drones, are taking the place of
conventionally piloted military aircraft, and ground vehicles are getting similar
treatment.
As with other professions, teachers and educational technologies can be
fruitfully examined through the framework of Bateson’s patterns. This is partly
because technological systems are like cultural groups and other life systems in
that they can change adaptively on the basis of feedback. Chalkboard, textbook,
desk, classroom and teacher can be said (at least until recently) to fit Bateson’s
pattern “c” in which groups persist in dynamic equilibrium with one another. Each
element has a distinct and essential function, and no one element is getting
squeezed out by the others. Collins and Halverson (2009) note, “Innovations that
threaten the ways that curricula govern the yearly teaching plan or the tacit
agreements between teachers and students in classrooms face a long, uphill
battle for implementation. This is because when complex systems are in
equilibrium, changing one part of the system usually results in other parts
pushing back to restore the initial balance” (p. 34). When new technologies seek
entrance into this established community, they are frequently denied, or else
admitted but molded in the shape of the technologies they replace. For several
decades, the popular response by educators to the intrusion of computers has
been to use them merely as substitutes for the existing technologies, such that
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computer + projector replaces chalkboard, and web page replaces textbook.
When technologies are assimilated into classrooms in this way, teacher and
student roles remain unchanged.
While the prevalent instructional system has managed to maintain an
equilibrium resembling pattern “c” for many years, computers continue to pose
new threats. Unable to change the educational system, computers went on to
change the world instead, as well as the humans in it. Hayles (1999) writes that
technology, “…has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can
no longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject” (prologue, para.
6). The meeting of humans and intelligent machines has by this view resulted in
a fusion as described in Bateson’s pattern “a” (complete fusion), and the birth of
the posthuman. While the established ways of teaching children may have once
“worked” in terms of the needs of society in the past, their efficacy today is
steadily declining in a world that has moved on. The rise of intelligent machines
seems to have brought the established system of education into disequilibrium,
and it remains unclear where these changes will take us. Bateson (1972) writes,
“The laws of gravity cannot conveniently be studied by observation of houses
collapsing in an earthquake” (p. 65). Likewise, making sense of which new
equilibrium education is headed towards, and understanding the degree to which
we can influence this course, is made difficult by the speed of the changes taking
place. We can, however, attempt to sketch out an outcome fitting each of
Bateson’s patterns from above. I believe that upon hypothetical exploration of
each of Bateson’s patterns as a potential eventuality, we can identify scenarios
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that are more likely, and also possibly realize opportunities for influencing the
changes presently occurring.
Teachers are frequently fearful of the disequilibria resultant from the
Computer Revolution. Part of this fear lies in the uncertainty regarding where the
teaching profession is headed. Some teachers fear an outcome resembling
pattern “a”, in which teachers and computers will undergo what Bateson calls
“complete fusion”. Such a result would change what it means to be a teacher, as
the cyborg thinks, acts, and perceives the world differently than the human.
Alternately, teachers may also fear an outcome along the lines of pattern “b” in
which computers make the teacher’s job obsolete, like so many others of late.
Already, with sufficient will and a computer, one can learn nearly anything without
the benefit of direct interaction with a human teacher. Also, as we increasingly
turn to the web for things like information and calculation, the need to learn these
things “in one’s head” seems lessened. If one always has a calculator at their
side, why learn multiplication tables? If one has access to Wikipedia, why
memorize names and dates from history? Teachers increasingly see the
perceived, if not actual, value of their services on the decline. What’s worse, as
the world continues to change around us and the educational system remains
woefully static, new educational imperatives often go unaddressed. The system
often constrains teachers to teach the same old things in the same old ways.
While they fear the prospect of patterns “a” and “b”, some teachers may
hope for pattern “c”, in which teacher and technology co-exist and perform clearly
delineated and separate roles. This, after all, is the pattern encountered by most
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teachers presently, and the one with which many are most comfortable. In this
pattern the teacher’s role remains essentially unchanged by the computer
revolution. This pattern can be glimpsed in how teachers have chosen to bring
computers in the classroom. Computers are used by many teachers primarily as
replacements for existing technologies, while the unique affordances of them
often go ignored. For example, the computer comes to replace the grade book
and the roster, and PowerPoint software and projectors allow the computer to
replace the chalkboard. The overall experience of the lesson, however, remains
much the same, with didactic instruction and text on a flat surface at the front of
the room, etc. As Collins and Halverson (2009) note, “Technology makes life
more difficult for teachers. It requires new skills that teachers often have not
learned in their professional development. Further, the lockstep model of most
classrooms undercuts the power of the new technologies to individualize
learning” (p. 6). Of Bateson’s patterns, “c” seems to be the most unlikely end
result, however. There are so few Switzerlands out there, so few occasions
where multiple systems form one community and yet remain distinct from one
another. That teachers are already being replaced by computers gives pattern “b”
some credence, and the fact that we are all increasingly resembling cyborgs (as
outlined in chapter 1) makes pattern “a” a possibility as well.
The urge of many teachers to remain in pattern “c” (in which each group
remains distinct from the other) potentially reflects a rejection of the reality of
impermanence, as well as a humanistic urge to retain individual human
autonomy. Further, direct resistance to present technologies (for example
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attempting to keep computers out of education) is not likely to yield success.
Perhaps, then, teachers should strive for pattern “a”, fusion. Those teachers who
best understand and make use of the affordances of computers are the most
likely to retain their jobs and provide meaningful education to their students. The
cyborg is not wholly human, but neither is it wholly machine. As a stable entity, it
does not seek the destruction of either its machine nor its biological elements. In
many ways and like much of the rest of society, teachers are already posthuman.
We just need to get past the denial stage.

Posthuman Teachers Outside of the Classroom
My wife Kirstin is one of those people who always has a project going,
generally of the gardening or home remodeling sort. She spends most of her
discretionary time engaged in these hobbies. She uses her cell phone frequently
during these projects, through which she acts alternatingly as teacher and
learner. She checks apps like Pinterest for ideas for the garden, and posts
pictures of her own completed work. Upon deciding to re-tile the kitchen floor,
instructional videos on YouTube were consulted. When she has a question for
which she cannot locate an answer, she sometimes posts her query in a
Facebook group tailored to the activity in which she is engaged. Others consult
her posts for ideas and guidance, and sometimes ask her questions directly.
Kirstin is another iteration of the posthuman teacher, unique among those
referenced thus far in that she does not work in a school. This version of the
teacher is also unique in that she is alternatingly (if not simultaneously) teacher
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and learner. Her constituent technologies enable her to teach and be taught by
countless numbers of people from her affinity spaces. As Gee (2013) outlines in
“The Anti Education Era”, affinity spaces like Pinterest, YouTube, Facebook
groups and others are designated areas (often but not always in cyberspace) that
allow people with some specific shared affinity to voluntarily exchange
knowledge regarding it. These spaces inform what it means to be posthuman.
Gee writes that, “the space itself [is] a form of emergent intelligence. The sum is
more than its parts; the collective is smarter than the smartest person in it” (Ch
20, para 13). In these spaces intelligence is less individual than it is collective.
The focus is on what is produced, rather than who is producing it.
Both Kirstin’s teaching and learning frequently seem superior to that
typically available in school. She teaches those who voluntarily come to her for
knowledge, and who are usually admirers of her work specifically. As such,
“discipline problems” are exceedingly rare. Failure, rather than being a signal of
inferiority, is a vital part of the learning process. When failure occurs, it functions
as vital feedback guiding future work. Failure in this context is effectively a coteacher. Kirstin expects to fail in the early stages of complicated projects, and
makes a point to try to limit the degree to which future failure will be a setback to
the project as a whole. Installing lights in panels, she picks the smallest, least
expensive panel first, so that if she damages it the replacement cost will be
lower.
Active in her affinity spaces, Kirstin frequently spends nontrivial amounts
of time documenting the phases of her work via text, images, and video. She is
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generally thrilled to receive and answer questions. Sharing knowledge regarding
her hobbies seems to bring her pleasure comparable to that of engaging in those
hobbies directly. She is a teacher who doesn’t grade. Or, rather, it might be more
apt to acknowledge that while she grades others’ work, at the same time
everyone grades each other. In these spaces, grading consists of some marker
of respect such as “likes”, gaining or losing followers, “upvotes” or “downvotes”,
etc.
In contrast with the rigidly fixed state-mandated curricula of schools,
affinity space curricula are always in flux. The unorthodox is never off the table
but is always poking its way in to the conversation, and sometimes leading to
reassessment, readjustment, and incorporation. At the same time, the
established “tried and true” ways are to some extent institutionalized. Like
established scientific theories, they require much documentation and prolonged
effort to dethrone. These curricula are vibrant, beautiful living things, changing in
appearance through space and time, and beckoning to those who might hear
their calls. The typical school curriculum, in contrast, is a dead thing chained to
the student, weighing them down.
In his Analects, Confucius (Waley trans. 1938) writes, “I do not open up
the truth to one who is not eager to get knowledge, nor help out any one who is
not anxious to explain himself. When I have presented one corner of a subject to
any one, and he cannot from it learn the other three, I do not repeat my lesson”
(Book 7, Chapter 8). School teachers generally must abide by a near-opposite of
those sentiments. As teacher evaluations are increasingly tied to student
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performance on standardized tests, teachers are often compelled to bring all four
“corners” of a subject to the students. Student eagerness to obtain knowledge in
the classroom context is a rarity, at least when said knowledge is tied to state
curricula. In contrast, the posthuman teacher of the affinity space seems to
occupy something of a middle ground between these two extremes. Affinity
space members, like Confucius, do not force their knowledge on anyone, but
share with those who seek them out. Unlike Confucius, however, these
posthuman teachers are not always unwilling to repeat their lessons. Indeed,
they might bring all four corners to the eager student.
Pedagogy in affinity spaces is peculiar. It seems impossible to pinpoint
precisely where education occurs in these contexts. The learner is taught
alternatingly by peers (with an emphasis on the plural), herself, her tools, her
environment and the task, making this a distributed pedagogy. The form of this
pedagogy changes with each instantiation, and the degree to which each
element contributes also varies. Finding the task itself to be a poor teacher, the
learner might frequently consult her affinity groups for aid. But in another case,
the reverse could be just as true. The method of this pedagogy seems always to
be determined by the learner herself, who disregards instruction that she does
not deem useful. At all times the learner runs the risk of failure as a result of the
pedagogical decisions she has made. Choices regarding the task itself (such as
its difficulty, the learner’s aptitude for the task, etc.), the peers from whom she
seeks knowledge, and the degree to which she listens to her own instincts all
inform the effectiveness of this pedagogy.
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Conclusions
The humanist emphasis on the individual seems more and more
misguided in respect to the teacher, as teachers become increasingly joined to
computer technologies. Indeed, individuals, it should be clear, only make up part
of an educational environment, and the entire environment functions as the
teacher. This is not to say that the teacher is no longer an important part of this
environment, but that educational considerations, as Dewey has emphasized,
must take the environment into account. Technology can serve as an amplifier
for intentions, both for teachers and learners, but intentions and passion are still
essential to education as well. The zombie teacher all too often fosters zombie
students. Finally, the rise of computer mediated teaching and learning outside of
the school setting warrants close consideration, as motivated teacher-learners
increasingly gather in virtual affinity spaces for their education. The posthuman
teachers of these spaces represent an ideal towards which school teachers
might aspire.
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CHAPTER 3
AIMS OF A POSTHUMAN EDUCATION
Having put forth a conception of posthumanism and examined the
posthuman teacher, this chapter is an effort to explore how posthumanism might
inform the aims of education today. Prior to this, however, will be an overview of
John Dewey’s humanist leanings, and how they informed his conception of the
proper aims of education. Dewey, a prominent humanist, is also one of the titans
of the philosophy of education. It is hoped that by getting a sense of how his
humanism influenced his thoughts on education, we can then contrast his
humanist education with a proposed posthumanist education. Following this
analysis of Dewey’s work, the idea of technology as “blinders” will be proposed
and explored. Technology frequently blinds us from awareness of the effects of
our taking, production, and waste. We see what we can take using technology,
but not what we (or our children) must eventually give. The two topics explored
thus far, humanism and technology use, will inform the posthuman educational
goals to follow. It will be proposed that in an unnatural environment, or an
environment for which we are not evolutionarily predisposed, “unnatural” actions
(actions that run counter to our evolutionary programming) are necessary to
restore our bodies and other life systems to equilibrium. We are evolutionarily
programmed to consume massive amounts of high sugar and high fat foods
when they become available to us, but we must learn to reject this programming
when faced with constant access to such foods. Similarly, learning to live in
homeostasis with the life systems to which we are connected requires that we
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learn restraint in the use of our tools, a restraint towards which we are not
naturally disposed. This imperative of restraint is accompanied by a need for
education, because we each must learn to act counter to our instincts.
From the premise that “unnatural action in response to an unnatural
environment can restore natural equilibrium”, three educational goals arise. First,
education should be oriented towards engendering lifelong learners. As our
technological environment is rapidly changing, our ability to exercise responsible
agency within it depends on our understanding of it. Also, as automation and
computerization continue to encroach on traditional careers, many will find it
necessary to (continually) learn new skills, even late in life. In addition to seeking
to foster lifelong learning, a posthuman education seeks the goal of increasing
awareness with regards to the impacts of technology use. Because of
technology’s blinders, it is imperative for education to illustrate how our
technology use, and the technology use we benefit from, impacts the life systems
to which we are connected. A third and final educational goal is that of
habituating learners to exercise restraint in their technology use. Once they are
aware of a harmful impact certain technology use is having on other life systems,
people should seek to restrain such usage, either through abstention or seeking
alternative, less harmful means to the ends in question. These posthumanist
educational goals, lifelong learning, awareness, and restraint, will in the closing
chapters serve as the guiding principles behind proposed posthuman
pedagogical methods and curricula.
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Dewey Re-grounded Philosophy
The great American philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey
was an avowed humanist who helped popularize the movement in the 1900’s by,
among other things, writing the essay “What Humanism Means to Me”, and
signing the first Humanist Manifesto. Humanist ideals permeate his writings, both
on education and in his other work. As this author hopes to explore the
implications for posthumanism on education, curriculum and teachers, a review
of humanism in Dewey’s work could be enlightening. This, it is hoped, will
illustrate points both of convergence and divergence between humanism and
posthumanism, and at the same time will help to clarify the outlines of each.
Further, a close study of humanism reveals that it was a necessary predecessor
to posthumanism, and further, that posthumanism is in some ways an extension
of humanist ideals. Also, let us not forget that humanism has recently provided
leverage in the fight for social justice, and if only for this reason should not be
rejected wholesale.
More than many philosophers, Dewey neglected the consideration of
metaphysics and epistemology in his work. For him, philosophy was about
human interaction, the (tangible) natural world, and the betterment of humanity.
He writes, “The task of future philosophy is to clarify men’s ideas as to the social
and moral strifes of their own day. Its aim is to become, so far as is humanly
possible, an organ for dealing with these conflicts…” (1920, p. 26). He lamented
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that, “direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties is left to literature and
politics” rather than philosophy (1917, p. 4). He sought to bring philosophy down
to earth, to humans and their concerns. For example, Dewey wrote at length on
the topic of democracy, his treatment of which culminated in what is perhaps his
greatest work, “Democracy and Education”.
Posthumanist theorist Timothy Morton’s argument for the importance of
“re-grounding” the human in the earth finds a fine ally in Dewey, for in Dewey’s
work one finds a consistent merging of mind with body and body with earth. His
writings on education emphasize the importance of the environment in learning.
The typical classroom, rows of desks shut off from the world, was far from the
ideal learning environment for Dewey. His utopian school has gardens, libraries,
laboratories, museums, open space and workshops in ample measure, and such
places serve as the primary locus for education (1933). Learning through the
actual practice of useful occupations was advocated in place of book learning.
He writes, “…the central problem of an education based upon experience is to
select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in
subsequent experiences” (1938, Chapter 2, para. 4). Experience, for Dewey,
allows the learner to peer into nature. His ideal teacher is connected with the
community and cognizant of the issues of the day. Opposed to teaching solely
via canonical texts, he argues, “the mistake of making the records and remains of
the past the main material of education is that it cuts the vital connection of
present and past, and tends to make the past a rival of the present and the
present a more or less futile imitation of the past” (1916, p. 61). Instead, he
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believed educators should strive to make the past relevant by tying it to the living
present, to inform the actions that will impact the future. Issues of present
concern thus must be consulted along with the canon.

Dewey, Distinctions And Synthesis
Why might distinction sometimes be necessary? Why do we desire it so?
There is often a clear progression from distinction to choice and from choice to
action. Distinctions allow us to decide and to get things done. Mental distinctions
are sometimes a matter of life or death insofar as they lead to decisions: here or
there, poisonous or non-poisonous. The corpus of human knowledge is in large
part composed of distinctions. Taxonomy and chemistry, for just two examples,
are largely occupied with matters of distinction. The ability to distinguish is a
prerequisite for morality; otherwise there would be no way to discern right from
wrong. Language provides the ability to communicate distinctions, and also
reveals a reflexivity between distinction and action. Just as distinction informs
action, so action informs distinction. On the learning of language, Dewey (1916)
writes, “The sound h-a-t would remain as meaningless as a sound in Choctaw, a
seemingly inarticulate grunt, if it were not uttered in connection with an action
which is participated in by a number of people” (p. 12). We see the influence of
action on distinction in other ways as well. I must sometimes taste different
flavors of ice cream to distinguish between them, for example.
Despite the affordances of distinction, and in a rather posthumanist
fashion, Dewey regularly seeks to problematize distinctions. At his most broad he

86
writes, “Distinction is genuine and for some purpose necessary. But it is not a
distinction of kinds or degrees of reality. Space here is joined to space there, and
events then are joined to events now; the reality is as much in the joining as in
the distinction” (1925, Chapter 3, para. 41). Dewey viewed the very purpose of
education as being the merging of the child with the social consciousness,
removing the distinctions that keep them apart. Also, he argued at various times
against divisions of subject matter from social context, of school from community,
of disciplines from each other, of social groups and classes from each other, and
more. Of women he writes, “Think of them as human individuals for a while,
dropping out the sex qualification, and you won’t be so sure of some of your
generalizations about what they should and shouldn’t do” (Boydston, 1975, p.
446). Gender and class distinctions, he recognizes, have been the impetus for
discrimination and oppression. Dewey was an advocate of internationalism, and
saw doctrines of national sovereignty as impediments to this goal.
Some of Dewey’s greatest works involve detailed consideration of two
opposing camps, along with his recognizing the necessary qualities each party
brings to the table, and finding a middle ground. In many ways this resembles
and was a precursor to Derrida’s deconstruction. This tactic was used to great
effect in Experience and Education in which he argues for the necessity of a
mixture of traditional and progressive educational methods. While traditional
education focuses too exclusively on the past, progressive education can err by
ignoring the past completely. Writing of progressive education, but using words
that might also apply to posthumanism, he notes, “There is always the danger in
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a new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would
supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and
constructively” (1938, Chapter 1, para. 7).

Dewey, Freedom And Technology
As with the need to balance education between matters of past and future,
Dewey sought a middle ground between individual freedom and social control.
We all feel some measure of social constraint on our behavior, and yet many of
us still feel free. Children at recess voluntarily give up some freedom to engage
in joint activities, for as Dewey (1938) notes, “Without rules there is no game”
(Chapter 4, para. 4). Freedom is not something to be had in any absolute sense,
and the restriction of it is not necessarily bad. One might, for example, willingly
relinquish certain freedoms for the greater good of society. Dewey is worth
quoting at length here:

“The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of
intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgment
exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worth while. The
commonest mistake made about freedom is, I think, to identify it with
freedom of movement, or with the external or physical side of activity.
Now, this external and physical side of activity cannot be separated from
the internal side of activity; from freedom of thought, desire, and purpose.
The limitation that was put upon outward action by the fixed arrangements
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of the typical traditional schoolroom, with its fixed rows of desks and its
military regimen of pupils who were permitted to move only at certain fixed
signals, put a great restriction upon intellectual and moral freedom.
Straitjacket and chain-gang procedures had to be done away with if there
was to be a chance for growth of individuals in the intellectual springs of
freedom without which there is no assurance of genuine and continued
normal growth. But the fact still remains that an increased measure of
freedom of outer movement is a means, not an end” (1938, Chapter 5,
para. 1).

When people use the word “cost”, it is generally understood to mean cost
in terms of dollars. Cost has become shorthand for the longer, more specific
phrase, because society accept money’s role as a standard of value. Similarly,
when one uses the word “freedom” they mean “freedom from” or “freedom of”.
One is never “free” in any absolute sense, except perhaps in death. As long as
we are alive we face constraints to our freedom. Gravity restricts my freedom to
fly. Hunger restricts my freedom to fast indefinitely. Laws restrict my freedom to
kill and steal. Unavoidable contact with that which I observe restricts my freedom
to consider objects objectively. Absolute freedom from societal constraints, on a
mass scale, is anarchy. Absolute freedom from physical constraints is entropy.
As Dewey notes, it is indisputable that certain restrictions on freedom can rightly
be considered oppressive or otherwise injurious. At the same time, though, it is
also true that the possession of certain freedoms allows for oppressing and/or
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injuring others. The freedom to purchase and drive an automobile contributes to
climate change. The freedom to eat meat contributes to the hunger of others, as
several pounds of grain are required for each pound of meat consumed.
Under the watchword of “freedom” neoliberals have made headway since
the 80s in increasing the freedom of powerful interests at the expense of the
freedoms of everyone else. Dewey’s assertion that freedom is a means rather
than an end holds not just in education, but in the world as a whole. We are
evolved with certain tools providing us the freedom to engage in certain actions
but not in others. Foraging humans were free to gather certain kinds of food, to
move through their environments in certain ways, to interact with one another in
certain ways, etc. Organisms are typically evolved possessing freedoms that
allow for both their own benefit and that of their environment. This is true for the
cell, the organ, the body (including that of foraging humans), and on up through
the ecological hierarchy. Freedom is never absolute nor is it all encompassing,
but is always a means to some end. Dewey (1938) writes, “The ideal aim of
education is creation of power of self-control” (Chapter 5, para. 5). Self-control in
this case can be thought of as the restriction of one’s own freedom. It is to adapt
oneself to function as a beneficial part of society. Had he advocated self-control
as a means of existing in equilibrium with the natural world, instead of just human
society, his sentiments might have been more in line with those of
posthumanism.
Technology has provided the illusion of absolute freedom, even as
technological advances have both increased certain freedoms and diminished
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others. Think of a suit of armor. This piece of technology allows one to withstand
certain attacks, and perhaps to best one’s enemies, but at the same time it limits
range of movement and bodily senses. The technologically constructed
environment in which we live is analogous to this suit of armor, with the natural
world as our foe. Just as the suit of armor is useful primarily for battle, so to this
point in history technology has largely been oriented towards mastery of nature.
We have been so caught up in the whirlwind of technological advance that we
have come to view freedom as an end goal, rather than a means to other goals.
Dewey (1900) writes, “With tremendous increase in our control of nature, in our
ability to utilize nature for human use and satisfaction, we find the actual
realization of ends, the enjoyment of values, growing unassured and precarious.
At times it seems as though we were caught in a contradiction; the more we
multiply means the less certain and general is the use we are able to make of
them” (p. 119). Aside from his connection of technology to mastery of nature, this
passage is noteworthy for it’s second sentence, which summarizes life in a
technologically constructed environment. We are now enveloped by our tools,
our “means” as Dewey refers to them, and yet we are in some important ways
less certain of our proper role on earth than ever. Though we are able to do
“more” with our tools, they do not inform (and in fact serve to confuse) what we
should do.
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Areas of Discord Between Dewey And Posthumanism
While some of Dewey’s work can inform posthumanism, and indeed is
sometimes in line with posthumanist theory, there are areas of clear departure.
Though possessing of a wonderful intellect, he was a man of his time. That he
was able to see so far and so clearly, without the benefit of the hindsight we
possess in critiquing his work, should be of primary focus. That he stumbled here
and there is less notable than the great progress he made. Still, the areas in
which Dewey seems to lie in opposition with a posthumanist account are of
importance, if only for the fact that many still subscribe to some of these views.
Many, for example, continue to believe that scientific advance will solve global
environmental concerns, and that no mass change in mindset or behavior are
called for. Further, a study of areas of discord between humanism and
posthumanism could reveal weaknesses not just in the former, but in the latter as
well.
One such area of discord lies in Dewey’s thoughts on “the savage”. For
Dewey, the savage was notable primarily for his lack of ability to mold the
environment to his own ends. For this “deficiency” he ruled the savage to be
inferior to civilized man. He writes,
“A savage tribe manages to live on a desert plain. It adapts itself. But its
adaptation involves a maximum of accepting, tolerating, putting up with
things as they are, a maximum of passive acquiescence, and a minimum
of active control, of subjection to use. A civilized people enters upon the
scene. It also adapts itself. It introduces irrigation; it searches the world for
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plants and animals that will flourish under such conditions; it improves, by
careful selection, those which are growing there. As a consequence, the
wilderness blossoms as a rose. The savage is merely habituated; the
civilized man has habits which transform the environment” (1916, p. 39).
Here Dewey falls prey to a trap he has spent much of his career warning against;
that of the false dualism. He poses two scenarios in opposition to one another,
and argues for the superiority of the one absolute over the other. In this case,
mastery of nature is posed against influence by nature, with a distinction made
between society and nature.
The dualisms of savage/civilized and nature/society seem to have become
less clear for Dewey in the years following “Democracy and Education”.
Fascinatingly, in “What Humanism Means to Me” (1984), Dewey explicitly breaks
with the popular conception of a humanism that is opposed to nature. Of this
strain of humanism he writes, “The significance it gives the ‘human’ can be
understood only in antithesis to the view it holds of nature. …It holds to a
complete gulf between nature and man in his true being” (p. 263). Contra this
false dualism, Dewey (1925) explicitly notes the inseparability of humans and
nature, writing that man “must in some measure adapt himself as one part of
nature to other parts” (Chapter 10, para. 29). Here Dewey’s writing comes most
closely aligned with that of posthumanist theorists. For example, Timothy Morton
(2013) argues against the use of terms like “nature” and “world”, writing, “The
ultimate environmentalist argument would be to drop the concepts Nature and
world, to cease identifying with them, to swear allegiance to coexistence with
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nonhumans without a world, without some nihilistic Noah’s Ark” (Part 2, Section
1, para. 4). For Morton terms like “nature” and “world” are a way for humans to
objectify that which they name. Nature is falsely perceived to be an object
separate from humans, an ark in which we reside. Latour (2004) similarly argues
for the need for a, “Political ecology [that] does not shift attention from the human
pole to the pole of nature; it shifts from certainty about the production of risk-free
objects (with their clear separation between things and people) to uncertainty
about the relations whose unintended consequences threaten to disrupt all
orderings, all plans, all impacts” (Chapter 1, Section 2, para. 12). Both Morton
and Latour object to the term “nature” insofar as it is used as a means of creating
a distinction that leaves humans excluded from the rest. Dewey’s belated
recognition that humans are themselves “one part of nature” would thus seem to
herald a rather posthumanist shift in his thinking.
A common theme of Dewey’s writings (especially his later work) on
education is a suggestion to bring humans into closer contact with the natural
world. Experience for Dewey is a means of knowing nature more clearly, and is a
vital component of education. His ideal school has gardens and open space, and
he acknowledges that prior to and outside of school, the natural world is our
primary educator. Still, he never completely broke with a conception of the
rightness of human mastery over nature. Here is his concluding sentence to the
essay “What Humanism Means to Me”: “At all events, what Humanism means to
me is an expansion, not a contraction, of human life, an expansion in which
nature and the science of nature are made the willing servants of human good”
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(1984, p. 266). For the older Dewey, nature was to serve humanity willingly.
Given his change of tone, perhaps had he lived a few more decades he might
have eventually recognized that humanity must serve nature willingly as well.

Technology’s Blinders
Dewey (1925) notes that Greek philosophers belonged, “…by status to a
leisure class relieved from the urgent necessity of dealing with [external]
conditions” (p. 33). Like those philosophers, the socioeconomically privileged are
free to contemplate the “finer” things of life only because they benefit from their
positions in the dominance hierarchy. Many people in developed countries enjoy
a lifestyle in which their necessities and many of their wants are easily met, and
the suffering of others is hidden. If temperatures are one or two degrees higher
this year on average, they are less likely to notice from their climate-controlled
dwellings. That their clothes are generally made by people further down on the
dominance hierarchy, with much fewer options in life, is not generally considered,
because the clothes are bought in nice stores (or online), far from the factories
that produced them. That the pound of beef they consume each week takes ten
pounds of corn (to be fed to the cow) does not likely cross their minds, nor do the
starving people that could have been fed from the grain used to fatten the cow.
Privileged groups are often oblivious to their roles in perpetuating oppressive
systems, thanks to a combination of reluctance to face up to the truth, and by the
extent to which technology separates them from their less fortunate neighbors
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(including the rest of the natural world). It is past time to remove the blinders from
their eyes.
Technology gives people “blinders” such that in the course of their daily
habits they fail to see the damage they cause to others and nature. Technology
is frequently a means of obtaining, and technological development is often driven
by the imperative of efficiency, or the need to find a better shortcut to this
obtainment. My ecological awareness is inversely correlated with how separated
I am from the sources of my consumption and the fate of my waste. Extreme
specialization, driven by technological development, often leaves the masses
clueless as to the methods by which their food, for just one example, is acquired.
One who catches their fish from the stream is often more ecologically aware than
one who works on cars all day and then buys their fish from the store. The tools
for extending our reach, in other words, extend beyond our ability to sense, and
so we do harm without realizing it.

Tikopia And The Need To Act Unnaturally In Unnatural Environments
Dominance hierarchies are common in nature, as is the tendency to
unquestionably use available means to ascend those hierarchies. The plant
takes as much sunlight, water and nutrients from the soil as it can to maximize
reproductive capabilities. However, the plant’s taking is limited by external forces,
including other plant life and animals. As our overpopulation and activities meet
the coping limits of the natural world, our own taking is beginning to face such
limits. The human ascension of the global dominance hierarchy is coming to an
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end, and humanity’s future depends on how we adjust to losing our (imagined)
status as the alpha life system of planet earth. The people of the Pacific island of
Tikopia are an example of a sustainable society, and one of the steps they took
to become so is of particular import. Sometime in the 1600s, the people of
Tikopia (by their own volition) slaughtered every pig on the island. Jared
Diamond (2005) writes, “According to Tikopians’ accounts, their ancestors had
made that decision because pigs raided and rooted up gardens, competed with
humans for food, were an inefficient means to feed humans…and had become a
luxury food for the chiefs” (p. 292). Seeing nature’s limits ahead, the Tikopians
took proactive steps to institute limits themselves. In this course of action and
others, they subordinated themselves to the system of which they were a
constituent part, the island’s ecosystem. They willingly sacrificed a measure of
their freedom, knowing that if they did not, nature was going to limit their freedom
herself.
Humanity as a whole can take steps like the Tikopians to make facing
natural limits less devastating. This will not be easy, though, and goes against
human nature. Once again, it is natural for creatures to use all available
technologies to ascend the ranks of the dominance hierarchies of which they are
a part. Our technological ability to make short-term gains at long-term costs is
often falsely perceived as the ability to make gains without costs. We have
trouble comprehending future costs, and often discount them too much but,
thankfully, we are able sometimes to compensate for these deficiencies. For
example, the ease of attaining food in developed countries has led to an obesity
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epidemic that affects many. Programmed via evolution to take all we can get
when we can get it, we struggle to adapt to a world of abundance. Many humans
facing this issue, though, have trained themselves into food consumption
behaviors that allow for a healthy body. They decide at the personal or
household level to abstain from fried food, ice cream and candy bars. Much of
this abstention is the result of an (often painful) period of habituation, whereby
neural pathways are re-wired, not unlike the brains of recovering drug addicts.
Taking steps to lessen our proximity to unhealthy foods also helps, as it is much
more difficult to resist the food when it is close by. Developing habits of exercise,
too, is an “unnatural” process many have undertaken in the face of abundance.
For early humans, daily physical activity for the purposes of survival, play, etc.,
obviated the need for spin classes or cross fit.
Those who have developed sustainable healthy habits of diet and exercise
are often quick to note their increased satisfaction in life. By imposing limits on
their own agency, by denying their own (often powerful) natural urges, they
become happier than they were when they indulged. Privileged humans are
faced with an unnatural situation of being in a state of disequilibrium with nature
whereby technology renders life’s necessities in abundance. They then counter
this unnatural situation by engaging in a rather unnatural task: self-imposing
healthy diet and exercise habits. Upon becoming habituated to these impositions,
they have returned their bodies to inner equilibrium. An unnatural external world
(our technological environment), which is to say one for which we were not
evolved to cope, is countered by unnatural actions (exercise for its own sake) to
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return the body to a sustainable state. When the individual fails to adopt healthy
habits of exercise and diet, she condemn herself to a shorter, less satisfying life.
Her unwillingness to relinquish short-term pleasure causes more long-term harm.
The possibility of acquiring habits of restraint and self-control at the
individual level illustrates the possibility of acquiring them at the global level.
Recognizing our global state of disequilibria with nature, developed countries
must willingly curb resource consumption (both renewable and non) and develop
alternative energy sources. These endeavors are unnatural to society just as
self-imposing limits on food consumption is unnatural to the individual. Such
actions would require that societies make choices causing them short-term pain
for long-term health. This pain would likely include higher prices for necessities,
and until alternative energy infrastructure becomes established (something that
will take years), pain will persist. Taking our analogy further, the human race
today is most akin to an obese individual. Doctors have warned her that she is on
the verge of a heart attack, just as scientists warn us of runaway global warming.
Family members are hurt by her gluttony, just as life systems of the earth are in
decline as a result of our gluttony as a race. Perhaps this overweight person is in
some denial as to her condition and/or, seeing the mess she’s made, fears that
she is incapable of fixing things. She might worry that she is already “too far
gone”. All of these sentiments can be found in society, as many reject the
findings of scientists, and convince themselves that things can keep going on as
they were. Our individual might turn to religion, hoping for a better life after this
one, and become increasingly vested in that belief as a means of avoiding her
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bodily troubles. This too, appears to be a response of many in our race to the
damage we are causing to the biosphere. But! There is a part of our overweight
individual that knows that her doctors are telling her the truth. Also, she loves her
family dearly, and it hurts her to see them in pain. She knows that, despite her
rampant indulgence, she is not happy. Our obese person is not a lost cause yet,
and the louder the angel on her shoulder gets the more likely she will be to begin
and continue her journey towards restoring her bodily equilibrium. Those who
recognize the dangers caused by humanity need to be the angels on humanity’s
shoulder. We need to appeal to the better part of our species. We will not win
skeptics over by mocking them, nor by coddling them. We must be firm but
loving, consistent but not boring
Just as individuals have self-imposed unnatural restraints on their shortterm desires, so have larger communities of people. A group of scientists,
environmentalists, volunteers and others founded the Oyster Recovery
Partnership in 1993, after years of overharvesting threatened the survival of
oysters in the Chesapeake Bay. Partially in response to pressure from that
grassroots organization, the state of Maryland passed the Oyster Restoration
and Aquaculture Development Plan in 2010, which cordoned off one quarter of
the viable oyster habitat in the bay. This coalition of ecologically-minded citizens
and the state government are making slow but clear progress in rebuilding the
oyster beds. A sizeable contingent of oystermen protested the restriction of
harvesting in those areas, as it had an immediate and direct negative effect on
their livelihoods. This illustrates the “tragedy of the commons” whereby if a
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resource is commonly available, consumers of that resource will often race to get
as much of it as they can. They do this despite the knowledge that their actions
are unsustainable in the long run because they reason (often correctly) that if
they don’t take it, their competitors will. Despite having harvested the
Chesapeake’s oysters nearly to extinction, and directly harmed their own well
being, many opposed any state intervention that would break their cycle of
plundering what remained of the oyster beds. The urge to get what one can while
one can and to resist externally imposed limits on actions to satisfy this urge—
are both natural and understandable within nature’s creatures. It is worth noting
here that greed in humans came long before Capitalism. Note the extinction of so
much of the earth’s megafauna shortly after humans began using tools. Our
enhanced ability to take more led almost immediately to our taking of more.
Like our obese woman’s ability (through the benefit of technology) to
obtain food, the technologies of oystermen (boats, dredges) gave them an edge
over nature. It was only when the situation became most dire that people were
able to self-impose unnatural limits on their actions, and even then there was still
fierce resistance in some quarters. The end goal, and one that appears feasible
at least from the local level, is for oyster harvesting to one day resume, with
properly enforced government regulations that ensure oyster bed sustainability.
Should that day come, oystermen will enjoy harvests much higher than what they
now obtain. Further, they can rest easy knowing that their long-term livelihood is
secure. They will no longer have to worry about working themselves out of a job.
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We have all either witnessed or experienced the countering of unnatural
affordances of technology with unnatural self-imposed action to restore a natural
equilibrium to the human body, via exercise and diet. We have just noted an
analogous self-imposition on short-term aims for long-term equilibrium via the
Chesapeake Bay oyster population. We can even widen our scope to the
national level for more examples of a similar nature. For example, both Germany
and Japan have undertaken massive, government-led, top-down forest
management initiatives that decreased and then reversed deforestation
nationwide. Success of this initiative in Japan is striking, as approximately 80% of
the land is covered by forest, despite the island nation having the highest
population density of any first world country.
In drawing analogies between individual, community, and nation, several
similarities arise that can inform the action to be taken at the global level. First,
the success of initiatives varying so widely in scope, and at all levels of
population size, lends hope to the idea of the global initiatives needed to address
problems that have outgrown the local. If the individual, community, and nation
can do it, why not humanity as a whole? Next, the analogy hinges on unnatural
affordances of technology being countered by unnatural (and often painful) selfimposed limits or rules, which allows for a return to a natural equilibrium for the
life system (be it body, oyster bed, forest, etc.). Often, action is not taken until
hope is all but lost. It took the near death/elimination of the body/oyster
beds/forests before action was taken. This is likely the result of how unnatural
such action is to our evolutionary programming, which is oriented towards taking
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all we can get. Only when the direness of the situation becomes immanent are
we spurred to take action, and even then such action faces protest. There is no
reason to expect that action at the global level will be different. However, the
greater danger is that climate change could result in a chain of events that is
irreversible, such that our resolve to take action could come too late.
A final commonality between each of the examples is that they all required
rules or laws, and authorities willing and empowered to enforce them. An obese
woman self-imposes a diet with certain rules and restrictions regarding caloric
intake, servings of vegetables, etc., and sets certain goals for exercise, such as
daily walks. In our other examples, state and national governments enacted
legislation that drew and enforced their own lines in the sand. The coordination of
governments, likely via supranational organizations, will be required for global
action. This is not to discount or discourage the efforts of concerned citizens for,
as in Maryland, bottom-up protest can lead to top-down government action. In
other words, for an effective global initiative to be enacted, governments around
the world will need to face pressure from concerned individuals and groups. In all
three cases, unnatural limits were self-imposed. Finally, all three examples
involve the trading off of short-term gain for long-term health, and restoration of
natural equilibrium to the life system. The very plasticity of our brains that allows
us to cheat nature (by developing technology) is the only thing that can save us,
as it allows us to counter our technology use by developing sustainable habits.
That we have not sufficiently developed these habits yet does not mean we are
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unable to, as we have witnessed successes ranging from the individual to the
national levels.
A sustainable human existence in the face of technology-induced
disequilibrium with nature requires a major shift in the aims of education. The
Greeks saw education as an opportunity for a certain class of people, sitting at
the top of the dominance hierarchies of both humans and all of nature, to aspire
to a life of the mind superior to that of the flesh. The Industrial Revolution and
capitalism expanded the scope of education to the masses, but this factory
model of education is largely concerned with turning new generations into more
efficient producers and consumers. Both of these aims of education are harmful
in their own ways. The Greeks were complicit with slavery, and their philosophers
argued that slavery was necessary to free up the superior people (i.e.
themselves) for consideration of the metaphysical realm. Dewey (1925) notes
that, “…the Greek community was marked by a sharp separation of servile
workers and free men of leisure, which meant a division between acquaintance
with matters of fact and contemplative appreciation, between unintelligent
practice and unpractical intelligence, between affairs of change and efficiency—
or instrumentality—and of rest and enclosure—finality” (Chapter 3, para. 22). In
contrast to the Greek model of education for the elite, the factory model provides
universal education, but it is an education for enslavement. The school’s function
in this model is to produce efficient workers.
It bears repeating that dominance hierarchies are common in nature, and
that organisms unquestioningly use the technologies available to them to ascend

104
these hierarchies as far as they are able. All creatures are in some measure both
oppressed and oppressor. This is a lesson taught by life, and one that schooling
is not necessary to learn. However, the challenges of the day bring a true need
for a posthuman education. Such an education should have two aims. First, we
should be made to see more clearly the effects our technology use has on other
people and the natural world. It is only after a realization of unsustainability that
calls for sustainability gain credence. Second, we should learn restraint in our
technology use. This is akin to Marcuse’ (1968) Great Refusal, which he phrases
as “…the protest against that which is” (Ch.3, para. 19). This protest requires
education because refusal is an unnatural act, in that it runs counter to our
evolutionary programming. We need to learn restraint in using technology to take
from nature. Just because we are able to take from her in the moment does not
mean that it is wise to do so. Limiting our ability to plunder via regulations and
other legislation is vital, and raises an educational imperative all by itself. At any
point before, during, and after such rules are enacted, however, educators of all
stripes can help illustrate alternate paths. It is not enough to prohibit the obese
person from eating junk food; she must be made familiar with healthy
alternatives. When ecologically minded groups and the government accomplish
their legislative goals, educators need to be at the ready with sustainable options.
When the governments close doors, educators need to be there, holding other
doors open.
What is needed, then, is an education of restraint. Again, restraint does
not come naturally, hence the need for education. This is an education of living
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within one’s means. Ironically, considering free markets contributed to our
present difficulties, one can look to personal finance curricula for guidance. Its
aims are generally the same as that of this new education: living sustainably. In a
typical personal finance course, students are taught the dangers of accumulating
debt. So many people find the lure of plastic irresistible (a perfectly natural urge,
as is hopefully clear), and run up credit card debt without fully grasping the longterm effects of their spending sprees. The curricula for these courses often
involves exercises that illustrate the amount of time necessary to pay off such
debt at such-and-such and interest rate, at the minimum monthly payment. In
these exercises and others, students learn about the nature of compound
interest, and get to see how the interest paid often exceeds even the amount of
the purchases. In these and other ways students are warned of the long-term
costs of their spending sprees. In the same courses, they are taught the proper
habits for sustainable personal finance, to include budgeting, advice for prudent
investing, and others. So, these courses teach by showing the potential harm of
unsustainable living and prescribing ways to avoid poor finance choices. This is
the new imperative of education, and as such should be the guiding focus of
curricula in general: Humans must learn such restraint, in terms of their impacts
on other life systems, through becoming familiar with the costs of continued
indulgence, and learning a few tools and tricks for abstaining from continued
indulgence.
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Proposed Primary Goals of a Posthuman Education
The goal of education is not mastery of subject matter, but of one's person.
Subject matter is simply the tool. Much as one would use a hammer and chisel to
carve a block of marble, one uses ideas and knowledge to forge one's own
personhood.
-David Orr, What is Education For?, p. 55
In light of the challenges above, three educational goals seem
appropriate, and it is from these that a posthumanism-informed pedagogy and
curriculum (to be explored in the following chapters), will spring. The first goal is
to create lifelong learners due to rapid and accelerating environmental (both our
natural environment and our technological, built environment) change. Lifelong
learners are able to find dignity outside of the market system, which is essential
due to the dwindling opportunities to find self-worth in that system. The second
educational goal is to engender awareness in regards to technology use. As our
technologies allow us to take without regard for the life systems we are taking
from, and without knowledge of how our taking affects them, awareness is vital to
a continued sustainable existence. Developing restraint in technology use is the
third educational goal. Knowing that our actions are harmful is not enough. We
must also act (or refrain from acting) based on that knowledge. The following
paragraphs will elaborate further on these goals and make a case for their
primacy in future educational endeavors.
Most schools today are oriented towards “just in case” learning, in which
massive amounts of information are conveyed to students who are expected to
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memorize it all, just in case that information is one day useful. This orientation
made more sense fifty years ago, when being a student and having a career
were fairly distinct from one another. Today, however, there is significant overlap
between learning and working. Collins and Halverson (2009) write, “Schools are
designed to teach us everything we might need to know in later life. But perhaps
this is a fool’s errand, given the knowledge explosion our society has enjoyed in
recent years” (p. 48). Disruptive technologies and changing environments have
left few careers unaffected, and our jobs and ways of interacting with the world
are changing at an increasing pace. At the same time, memorizing information
has become less and less useful, as we have near instant access to most
information through our computers and smart phones. Young people feel this
keenly, as an anecdote from my own experience may help illustrate. Teaching
introductory macroeconomics to high school seniors involves tasking them with
some basic math problems involving multiplication, division, and reducing ratios.
Though frequently students grasp economic concepts well enough, they seem to
struggle inordinately with the basic math. Since calculators are banned on the AP
exam, their use is prohibited in class. Is the ability to do basic math in your head
really that important anymore now that our smartphones do it for us? Regardless
of where one stands on this question is perhaps less relevant than the fact that
students seem to be becoming less capable at those tasks. I remember my
times-tables because I was in my twenties before I began carrying a computer
around in my pocket, and had occasion to call on that knowledge enough that the
neural connections became firmly established beforehand. If most young people
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use their smartphone calculators whenever they encounter a task demanding
basic math, then whatever mental space they allocated to that knowledge in
grade school will likely be taken over eventually by some other knowledge.
Knowledge of basic math seems doomed to the same fate as other forms
of knowledge that became obsolete as a result of technological advances.
Agricultural improvements led to a decline in knowledge of edible food in the wild.
This knowledge was once essential to the survival of foraging groups, and was
shared by all members. Nicholas Carr (2010) notes the effects paper maps had
on knowledge, writing, “Our ancestors’ navigational skills were amplified
enormously by the cartographer’s art. …But their native ability to comprehend a
landscape, to create a richly detailed mental map of their surroundings,
weakened” (p. 207). Similarly, cabbies once had to memorize the map of their
city including, amazingly, all of the street names. This knowledge is not essential
anymore since the advent of GPS-equipped smartphones. One need not always
chalk up the loss of some form of knowledge to technological advance; changes
in the environment, culture, location, etc. of a people can each render formerly
important knowledge trivial. When people migrated to the snow covered tundra of
the north, much prior knowledge was no longer useful, and much new knowledge
had to be developed. Like those travelers, we are in an environment significantly
different from the one our knowledge is meant to cope with. Unlike them,
however, we have not left one environment for some other specific place, but
rather have become nomads. Our environment is now changing constantly, and
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we need not only new knowledge, but also a new pedagogy, a new method of
acquiring knowledge.
“Just in case” learning is worthwhile only if there remains a notable
likelihood that such a case will arise, or if the case in question is of great
importance. Undoubtedly, there are examples of this. The phrase “stop, drop,
and roll” is a particularly good example of “just in case” knowledge that is
worthwhile. We are entering an epoch, however, which more frequently demands
“just in time” learning, or continuously learning new things as we face new
demands. For Gregory Bateson, (1972) learning to learn is a habit of thought we
all should acquire: “We have got to be like those few artists and scientists who
work with this urgent sort of inspiration, the urgency that comes from feeling that
great discovery, the answer to all our problems…is always only just beyond our
reach” (p. 176). The educational goal, then, is to engender and nurture a passion
for discovery.
As the list of jobs computers and robots cannot do continues to shrink, a
major source of dignity for many (post)humans will be taken away. Identity and
pride have long been associated with vocation, and income has long functioned
as a measure of self-worth under capitalism. Even in jobs that have not been
replaced by robots, the skill demanded of human workers is declining as a result
of automation. Autopilot greatly reduces the mental effort required to fly a plane.
“Autoland” functionality is built into most new commercial planes now, allowing
the plane to land without pilot involvement. Though generally used when weather
severely limits visibility, autoland will likely become more widely used in the
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future, further reducing the skills demanded of pilots. In “Super Crunchers”
(2007) Ian Ayres notes a trend of algorithms outperforming experts. Statistical
analysis in baseball (sabermetrics) thus increasingly came to be favored over the
knowledge of the scout. Wine experts have found their expertise challenged by
mathematical formulas that predict the quality of wine without tasting it, and
before it is even produced. Examples such as these are both numerous and
quickly growing. These developments suggest that we must increasingly seek
our dignity outside of the commodity space. Pierre Levy (1997) writes, “A society
that explicitly acknowledges the principles of an economy of human qualities will
recognize, encourage, and maintain those qualities…In this way it would enable
those without employment to construct an identity for themselves through
interaction with the community” (p. 35). Levy’s economy of human qualities could
in this way function as a replacement of functions previously served by the
market. The goal must be to show learners paths to self-worth that are not bound
to vocation or income. Instead, we must learn to find our self-worth through
knowledge-based and creative endeavors.
In addition to making lifelong learners, education today must foster a
combination of awareness and restraint. Dewey (1938) is blunt on this matter,
writing, “The ideal aim of education is creation of power of self-control” (Ch. 5,
para. 5). We are the products of millions of years of evolution oriented towards
preparing us for lives in an environment that is quite foreign from the ones most
of us inhabit today. Urges and proclivities that benefitted early humans are in
some cases liabilities today. Acting on violent urges today can result in much
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more harm, what with the availability of guns and other weapons. The desire to
eat more sweets than is prudent was once advantageous to our species, as highsugar foods promoted fat storage, which was actually an asset in a time when
food security was low. I use the term restraint here to denote any rejection of
behavior that is the result of evolutionary predisposition. Such restraint is a
necessary component of life in our technological environment, in which acting on
our “natural” urges using the means at our disposal often is deleterious to our
bodies, other life systems, or both. Our technologies are frequently of the taking
sort, means towards the attainment of ends. Thus, they facilitate taking from the
natural world and our less technologically-endowed, (post)human peers. As a
result, some people have taken too much, without giving much of benefit back.
We are the primary (if not sole) agents of a natural disequilibrium at the planetary
scale. Breaking from humanist notions of the savage, we must recognize that,
rather than our animalistic proclivities, it is our technology use that must be
tempered. Prior to the Stone Age, the tools used for taking were all bodily tools;
brains, nails, teeth, fists, etc. The damage we were capable of accomplishing
was limited. A military tank functions as a synecdoche for technology as a whole,
in that it holds both great destructive power and provides a mostly impervious
cocoon for the people inside. It allows for the taking of life without giving life, and
separates those inside from the outside world.
Gun rights advocates use slogans like, “Blame the bad, not their tools”
and of course, “Guns don’t kill people. People kill people.” Thoughts like these
are commonly applied to other technologies as well, as many view technology as
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being inherently neutral. In stark contrast to this view, Latour (1992) notes,
“Prescription is the moral and ethical dimension of mechanisms. In spite of the
constant weeping of moralists, no human is as relentlessly moral as a
machine…” (p. 157). Our technologies prescribe certain actions and/or ways of
acting, and as such they impose a certain morality. Marshall McLuhan (1964)
perhaps presented the best refutation of the neutrality of technology argument,
applying this faulty logic to other products to reveal its absurdity: “Apple pie is in
itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that determines its value” (p.
11).
Because of the value-laden nature of technologies, and the taking power
they frequently afford us, we must develop habits of mindfulness and restraint in
their use. Such habits do not come naturally, and thus are an essential goal of
education, which should focus on the impact of technology use on life systems.
This should include learning where their consumer goods ultimately come from,
the environmental impacts of production and waste disposal, and the effects their
purchases have on other people. As typical consumption patterns are
problematized, more sustainable alternatives should be introduced. Awareness is
in this manner coupled with restraint, and should be aimed at impacting a wide
range of aspects of life, including choices regarding transportation, food, shelter,
clothing, electronics and others.
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From Aims to Curricula
The consideration of Dewey in the preceding pages underscores the
dangers in positing humans as separate from nature. This human/nature
distinction led directly to the premise that humans are meant to rule nature, and
the exercise of this rule has been the source of much suffering and destruction of
life. Further, global effects of human technology use are threatening not just
other species, but our own existence as well. Technology frequently blinds us to
the effects of what we take from and give to the life systems with which we are in
contact, and reinforces our humanist ideas of a human/nature distinction. From
these considerations, three primary aims of education have been posited. First,
that we must become lifelong learners, for our tools have begun to be developed
more rapidly. Understanding how our tools function helps us to remove
technology’s blinders, so that we might better understanding the effect of their
use. This removal of blinders is represented in the second educational aim of
awareness. Finally, as we become more aware of the effects of our technology
use on other life systems (as well as on our bodies), it is vital to learn habits of
restraint. Evolutionarily predisposed to seek comfort, we use our tools to
maximize comfort and the satisfaction of bodily urges, often with consequences
disastrous to life systems. Learning restraint is unnatural in that it runs counter to
our instincts, and yet this unnatural response is vital in our unnatural (as in far
removed from the environment for which we were evolved) milieu. These aims of
lifelong learning, awareness and restraint will be used in the following chapter as
the foundation for a number of posthumanist curricular imperatives.
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CHAPTER 4
FOUR CURRICULAR IMPERATIVES
From the posthumanist tenets of interconnectivity, responsible agency,
and embodiment, three educational goals have been outlined. They are lifelong
learning, awareness of how technology use affects other entities (and how we
are affected by its use on us), and restraint in technologically facilitated action. In
this chapter, four curricular imperatives are posited that align with these goals.
The first of these is critical media literacy, which involves learning the languages
of today’s media, in part through acts of creation using those media. An
education in media literacy should involve training and practice in interpreting
and creating within the realms of audiovisual media, social networking,
advertising, and others. It should also include the development of what James
Gee (2013) has termed “mining skills”, or the ability to obtain the information we
need, when we need it, from the Internet and/or databases (Chapter 22, Section
3, para. 14). In today’s knowledge-based economy, such skills are increasingly
vital. A second curricular imperative, critical cultural studies, seeks to remove the
cultural blind spots young people face as a result of technology-facilitated
segregation. Our tools today allow us, perhaps more than at any other time in our
existence, to serve as gatekeepers deciding whom we will grant interpersonal
access to. This affordance has had the undesirable effect of the proliferation of
self-same groups. Rather than interact with those whose views challenge our
own, we all too often retreat to friend and acquaintance groups that largely mirror
ourselves in appearance, opinion, culture, etc. Giving students an education
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oriented to fostering and maintaining healthy bodies is the third curricular
imperative. As we rely less on our bodies, tending to view them as afterthoughts,
we increasingly fail to tend to them. Further, the ubiquitousness of cheap,
unhealthy foods (and advertising for same) makes proper habits of diet even
more difficult to engender. Humanists often forget the reflexive relationship
between mind and body, tending instead to place the mind on a pedestal.
Posthumanism serves as a corrective here, recognizing that the body and the
mind influence each other. A final curricular imperative for posthumans is
ecopedagogy. There are parallels here between disregard for the body and
disregard for the environment. When disembodied information takes precedence,
both body and environment become neglected. Just as body and mind have a
reflexive relationship, so posthumans have a reflexive relationship with the life
systems they encompass and the ones that encompass them. That our tools
allow us to take from the environment, without regard for or knowledge of the
impacts of our taking, makes ecopedagogy all the more important. Though
different from one another, these imperatives share a focus on selective
permeability, or letting the Other in without becoming subsumed. Each, in some
form, seeks to educate the posthuman in what she might take in or absorb, and
produce or excrete.
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Curricula Today
Through 21st century media (though not limited to them), business
interests teach a curriculum of consumption. The goal of this curriculum’s authors
is to engender within us what Marcuse has termed “false needs” (1964, p. 4).
Like other curricula, this one establishes a path and provides encouragement to
the learner to progress along it. Giroux (1999) writes, “corporations hold an
excessive amount of power in shaping children’s culture as a largely commercial
endeavor, using their various media technologies as teaching machines”
(Introduction, para. 19). Today advertisements target individuals through a bevy
of data including search and purchase histories, and demographic information.
Further, as cell phone usage becomes a more integral part of our lives, ads
become ever present. The market was once a physical place to be traveled to,
but we are now always in it. Fifty years ago, when it was time to get work done a
person could just put the newspaper (with its ads) aside, and turn off the
television. Today, though, most people are always connected. “Fear of missing
out” often prevents them from shutting off their phones, which ring or vibrate,
beckoning us with the arrival of new things. Though the curriculum of
consumption may not have changed much since the advent of 21 st century
media, the lessons now last all day (and into the night).
We are born with tools of nature that enable us to detect and transmit
sights and sounds. Through the use of these bodily tools and with guidance from
school, family, and peers, our abilities of communication grow. Today, an
increasing amount of interpersonal communication occurs through cyberspace.
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Dana Boyd (2014) sums up the new landscape of interpersonal communication
thusly: “Unlike me and the other early adopters who avoided our local community
by hanging out in chat-rooms and bulletin boards, most teenagers now go online
to connect to the people in their community. Their online participation is not
eccentric; it is entirely normal, even expected.” (p. 4). The functionalities of
cyberspace tools change regularly, unlike mouths and ears that work much the
same way at the age of forty as they do at four. One’s peers are most frequently
the instructors of this social media curriculum, as education from family or school
is often markedly absent in this arena. The path of this curriculum, as with other
curricula, leads towards mastery in its content area. The rewards of such mastery
include status, feelings of pride and satisfaction, influence, and others—the same
as developing any other interpersonal skills. This curriculum, often viewed with
suspicion if not outright hostility by educators, is not without merit. Mastery in the
domain of social media requires creativity, both in the written word and the visual
realm, among others. As in conversation, it requires the development of a keen
sense of timing. It requires sensitivity to context and knowledge of one’s
audience. Further, developing skills in social media use will almost certainly be of
benefit to the learner, as such media continue to increasingly colonize
interpersonal communication.
The school curricula, though marginalized of late, retain some influence in
the education of the young. These curricula now are mandated by the state, and
are often composed through some combination of subject area specialists,
textbook publishers, “experts” in education, and other political and business
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interests. This centrally planned construction of curricula carries certain
disadvantages. First, it fails to address regional and local differences, and thus
can serve to impede student engagement. Also, this method of composing
curricula typically leads to the omission of the controversial, and so important
topics become stricken from the curriculum lest some people become offended.
In addition, these curricula make no distinctions of culture, socioeconomic level,
etc. As such, students in vastly different contexts, with sometimes vastly different
needs, are taught the same curricula. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
school curricula are tied to a model of education that is becoming increasingly
obsolete. Subjects are typically distinct from one another. Memory remains a big
focus of these curricula, as students are expected to recall names, dates,
formulas, rules, etc. The school curriculum continues to fade in stature as
teachers, students, and the community increasingly recognize its obsolescence.
Collins and Halverson (2009) note that as we move “toward a situation where
people choose for themselves what kind of education they will obtain, standards
will serve as a constraint on the range of what counts as legitimate learning”
(Chapter 6, para. 8). Importantly, this is not to imply that there is no longer any
useful place for schools in society. Rather, it is the curriculum, over which the
teacher has little control, which is in desperate need of reform.
In the following paragraphs, an attempt will be made to outline the
foundations of a posthuman curriculum, by which I mean both a curriculum for
posthumans and a curriculum that is posthuman-ist. Such a curriculum seeks to
address a posthuman entity that is neither distinct from nature nor from artificial
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prostheses, an entity that shares deep connections with other humans, living
creatures, life systems, machines, and entities that we do not necessarily
recognize as living. At the same time, this curriculum would seek to serve as a
corrective to humanist notions of human superiority over the natural world, while
at the same time radically extending humanist notions of equality among humans
to all life systems. Finally, this curriculum will not present the humanities as a
path away from a “lesser”, “baser” nature, but instead make fostering
connections with nature a focus of the humanities.

Critical Media Literacy
In the face of certain posthumanist tenets and proposed primary
educational goals, media literacy rises as a clear curricular imperative. Kellner
(1995) defines a media literate person as someone who is, “…skillful in analyzing
media codes and conventions, able to criticize stereotypes, values, and
ideologies, and competent to interpret the multiple meanings and messages
generated by media texts. Thus, media literacy helps people to use media
intelligently, to discriminate and evaluate media content, to critically dissect
media forms, and to investigate media effects and uses” (p. 73). The
posthumanism outlined in these pages, in contrast to the feelings of many
transhumanists and techno-utopians, rejects the proposition that technology is
neutral. Both the forces driving technological advance and the resultant
technologies are instilled with the values of engineers, programmers, investors
and other technocrats. Posthumanism acknowledges that we are unavoidably
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embedded in a technological environment, but does not advocate an
unquestioning embrace of the technologies with which we are in contact.
Haraway (1991) writes that we should take “pleasure in the confusion of
boundaries”, for instance between ourselves and machines, but at the same time
that we have to take “responsibility for their [the boundaries] construction” (p.
272). Though we are all cyborgs, more or less, this does not imply that we have
to give up all agency. Instead, we must exercise the posthumanist tenet of
responsible agency. Three forms of media literacy seem particularly crucial to
this end, and they are critical media literacy, navigation literacy, and network
literacy. Each will be explored in brief below.
As our screens mediate more and more of our engagement with the world,
it is possible that these media can take more than they give. Hansen (2015)
sums up many of the dangers thusly: “…contemporary advertising aims to
capture our attention without our awareness, to manipulate us subliminally and
outside of our control; and today’s digital networks possess the capacity to gather
and to exploit all kinds of data without us having any knowledge, and, to a great
extent, any possibility for knowledge, of such activity” (Chapter 1, section 8, para.
4). Our minds are mined for information as a mountain is mined for coal, and this
information is then used on us to spur consumption and to accept (or remain
unaware of) our own subjugation. Our purchasing patterns, Internet searches,
streamed movies, news articles read, and other Internet usage are gathered and
fed into algorithms that recommend changes in what we subsequently view on
line. Ads are individually targeted, and news stories and Facebook feeds are
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molded to show what we are each predicted to respond to the most. In these
ways and others our machines threaten to take over our thoughts and bodies.
Following Haraway’s argument that we must take responsibility for our own
agency, the need to resist our subsumption into our tech seems clear. This need
to exercise responsible agency in our interactions with technologies, however,
cannot occur without media literacy. For Kellner (1995), critical media literacy
“teaches students to be critical of media representations and discourses, as it
stresses the importance of learning to use media technologies as modes of selfexpression and social activism wherever appropriate” (p. 73). Critical media
literacy, then, allows us both to be critical of what is presented to us, and
competent in how we present ourselves to others.
The term “digital native” is in many ways a misnomer. Though smart
phones are becoming increasingly ubiquitous among young people and tablets
are being used to pacify even small children, the use of these devices is
generally limited to escapism and/or social networking. The programming,
statistical, and even many of the creative functionalities of these devices often
remain unexplored. Danah Boyd (2015) writes, “Just because teens are
comfortable using social media to hang out does not mean that they’re fluent in
or with technology. Many teens are not nearly as digitally adept as the often-used
assumption that they are ‘digital natives’ would suggest. The teens I met knew
how to get to Google but had little understanding about how to construct a query
to get quality information from the popular search engine” (p. 22). Without media
literacy, media use tends towards escapist disengagement with the external
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world, and commodification by technocrats. Though the digital divide is shrinking
in terms of access, a media literacy divide remains. People with more wealth are
more likely to be media literate, and therefore to pass this knowledge on to their
children. Because media literacy is generally not taught in schools, poor children
are less likely to gain that literacy. This can contribute to the persistence and
widening of educational and income gaps between white and black and/or rich
and poor.
21st century media frames the outside world for us, and a primary task of
media literacy is to investigate the nature of this frame. Why does it show us
what it does, and what does it leave out? What is it trying to make us think, and
what if we purposefully think in contrary ways? Being able to answer these
questions constitutes what Kellner (1995) refers to as critical media literacy. He
argues, “Learning how to read, criticize, and resist media manipulation can help
individuals empower themselves in relation to dominant media and culture. It can
enhance individual sovereignty vis-à-vis media culture and give individuals more
power over their cultural environment and the necessary literacy to produce new
forms of culture” (p. 2). Of a number of media literacies to be considered here,
critical media literacy is most oriented towards critically examining the media to
which we are exposed. We must learn to resist being overwhelmed by spectacle,
or drawn into unthinking escapism or consumerism.
In order to develop critical media literacy, one might look to posthumanist
theory for guidance. Where posthumanists argue for acceptance of the reality of
a technologically mediated existence, they warn against becoming subsumed
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into the technology. One effective means of resistance to the onslaught of
marketing and commodification through media is to become a producer of such
media instead of only a consumer. All forms of media in which one is a frequent
consumer should be forms in which one also creates. For American youth today,
these forms should include movies, songs, commercials and other forms of
advertisements, music videos, video games, and others. Creating in these
realms help to make us more aware of the ways they frame what we see, and
hence to be more likely to view media more critically. For McLuhan (1964), “The
serious artist is the only person able to encounter technology with impunity, just
because he is an expert aware of the changes in sense perception” (p. 18). The
task of turning media consumers into media producers is greatly facilitated by the
same technologies through which so much consumption takes place; smart
phones double as video production studios, for example.
Critical media literacy can be fostered in other ways as well. Temporarily
adopting and exploring contrarian viewpoints can help to clarify one’s own
positions. This might include having learners consider a product they own or are
interested in owning, and then exploring the costs born by other entities in its
production. Learners can also explore the positive ways they will be affected if
they do not own that product, and/or the negative effects ownership will have on
them. The point here is not necessarily to dissuade the learner from purchasing
the product, but to understand more fully the impact of their consumption in
general. In regards to popular culture, critical media literacy can be developed by
exploring pop culture’s influence on societal norms. Themes of sexism, racism,
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homophobia, and others are often embedded in pop culture artifacts that are not
always immediately apparent. Taking opportunities to seek out these hidden
messages can help make such messages less hidden in later experiences of pop
culture. Finally, in addition to critically examining what is presented, media
literacy involves noting what is left out. As Chomsky (1999) notes, “It is always
enlightening to seek out what is omitted in propaganda campaigns” (Chapter 6,
section 2, para. 1).
Critical media literacy is just one of several literacies vital to today’s
learners. A second form of literacy involves the development of what James Gee
(2013) refers to as “mining skills”. This literacy, which has also been termed
navigation literacy (Rainie and Wellman, 2012), information literacy (Boyd, 2015),
and search literacy (Thompson, 2013), involves the ability to successfully
navigate the Internet to obtain desired information. Rainie and Wellman define it
as, “a sense of internet geography that allows [one] to maneuver through multiple
information channels and formats” (Chapter 10, section 4, para. 3). Developing
this form of media literacy can perhaps ideally be accomplished through the
research paper and/or project. An anecdote from personal experience could be
enlightening here. A number of years ago, after taking a few statistics classes
and installing open-source statistics software onto many of my school’s
computers, I began having some of my high school social studies classes
conduct quantitative studies. In the course of their work, they have to find
numerical data for each variable from the models they created, as well as peerreviewed articles for their literature reviews. Finding appropriate data and
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relevant articles has proven to be the most difficult task for the students. They
often are not able to find the specific data they are looking for, or will use data
they think is appropriate but is not. They commonly (and falsely) claim that no
relevant articles can be found, and misread irrelevant articles and mistake them
for relevant ones. The problem in both cases is two-fold; an inability to locate
what is desired and an inability to interpret what is found. In both cases, feedback
either from a teacher or a proficient peer has proven successful, provided
students have adequate practice. Only through multiple attempts at
searching/interpreting, followed by rounds of feedback, do students begin to
show improvement. Like all posthumans, young people are cybernetic systems
that adjust their functions according to feedback. More feedback results in more
accurate adjustments, such that failure guides future learning.
A third essential form of media literacy to the posthuman is network
literacy. We are connected with and influenced by others in our networks far
more than we may realize, and often in ways of which we are unconscious.
Hansen (2015) writes that, “the dominant coupling of an individualist perspective
on action and the privilege of the human as hermeneutic agent causes us to
overlook the actual functioning of networks and to neglect the radical dispersal
and distribution of agency that occur in networks” (Introduction, para. 2).
Developing network literacy is in accord with the posthumanist tenet of
recognizing our interconnectivity, in its shift in focus from individual to system.
Also, developing network literacy is vital to another theme of posthumanism: the
exercise of responsible agency. In short, it is important that posthumans learn
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about the functionalities of the systems of which they are biotic components,
recognize their agency within these systems, and understand how their exercise
of agency influences the larger systems. We are not evolutionarily predisposed to
be on our own, but have thousands of years of evolution that has oriented us
towards copious social interaction. This predisposition to network is especially
important today in an increasingly interconnected world. Through his work in
network science, Nicholas Christakis (2009) has found evidence to support what
he calls a “Three Degrees of Influence Rule” whereby, “Everything we do or say
tends to ripple through our network, having an impact on our friends, our friends’
friends, and even our friends’ friends’ friends. Our influence gradually dissipates
and ceases to have a noticeable effect on people beyond the social frontier that
lies at three degrees of separation” (p. 28). He has found evidence to support
that this rule holds for things like happiness, smoking cessation, and even weight
gain. Various estimates put the average person at between four and six degrees
of separation from any other person on the planet. To influence people three
degrees out from us is potentially to affect many millions of people. This (often
hidden) influence of our networks on us raises a clear curricular imperative. In
addition to learning network science fundamentals, this education must also
include training on social media use. Understanding today’s networks is
generally not something that comes to us instinctively. As the field of network
science (itself born of cybernetics, a progenitor to posthumanism) has recently
come into full fruition and scholarship has proliferated, I will attempt to highlight
some contributions by the field such as can inform a posthumanist curriculum.
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Maintaining existing ties and developing new ones are increasingly vital
practices in today’s environment. Finding a job, mate, companionship, apartment,
etc., are all facilitated by having a large assortment of “loose ties” with people in
our social networks but not necessarily in our inner circles of friends. Danah
Boyd (2015) writes, “In a world where information is easily available, strong
personal networks and access to helpful people often matter more than access to
the information itself” (p. 172). It is no stretch to assert that financial and romantic
successes often result more from who you know rather than who you are, what
you know, or what you are able to do. Because we tend to associate with people
within our own socioeconomic strata, social networks help the rich stay rich as
they keep the poor in poverty, challenging notions of equity of opportunity.
Teaching network literacy can resist network inequality effects if such
instruction includes a focus on always developing and maintaining more ties and
more diverse ties. Rainie and Wellman (2012) write that, “Although some might
think that smaller networks will have higher-quality relationships— quality
compensating for the lack of quantity— in fact, quantity goes along with quality.
Not only do larger networks provide more support, but each person in a larger
network is likely to be supportive. We do not know why, but we suspect that
social capital breeds more social capital in a positive feedback cycle” (Chapter 5,
section 5, para. 8). These authors go on to advocate a number of practices to
network effectively, including following the Golden Rule with your ties, developing
contacts that are part of social groups that you have yet to make contact with,
and being aware of invisible audiences. A curriculum that fosters these and other
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practices can help provide young people with connections that could be of
tremendous benefit to them. Unless one is born connected, by virtue of wellconnected parents for example, one ignores networks at their own peril.
The concept of transitivity is an important one in network theory. Roughly,
transitivity indicates the level of centrality of one’s location in a network. If one’s
five friends are friends with each other, this person has a higher transitivity in
their friend network than someone whose friends are not friends with one
another. This latter person is peripheral to a number of friend networks, while the
former is central to one. Christakis and Fowler (2009) write, “Those with high
transitivity are usually deeply embedded within a single group, while those with
low transitivity tend to make contact with people from several different groups
who do not know one another, making them more likely to act as a bridge
between different groups” (p. 19). Transitivity gains can accrue via positive
feedback loop; as one’s location in the network becomes more central, they are
more likely to be befriended by others because of their high transitivity.
This rich-get-richer nature of friend networks is a trait common to all scalefree networks. Notably, neural networks exhibit the same behavior. A neuron is
more likely to connect to a more connected neuron than a less connected one.
Having connections attracts more connections. With their many connections,
highly transitive nodes, or hubs, exert more influence on the network. The
opinions of a well-connected person are typically more influential than those of a
less-connected one. Indeed, such hubs are the chief weakness of scale free
networks. Otherwise robust, networks that lose several hubs simultaneously can
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fail. Hubs hold the network together, and when they disappear it can fall apart.
For hubs, the trade-off they face for their transitivity gains is that of entering an
echo chamber. Gains in influence are offset by declines in sensitivity.
Bridges, the less transitive but more sensitive counterparts to hubs, are
comparably important to network topology. These nodes, as their name
suggests, are more likely to facilitate the sharing of information between
networks. In the scale-free topology of a social network or a brain, there exist
Russian nesting dolls of networks; networks of and within other networks.
Bridges, in this context, are vital for coordinating action between networks. Also,
bridges can link networks at one level of organization with those of another, such
that neural bridges exist both within and between parts of the brain. I know a
young man who was a member of both an anti-bullying club that supported gay
rights, and a young Republicans club. As bridges between such groups are
becoming increasingly scarce, his network location was quite unique. A nature
lover might have a low transitivity in human social networks, but function as a
bridge between the natural world and the increasingly removed (for most) human
one. Computer programmers might similarly function as bridges between
humans and digital machines. Many people live their lives without giving much
thought to the nature of their networks and the roles they serve in them. People
can become oblivious to the fact that their social networks often serve as echo
chambers. We often dismiss these networks as trivial diversions, even as they
exert influence on our emotions, actions, careers and bodies. For these reasons
and others, network literacy forms a vital component of media literacy.
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Critical Cultural Studies
Posthumanism faces a number of criticisms from historically marginalized
groups. Many in these groups, who have been striving for many years to be
recognized as “human” and to receive more equitable treatment in society, are
skeptical about a movement that seeks to dismantle the very club they have
sought membership in. Lewis Gordon (1998) for example writes that, “the
dominant group can ‘give up’ humanism for the simple fact that their humanity is
presumed” (p. 39). Also, transhumanism, which is often mistakenly conflated with
posthumanism, has been subject to (often valid) critique on the grounds that the
future it envisions would perpetuate and perhaps even bolster white privilege.
Transhumanists seek to augment their bodies with new technologies for the sake
of greater intelligence, longer life spans, and/or other attributes in which they
discern utility. Such augmentations, however, are like much of the technologies
we find utility in today: frequently expensive and/or requiring education to use
most effectively. As such, marginalized groups will likely have less access and
derive less usefulness from such augmentations, much as has already occurred
with computers and other technologies. Focusing on the potential benefits to the
individual from cyborg-ization, transhumanists frequently neglect to acknowledge
the almost certain disparity in access that would (and arguably has) result(ed).
Further, as with so many other human technologies going back to and preceding
guns and steel, these new technologies available to the privileged classes would
likely benefit them at the expense of those less fortunate. It would allow those in
power to keep and possibly to extend their power over others.
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The notion of dismantling the concept of “human” however does not
necessarily imply that posthumanists mean to dismiss the struggles of oppressed
groups. While posthumanism is in some ways anti-humanist, in other important
respects it is a radical extension of humanist thought. Posthumanism rejects
humanism’s anthropocentrism while seeking to extend humanist notions of social
justice to all life systems. Posthumanism therefore is opposed to a
transhumanism that stands to perpetuate or cause social injustice. To reconceive
humanity in ways that broaden its scope is to engage with posthumanism. It must
be noted that marginalized groups that were (and continue to be) denied entry
into the human “club” have long offered not only critiques of humanism but also
new ways of being in the world. Posthumanism is in a sense a rediscovery of and
reunion with these groups and ways of being. The alignment of postcolonial,
race, feminist, queer theories and other marginalized perspectives with
posthumanism is vital because forming a collective of (post)humans is a
foundational step in working towards a collective that includes other life forms. I
hope in the paragraphs that follow to illustrate origins of posthumanism in
cultural, race, gender, and queer studies, and to make the case that curricular
inclusion of these studies is a growing imperative.
Pragmatism involves a certain recognition of “the way things are”. We
must realistically acknowledge the context in which we act. Posthumanism has a
pragmatic aspect, in that much posthumanist theory seeks to re-ground us in an
environment of which we are constituent parts (and not masters). A real danger
here though, is that acknowledgement is often conflated with acceptance or
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acquiescence. I might acknowledge along with Haraway that we are all cyborgs,
without recognizing that some of us are more cyborg than others. Just as
oppressed groups have historically had less access to books and education in
the past, they have less access to computers and the Internet today, and this
reality runs the risk of being neglected when looking at (post)humanity as a
whole. Also, I might decry the global rise in carbon dioxide emissions without fully
acknowledging that: 1) my privileged position in the global order is built on a
foundation of fossil fuel use and 2) many developing countries seek to follow the
example led by my own country and finally 3) my society’s consumption of
imports has been a chief factor in the rise of CO2 emissions of other countries,
as their production depends heavily on our demand. To acknowledge the context
of one’s actions is to look from the particular to the encompassing. In terms of a
critique of posthumanism, this is perhaps the most valid: By acknowledging and
focusing on global truths we run the risk of dismissing local truths. Posthumanism
brings a perspective therefore that, while not wrong, is often incomplete. This is
not at all a case for it’s dismissal. Can we not say as much for other –isms
(feminism, post-colonialism, etc.)? What is special about posthumanism is that its
global/contextual focus allows it more readily to form a bridge between other
theories. I will seek in the paragraphs that follow to contribute to such bridge
building.
Some of the first anti-humanists came from oppressed groups, as they
recognized their exclusion from dominant notions of what constitutes the human.
They frequently articulated recognition of their exclusion from this group called
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“human” and the corresponding association of oppressed groups with barbarity,
and recognized humanism as an ideology to justify oppression. Davies (1997)
writes, “All Humanisms, until now, have been imperial. They speak of the human
in the accents and the interests of a class, a sex, a race, a genome. Their
embrace suffocates those whom it does not ignore. … It is almost impossible to
think of a crime that has not been committed in the name of humanity” (p. 141).
Also, oppressed groups became aware that their distinction from other
oppressed groups was itself a tool of oppression. Haraway (1991) writes, “Painful
fragmentation among feminists (not to mention among women) along every
possible fault line has made the concept of woman elusive, an excuse for the
matrix of women's dominations of each other” (p. 155). Calls among marginalized
groups to unify in resistance are the first steps towards the broader unification of
humans with technologies, life systems, and others. How can we acknowledge
our connection to our ecosystems, for example, if we do not acknowledge our
links with one another?
Critical cultural studies is an essential component both to posthumanism
and a posthumanist curriculum. Haraway (1991) writes of the need to, “craft a
poetic/political unity without relying on a logic of appropriation, incorporation, and
taxonomic identification” (p. 159). Oppressed groups are well acquainted with the
posthumanist tenets of boundary blurring and interconnectivity, as well as
methods for building unity. Further, several primary educational goals are
bolstered by curricular inclusion of these studies. First, critical cultural studies
promote awareness of how one’s actions affect other entities, as we become
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more aware of power structures and our implication in them. Exploring these
structures (including the technology that in part constitutes them) can help us see
more clearly how such structures privilege some at the expense of others. With
increased awareness, we can pursue a second educational goal, the
engendering of restraint in harmful technology use. Knowing how our actions and
technology use are affecting others must be paired with engendering habits of
responsible action. Educating for awareness and restraint might start with
(post)human interactions first, before moving on to considerations of other life
systems. Until posthumans are able to see their interconnectivity with one
another, it is unlikely that they will recognize their connections with other life
systems.
Another reason critical cultural studies is a major curricular imperative is
that dominant school structures and curricula today perpetuate oppression.
Critical cultural studies within the school must undo damage done by the school.
In our capitalist system, schools’ social function is understood as “reproductive of
dominant values, not only through curriculum content, but via grouping
procedures, faculty hiring patterns, and differential school funding” (Pinar,
Reynolds, Slattery, Taubman, 1995, p. 318). In her study of African American
schoolboys, Ann Ferguson (2000) found evidence for “radical schooling theory in
which there is a hidden curriculum to reproduce current inequities” (p. 50).
Oppressed groups find in school that rules are often selectively enforced to their
detriment. They often face relatively lower achievement expectations from their
teachers, which can contribute to poor performance. They are grouped with other
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“underachievers” and thereby lose opportunities to learn from high scoring peers,
and are placed in less advanced classes. The Eurocentric humanism that posits
the white male as the model human is alive and well within the American school.
A prerequisite for teachers to implementing critical cultural studies into
curricula is reversing and/or resisting systemic oppression of marginalized
groups within the school. Examples of opportunities for teacher resistance
abound. Michie (1999) has noticed that, “ ‘Low’, ‘regular’, and ‘top’ groups were
identifiable at every grade level, and though they weren’t labeled as such, the
reality of their presence escaped no one” (p. 45). These groups, once sorted, are
taught differently. Based on his observations as a public school teacher, Schultz
(2008) notes that “middle class students are taught to think creatively and
question, [while] poor students are taught to parrot” (p. 13). Similarly, Ferguson
(2000) sees “evidence of Friere’s banking model” in the education of poor
(usually African American) students (p. 49). Teachers cannot negate all systemic
oppression. Often, student tracking and discipline are not under teacher control.
However, resisting as one is able can impact curriculum positively, even if critical
cultural studies is not an overt component of the curriculum. For example,
assigning groups that are diverse (or, as diverse as possible, depending on the
classroom) with regards to gender, race, sexual orientation, socioeconomic
status, etc., can provide a learning experience quite valuable to group members,
regardless of the task the group is assigned. Teachers of “lower track” classes
can resist the pressure to lower their expectations, and instead seek to engender
lifelong learners. Remaining vigilant to ensure equity in one’s own handling of
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student discipline is another way teachers can resist systemic oppression.
Teachers are disproportionately drawn from privileged groups, and are often
unaware of their unjust treatment of students from marginalized groups. They
tend to see students from their own groups in a more pleasant light, and dismiss
infractions for them but not others. In her study of African American schoolboys,
Ferguson (2000) found evidence for “radical schooling theory in which there is a
hidden curriculum to reproduce current inequities” (p. 50). Implementing critical
cultural studies should start with this hidden curriculum, those elements of a
curriculum that are not overtly part of the lesson but are nevertheless key parts of
the education that takes place.
A theme in posthumanism is that we must take responsibility for the
agency we exercise. This is especially true for those in positions of power,
including teachers. Posthumanist theorist Rosi Braidotti (2013) writes, “The pride
in technological achievements…must not prevent us from seeing the great
contradictions and the forms of social and moral inequality engendered by our
advanced technologies” (p. 42). Like other posthumans, teachers are part of a
technological environment in which structures augment their power over other
entities. The technologies that constitute the typical school act in concert to
empower the teacher over their students. As such, the agency provided to the
teacher by these educational technologies must be exercised with great
awareness and restraint. In this manner the teacher can serve as a model for the
exercise of posthuman agency. Posthuman teachers must practice what they
teach.
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More overt education in critical cultural studies should be woven into
curricula where possible. This is less possible on the math and science halls than
it is in liberal arts and the humanities. Critical cultural studies are most vital and
can find the most traction in social studies, literature, and art classrooms, as
these are relatively more concerned with people and the communication that
takes place between them. Because the standards to which curricula are tied
typically leave much to be desired in this area, lessons in critical cultural studies
must take place in tandem with state approved lessons. The powers of the
teacher to frame and present lessons offer opportunities to add a critical cultural
studies component to lessons. Chela Sandoval (2000) writes, “The differential
mode of social movement and consciousness depends on the practitioner's
ability to read the current situation of power and self-consciously choosing and
adopting the ideological stand best suited to push against its configurations, a
survival skill well known to oppressed peoples” (p. 59). Teachers might adopt this
differential mode in incorporating critical cultural studies elements into lessons.
As contexts differ from one school to another, teachers can “get away” with more
tweaking of the curricula at some schools than others.

Embodiment
The posthumanist focus on embodiment lies in stark contrast to
transhumanism, which treats the body as an afterthought. Transhumanists
imagine a day when they can upload their consciousnesses into machines and
leave their bodies behind. For Descartes, the mind is non-physical, and so is

138
distinct from the body. As humanism provides ideological justification for placing
the human in power over other life systems, Cartesian dualism justifies “mind
over body”. In both cases, it is the distinction, or the insistence on difference, that
does the damage. The mind has been posited as being unique to humans,
justifying our rule over nature. At the same time, our bodies are of nature and fall
under this rule as well. Dualism thus leads to a view of the body as a tool to do
the mind’s bidding. By this ideology, one should resist their animal urges, as
indulging them makes us less human.
In stark contrast to this dualism, posthumanism blurs the line between
mind and body (and human and animal). There is no such thing as a
disembodied mind, and to the extent that mind and body are entities
distinguishable from one another, their relationship is unavoidably reflexive. The
body and the mind shape one another. The mind tells the hands and arms how to
steer the car, and the body tells the mind that it is time to eat. However, these
examples makes it sound as if the mind gets all of the “thinking” tasks, and
indeed this is how we often mistakenly believe the relationship to work. Instead, a
cybernetic view of learning includes the body in the learning process. People
tend to learn more effectively “by doing”, than solely through classroom lecture.
The effect of the body on the mind goes beyond the potential for kinesthetic
learning, however. In “Our Own Metaphor” (1972), Catherine Bateson argues
that the body functions as a central metaphor by which one comes to understand
the world. How we move helps us understand the movements of others, our
hunger allows us to understand others’ hunger, and so on. We stand upright, and
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therefore associate “being above” with being better, or more just. Hayles (1999)
argues that, “if we had bodies with significantly different physiological structures,
for example exoskeletons rather than endoskeletons or unilateral rather than
bilateral symmetries, the schema underlying pervasive metaphoric networks
would also be radically altered” (p. 206). Morton (2013) goes a step further,
claiming that the metaphor is actually a working analogy, “We all contain water in
about the same ratio as Earth does, and salt water in the same ratio that the
oceans do. We are poems about the hyperobject Earth” (Chapter 2, para. 29).
Also, there is an undeniable (direct) correlation between mental health and bodily
health. Neglecting the body tends to lead to a decline in mental faculties. Stress
is a good example of influence going the other way, from mind to body, as mental
stress can lead to higher blood pressure, skin rashes and other bodily ailments.
My body provides a path from my mind to the external world, but it is also
more than this. Bergson (1907) writes that, “…if the fringe exists, however
delicate and indistinct, it should have more importance for philosophy than the
bright nucleus it surrounds. For it is its presence that enables us to affirm that the
nucleus is a nucleus, that pure intellect is a contraction, by condensation, of a
more extensive power” (p. 27). For Bergson, fringe is body and nucleus mind.
The body must exist to affirm that the mind is a mind, and the intellect rests on
the material foundation of the body. Bergson writes that the intellect is lacking in
its ability to understand life, arguing instead that intuition must serve this function.
By definition, intuition comes from the body, while intellect is an attempt to
distance the mind from the body. Bergson therefore envisions an embrace of the
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body, resolving to, “…see the life of the body just where it really is, on the road
that leads to the life of the spirit” (p. 157). He therefore seeks to articulate, “…a
philosophy that attempts to reabsorb intellect in intuition…” (p. 158). This is not, it
should be noted, an attempt to annihilate intellect so much as it is one to
reinstate an intuition that itself has been maligned by intellect. Such a
reinstatement has never been so important or necessary as it is today, as
intuition and body both face new threats of the technological variety.
Many of today’s technologies tend to neglect the body. We live in the age
of the screen, and our lives increasingly take place through these screens. The
body is generally immobile during this screen use, and much less aware of the
surrounding non-screen environment. Baudrillard (1988) notes a,
“…displacement of bodily movements and efforts into electric or electronic
commands” (p. 128). Automation is leading to structural unemployment in more
and more fields, as robots increasingly replace bodies whose use value in our
present society is steadily falling. As our bodies become less central to
communication, labor, and leisure, neglect of our bodies becomes a growing
problem. This neglect has led directly to a rise in obesity and obesity-related
illnesses (heart disease is currently the number one cause of death in the United
States). Also, in neglecting our bodies we give up
one of our most powerful learning tools. Our bodies more than our minds
facilitate an understanding of the natural world. There is a fable about a person
who lives in a place where the only visible colors are black and white. In this
place, people know about color but they cannot see it. This is akin to the human
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inability to see infrared; we know about infrared, but we do not see the world that
way. In the black and white world of the fable, there lives a person who is the
foremost expert on color. She has read volumes on the science of color and how
humans perceive it. One day, she is taken out of this black and white world for
the first time, and into a place with color. Though she held much knowledge of
color before, her exposure to it now gives her an understanding of which she had
to this point been deprived. To become subsumed in a screen-mediated
environment is akin to living in this black and white world. A screen-mediated life,
though it offers a mind-boggling amount of access to information, fails to provide
the bodily contact that is often required for meaningful understanding. Put
differently, to live through the screen is to cut off other paths of experiencing and
understanding the world.
Schools both neglect and control bodies in the extreme. Grumet (1988)
notes that, “…schooling…has functioned to repudiate the body, the place where
it lives, and the people who care for it” (p. 129). Students often must remain
seated for most of the school day, avoid “horseplay”, and generally refrain from
acting on bodily urges. The school fixes bodies in space and time, by use of the
clock, seating chart, designated classroom and bell. Student clothing is often
regulated, as are hair color and style, and visible piercings and tattoos. Teachers
may object to postures deemed aggressive, lazy, or otherwise disrespectful.
Permission often must be granted before students can go to the restroom or to
get water, and teachers often have rules concerning food consumption. Dewey
(1916) notes, “Before the child goes to school, he learns with his hand, eye, and
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ear, because they are organs of the process of doing something from which
meaning results. …His senses are avenues of knowledge not because external
facts are somehow ‘conveyed’ to the brain, but because they are used in doing
something with a purpose” (p.114). Classroom education tends to lean heavily on
the written word and the lecture, such that student movement is generally kept to
a minimum, and sensory perception limited to a small range within the audiovisual (tactile learning being almost entirely absent). These bodily and sensory
restrictions often inhibit the very learning they are purported to facilitate. As such,
a curricular imperative of embodiment is in large part about mitigating schools’
oppressive policies and technologies, much as with critical cultural studies.
Bringing the body into the fold as a component of the learning process
should occur via several simultaneous approaches. More freedom of movement,
though perhaps a hindrance to textbook/lecture centered lessons, can facilitate
“learning by doing”. It is not so much that learning cannot occur through textbook
and lecture, but that exclusively didactic instruction cuts one off from other potent
ways of learning. As such, this is not a condemnation of lectures or textbooks,
but an argument for adding other pedagogical forms. In addition to facilitating
new paths towards curriculum centered learning, increased bodily freedom helps
one learn about their body. The more we move, the better learn how to move.
Clothing the body is another important aspect of bodily freedom. As with
movement, the more freedom we have to choose our clothes, the better we get
at putting together outfits.
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Allowing students more bodily freedom in school in the form of more
frequent breaks, recess periods, the option of standing during class, etc. could be
beneficial to the health and learning ability of the child, but true embodied
learning would involve engaging the body in relation with other bodies or the
outside world towards a pedagogical end. We see this most often in art and
music classes, “shop” classes such as welding, woodworking and automotive,
and agriculture, among others. It is also often found in “hands on” projects that
require building, gathering, sorting, and/or assembling, etc. It is true that some
classes lend themselves more easily to such embodied learning than others. It is
possible that since the intellect frequently repudiates the body, those fields that
take pride in relying almost entirely on intellect are by their natures less likely to
lend themselves to such learning. Calculus, creative writing, chemistry, and
economics are just a few examples of courses that could fall into this category.
There are two paths forward here in the quest for embodied learning. First, the
classes that lend themselves most readily to such learning might be given more
prominence. Currently such classes are rarely required and are frequently
underfunded, in stark contrast to the esteemed “academic” classes. Students
might be required to take certain art and vocational classes, just as they are
required to take certain academic ones. Secondly, the teachers of academic
classes might look for pockets of opportunity for embodied learning. Just as the
mind never escapes the body, academic classes never fully escape the
environment from which they were born. Reading one’s poem or story aloud to
an audience has an important bodily element, and certain economics lessons
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might lend themselves to production simulations. Teachers of academic courses
might be vigilant for such opportunities, and make the most of them when they
are presented.
In addition to removing oppressive bodily restrictions in schools, a
curricular focus on embodiment should also provide opportunities to learn healthy
habits of body maintenance. As in other areas already mentioned, schools both
need to stop obstructing and to start helping. Technological advances have made
appealing but unhealthy food abundant and cheap in America. Confessore
(2014) notes, “Instead of exposing children to a variety of foods, school lunches
[have] tended to indulge their cravings”. We are not evolutionarily equipped to
resist fatty and sugary foods, and so there is a clear educational imperative here.
As with so many other areas in which technology facilitates shortcuts to our
desires, we must learn restraint. This should start in the cafeteria, of course. My
school has a permanent pizza line, a permanent burger line, and a third line with
daily changing selections. The public high school I attended had a permanent
chili cheese fry line. With the pizza line, daily tater tots, etc., the cafeteria actively
facilitates the development of poor dietary habits that impose real costs on
society. Having served as a lunch line monitor, I have noticed that the same
people tend to show up in the pizza line every day. Removing these unhealthy
options, or at least de-institutionalizing them, would be a step in the right
direction.
It is not enough to give students the option of healthy meals when
unhealthy meals are always available, especially if no effort is made to engender
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healthy dietary habits. Tellingly, developing healthy habits of eating does not
stand to benefit the economy. Gross domestic product often rises more when we
eat processed and/or prepared food (and later see the doctor for diet related
health issues) than when we buy ingredients and prepare our own food.
Lobbyists in the food industry seek to block legislation and policies that would
hurt their bottom lines. Thus, at the same time that some strains of humanist
thought (privileging the mind over the body) make dietary education seem less
important than other subjects, powerful interests seek to block such education for
economic reasons. Big Food has already infiltrated the school through a variety
of marketing avenues including Channel One, soft drink “pouring rights”,
advertisements on book covers, club and activity sponsorship, among many
others. Makers of processed foods for school cafeterias have fought and
continue to fight legislation that hurts their bottom line. Also, as Marion Nestle
(2002) notes, “Congressional reluctance to favor children’s health above the
rights of soft drink producers is a direct result of election laws that require
legislators to obtain corporate funding for their campaigns” (p. 146). Politicians
tend to side with Big Food over the interests of American children because the
former are significant campaign contributors.
In addition to combatting the marketing and provision of unhealthy foods in
schools, there is a strong case to be made for dietary education for all students.
Classes that offer guidance in making healthy choices in the grocery store,
preparing healthy food, and understanding the consequences of a poor diet
would be of practical benefit to students’ bodies. Successfully bringing dietary
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nutrition into a place of prominence in the curriculum is a way to increase quality
of life. Diet only seems trivial to us because we have bought into a Cartesian
dualism, believing the mind to be the master of the body. Matters of diet for this
reason seem less important than institutionalized subjects like literature or
algebra. As with freedom of movement, a healthy diet facilitates learning in
general. When the body is properly attended to, the mind is “freed up” to focus on
other matters more fully.
In addition to dietary considerations, a focus on embodiment in curricula
must include the development of healthy habits of exercise. Reducing limits to
bodily movement, as already mentioned, are a first step in the right direction,
though this is more an issue of mitigating harm done by the school. Schools tend
to offer more guidance and opportunities in terms of exercise than they do in
dietary matters. Some minimum number of physical education credits is typically
required for graduation, and a variety of after school sports are open to students.
Still, the focus seems to be less about developing lifelong habits of exercise than
about having fun or winning games. Also, physical education classes that switch
activities daily are not conducive to habit formation. The focus might be shifted to
physical activity that can be engaged in without undue risk of injury, such that the
activity is suitable even for the elderly. Such activities might include running,
swimming, hiking and yoga. Developing habits of exercise in one or more of
these areas (and others like them), can result in sustained exercise throughout
one’s life. Winning the football game is too often the ultimate focus, and this

147
leads students to dismiss the ultimately more important imperative of lifelong
bodily health.
Aside from diet, exercise, and opportunities for learning by doing, there
are still other ways in which a focus on embodiment can find fruition and offer
benefits. Wrestling, dance, judo, yoga and others help develop bodily
understanding. They show what the body is capable of and how it can move in
relation to other bodies, and make us more comfortable with bodily contact.
Bodily contact is especially important today, as our technologically mediated,
mind-over-body world tends to shun such contact to a highly unnatural extent. In
foraging groups we likely took time each day to groom one another, and our
social natures continue to yearn for contact. We are evolutionarily predisposed to
regular and varied bodily contact, and so such practices could be another way of
attending to our bodies’ needs. Kearney (2014) writes, “We need to find our way
in a tactile world again. We need to return from head to foot, from brain to
fingertip, from iCloud to earth. To close the distance, so that eros is more about
proximity than proxy”. Also, attending to our bodies might include a focus on what
Buddhists call “mindfulness”, or consciously directing one’s attention to what is
happening in one’s mind in the present. Though this could be construed as being
neglectful of the body, mindfulness involves listening to the body, and
acknowledging bodily sensations. Buddhists work towards mindfulness through
meditation, and yoga encourages mindfulness as well. Another path to
mindfulness is simply quiet self-reflection. In our present technological
environment, we are generally in a state of sensory overload. Schools could
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provide screen-free, quiet time for students to practice mindfulness, and thereby
listen more attentively to their bodies.

Ecoliteracy
Just as our technologies contribute to the illusion of mind/body dualism,
they also fool us into believing that we are distinct from nature. Just as the
mind/body dualism led to the false hierarchy of “mind over body”, so the
human/nature dualism leads us to believe that we are the rightful masters of
nature. As Lovelock (1979) notes, “In our belief that all that matters is the good of
humankind we foolishly forget how much we depend upon all the other living
things on Earth” (Preface, para. 5). Posthumanism is in part a rejection of the
anthropocentric worldview, and posthumanist thinkers often address the harmful
legacy wrought by this anthropocentrism. Chapter one argues that technology
facilitates a one-way conversation with nature, in which humans talk but do not
listen. This one-way conversation is also linked to our anthropocentrism, because
meaningful dialogue is difficult when a significant power imbalance (or perceived
power imbalance) exists between conversants. As long as the slave (nature) is
giving us what we ask for, there is no stimulus to engage with or reflect upon the
slave. However, this perceived power imbalance between humans and nature is
starting to fray, along with ideas that distinguish between humans and nature.
No curriculum today that makes a claim to provide a comprehensive
education for the young is adequate without a focus on ecoliteracy. David Orr
(1992) coined this term to describe knowledge of how life systems function and
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interact with one another and their environments. Crucially, ecoliteracy informs
human action, as it explores how our actions affect other natural systems. As
such, ecoliteracy offers a path to a sustainable existence with and part of all
other life on the planet. Such literacy is a curricular imperative because human
actions presently threaten planetary life to the extent that we have entered a
global mass extinction period, the first such event to be caused by human
activity. Anthropocentric climate change, soil degradation, water and air pollution,
ocean acidification, resource extraction, urban sprawl, and others have
contributed to a “free fall” in biodiversity.
Sylvia Wynter (2015) places much of the onus for global environmental
issues on the Western world, not just for their own direct harm to the
environment, but for persuading much of the rest of the world to follow along.
She writes that the West told the victims of imperial subordination “…that the
problem with [them] wasn’t that [they’d] been imperially subordinated, wasn’t that
[they’d] been both socioculturally dominated and economically exploited, but that
[they] were underdeveloped. The West said: ‘Oh, well, no longer be a native but
come and be a Man like us! Become homo oeconomicus!’” (p. 20). Wynter here
ties the persuasion of formerly colonized peoples to industrialize to the global
warming crisis today. This idea, that the West deserves the lion’s share of
culpability for anthropocentric climate change, would seem to make ecoliteracy
an all the more vital component of a curriculum oriented towards Western youth.
It falls upon the West to seek to undo and/or mitigate the damage wrought.
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As our actions throw more and more life systems into disequilibria, we
increasingly find our own livelihoods threatened. Contrary to our anthropocentric
beliefs, humans are not masters of life but are rather biotic components of it.
Technology, combined with an anthropocentric worldview, blind us to our
responsibility to function as beneficial components of the systems of which we
are parts. Ecoliteracy can foster ecologically sensitive praxis by overturning these
anthropocentric worldviews. By understanding the interconnections and
interdependencies of life systems, people come to know their place in the larger
scheme. The illusion of the perfectly autonomous individual entity is replaced
with a sense of shared identity. Much as we abstain from unhealthy foods due to
their impact on our bodies, ecologically sensitive praxis involves abstaining from
actions that negatively impact the larger bodies in which we are embedded.
The curricular imperative of ecoliteracy is directed towards inspiring
ecologically aware praxis. Leadership is desperately needed in the fights against
biodiversity loss, climate change, and others, which are rarely deemed
newsworthy. They don’t grab our attention, or push our buttons in ways that
compel us to know about them. To the contrary, many people seek to avoid
knowing about these issues, preferring the “head in the sand” approach. As such,
there is a need for people to spread this unpleasant and unwanted message.
Berners-Lee and Clark (2013) write, “Given where we are now, it’s crucial that
more people hear the simple facts loud and clear: that climate change presents
huge risks; that our efforts to solve it so far haven’t worked; and that there’s a
moral imperative to constrain unabated fossil fuel use on behalf of current and
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especially future generations” (Chapter 14, para. 9). In addition, lifestyle choices
can help the fight in small ways and large. One should focus on living more
simply, which is to say avoiding consumerist tendencies and refraining from
actions that (directly or indirectly) cause undue harm to other life systems.
Berners-Lee and Clark, again, write, “There are no hard and fast rules except
that doing something is better than doing nothing – and that if it feels invigorating
it’s probably both more sustainable and more catchy. Many of us feel that we’re
too insignificant to make a difference, but the social and political ripple effects of
our efforts may be more powerful than we’d expect” (Chapter 19, para. 2).
Individual action can serve as inspiration to others to follow suit, and so individual
action can contribute to a movement. However, resisting consumerism is made
difficult by that not insignificant portion of our education that comes from
corporate marketing.
We must use our technologies with restraint, and recognize that
technology will not “save us”. As Toyama (2015) notes, technology, “…amplifies
people’s capacities in the direction of their intentions” (p. 29). People often
mistakenly view technology as developing in a neutral and autonomous manner.
We often forget that technological advances are human directed, and developed
as means to some predetermined end. Societal intention presently is
overwhelmingly directed towards maintaining Capitalism’s status quo, and as this
intention involves taking from nature, technology’s amplification is resulting in
great harm to the natural world. Without sufficient societal intention to live in
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harmony with other life systems, our technologies will remain a central part of the
problem, rather than a solution.
It is difficult to make people understand anthropocentric climate change,
and still more difficult to inspire action to address it. Global warming is often “too
big” for people to wrap their heads around. A consequence of global warming is
an increase in temperature aberrations in general, such that many areas
experience unseasonably low temperatures at certain times. This can obscure
the bigger picture of a long-term global temperature increase. Many of our
actions contribute to global warming, and so we may be reluctant to acknowledge
truths that implicate ourselves as parts of the problem. Cows emit methane, and
so beef consumption adds a potent greenhouse gas into the atmosphere. Driving
cars releases carbon dioxide, the main climate change gas. The electricity we
use may come from coal burning power plants. Examples such as these are
many and overwhelming. There is a tendency here towards what Harman (2011)
refers to as overmining, in which we view events as being too large to be
influenced by individual action. This suggests that even when people
acknowledge the dangers of global warming, they may not adjust their actions to
live in a more sustainable way. Climate change threatens our ways of life at
foundational levels, especially in regards to the Capitalist system. Smith’s
invisible hand, thought to be guiding us to ever-greater heights, seems now to be
directing us (and other life on the planet) towards our doom.
There are a number of ways to mitigate the educational difficulties of
ecoliteracy. Of utmost importance is that, faced by such obstacles, the teacher
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not fall prey to overmining. It is vital to speak up, to speak clearly, to speak
without exaggeration but to address matters fully and directly. Also, one should
not close off paths without opening others. We cannot limit ourselves to telling
people what they should cease doing, but must show people alternatives. We
need to make the case for these alternatives as being better both for the world,
and crucially, the individual. Self-actualization can be achieved outside of the
market system, and people need to understand how this is so. Living a life of
simplicity is more fulfilling than one of acquisition, and this is most effectively
taught by practicing what we teach. Finally, even within the confines of today’s
schools, it is possible for teachers to weave ecoliteracy education into all
curricula. Orr (1992) advocates for the reshaping of, “…institutions to function as
transdisciplinary laboratories that include components such as agriculture, solar
technologies, forestry, land management, wildlife, waste cycling, architectural
design, and economics” (p. 90). Short of this, many existing curricula can
contribute to ecoliteracy. Natural sciences and geography provide clear
opportunities, but the arts (including literature) can also lend themselves to the
task quite well. Art is inspired by our environments, after all. Math, which
sometimes seems so disconnected from the tangible world, can be used to
explain environmental issues with precision, and offer a forecast of what’s to
come. History is another valuable contributor to ecoliteracy, as environmental
management (or mismanagement) has repeatedly proven to be pivotal in the rise
and fall of cultures. There is evidence that deforestation and erosion for example
contributed to the fall of the Mayan empire (Diamond, 159).
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Biophilia can drive ecoliteracy, much as a child’s love of bedtime stories
can motivate them to learn to read for themselves. Biophilia is a love for, and
acknowledgement of a shared bond with, other life systems. This can be
engendered through contact, and so education for ecoliteracy should include
opportunities for learners to be in contact with (and if possible, immersed in)
other life systems. One can also nurture a love for nature by sharing one’s own
love for it, or that of others. Literature and art can be helpful in this regard. I am
reminded of the poetry of Whitman: “The press of my foot to the earth springs a
hundred affections, They scorn the best I can do to relate them” (p. 27). One
might also look to Thoreau’s prose, to the landscape paintings of Francis Edwin
Church, the photography of Ansel Adams, and countless others. We are so cut
off from the natural world that we often fail to hear what nature says. Developing
a craving for that proximity, and following up on those cravings, makes us more
receptive to messages from other life systems. The technologically facilitated
monologue with nature can be transformed into a dialogue in this way. What’s
more, developing ecoliteracy turns a person into a translator, allowing other life to
speak through them and to other people.
The tendency towards overmining might best be addressed through
instructional scaffolding. Learners often benefit from a scaffold or framework on
which to hang new knowledge. They must have some way to relate the new
knowledge to knowledge that has already been internalized. This is one reason
why the order in which a curriculum is presented is important; there is a logical
procession, a continuous building onto what came before. With new topics,
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teachers are wise to start by relating the topic to something the student has
already learned somewhere else. In the same way, one will be more likely to gain
ecoliteracy in the global sense if they first develop it at the local level. By
gradually scaffolding up from local to global, the learner is less likely to feel
disconnected and powerless to global environmental considerations. Put more
generally, ecoliteracy can be developed by starting with an investigation of local
environmental issues. Learning about local issues can be combined with joining
and/or starting local conservation efforts.

Conclusion
Though seemingly disparate, the four curricular imperatives I have
outlined (critical media literacy, critical cultural studies, ecopedagogy, and bodily
health) all reflect an acknowledgement that our bodies are not autonomous,
disconnected, or individual in any definitive sense. As such, these imperatives all
can be said to spring from a posthumanism that blurs the boundaries of the
human body. Because our bodies are conflated with our media, critical media
literacy has become vital. As we recognize our interconnections and
interdependencies with all people, we recognize the need to understand the
perspective of the Other. Our bodies can become neglected as their functions
are replaced by machines, raising the imperative of a renewed focus on
embodiment. Finally, the need for ecoliteracy arises from the recognition that we
are each biotic components of greater bodies, of which we are each in part
responsible. Braidotti (2013) notes that, “For posthuman theory, the subject is a
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transversal entity, fully immersed in and immanent to a network of non-human
(animal, vegetable, viral) relations” (p. 193). This transversality, this cutting
across boundaries of skin, mind, silicon, etc., is what a posthuman curriculum
must address. Our bodies can no longer be conceived as ending with our skin,
and this makes them much more difficult to conceive. The task of making sense
of the posthuman body, however, has never been more important.
Each of the four posthumanist educational imperatives proposed take into
account certain vital connections that can often go ignored. Our media are
among our primary connections to the outside world, and the nature of this media
is often left uninvestigated by users. Cultural studies offers an opportunity to
examine connections between cultures, including connections that function as
systems of exploitation and/or oppression, but also connections that challenge
Western notions of the “human”. Ecopedagogy and a focus on healthy bodies
account for and explore the connections between body and earth, and mind and
body. Such a focus on connections is a posthumanist move, as it works to
problematize notions of the autonomous human. Note that three broad
posthumanist educational goals outlined in the previous chapter were
awareness, restraint, and lifelong learning. The focus on connections in the
educational imperatives of this chapter follow directly from these goals.
Knowledge of the connections between mind and body, body and body, bodies
and earth, etc. directly facilitate both awareness and restraint. By being more in
tune with our inescapable connectedness to the world, we begin to see the
health of our bodies, our neighbors, and the life systems that encompass us as
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being connected to our own health. The educational imperatives outlined also
promote lifelong learning, as our bodies, cultural relations, environments, and
media are constantly changing. Indeed, the rapidity of some of these changes
raises an urgent need for continued learning (electronic media and environmental
degradation come immediately to mind as two such areas of rapid change). In
the following, concluding chapter, pedagogy will be proposed to facilitate the
educational goals of chapter three, and the curricular imperatives outlined in this
chapter. The posthumanist preoccupation with connections and especially
problematizing the notion of the distinct autonomous human will be reflected in
pedagogy that views education as a distinctly and unavoidably distributed affair,
rather than something that occurs in an individual human mind.

158
CHAPTER 5
BARYCENTRIC PEDAGOGY
This chapter will outline a pedagogy that is mindful of posthumanist
theory. After a brief review of posthumanism, considerations of present trends in
technology use and environmental issues will follow. These considerations, it is
hoped, will prove adequate justification of the need for changes in predominant
pedagogies. Following this, I will introduce and elaborate on what I call
barycentric pedagogy. In physics, the barycenter is the center of mass of two or
more bodies orbiting each other. In this case, the “bodies” are (post)human
bodies that are both simultaneously teachers and learners, and the curriculum is
the barycenter, or point around which teacher/learners orbit. This pedagogy is
thus neither teacher nor student-centered, and involves learning that is both
distributed and reflexive. I will argue that learning does not occur in the individual
alone, but is distributed between the (post)humans (including their bodies),
technologies used by them, and the life systems to which the they are connected.
Next I will explore the ideal setting for this pedagogy, which has gone by a
number of names, including “affinity space” (Gee, 2013), “knowledge space”
(Levy, 1997), and “community of interest” (Collins and Halverson, 2009). The
barycentric pedagogy suggests a vastly different role for professional teachers
than what is commonly practiced. This new role will be investigated, and will
include a picture of the teacher as mentor, and a shift from didactic instruction to
common productive inquiry. This chapter will conclude with an exploration of
dangers and difficulties of this posthumanism-informed pedagogy.
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Review
Humanism has been problematized on several fronts, including its
Eurocentricism and notions of human mastery over nature. Notably, these two
fronts are related, as people not of European descent have been viewed as more
“savage” and less “human”. In this manner humanism has helped justify
enslavement and oppression. Certain humanist tenets are presently being
challenged by two related and escalating trends: environmental damage and
technological advance. It is generally accepted that we have entered a period of
human-caused mass extinction of life (only the sixth in earth’s history, and the
first to be caused by human action), facilitated by technology. At the same time
technology use threatens life on the planet, it is having profound effects on how
we act, look, perceive, and communicate. Mark Hansen (2015) writes,
“Encompassing everything from social media and data-mining to passive sensing
and environmental microsensors, twenty-first-century media designate media
following their shift from a past-directed recording platform to a data-driven
anticipation of the future” (Introduction, section 2, para. 1). Fundamentally
different from the media that came before, twenty-first-century media are always
with us, ready with data to inform present and future actions. In this way they are
more akin to bodily sense organs than previous media, such that their rise
bolsters arguments that we are now posthuman.
Humanism’s emphasis on the individual subject has also been critiqued in
posthumanism and elsewhere. The “free individual” has been responsible for
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much pain and death among both humans and other life forms. Posthumanism
blurs the boundaries between the individual and the group, humans and the life
systems to which they are connected, humans and other animals, biology and
technology, and others. Posthumanism holds that we are all what Pettman
(2011) has called “humanimalchine”, a mixture of human, animal, and machine
(Introduction, para. 12). Through much of human history technology has served
to isolate humans from one another and thereby foster individuality, but today’s
media forge new connections between us. Social media make thinking and
expression much more communal affairs and in some ways signal a return to the
communal expression of tribal foraging groups who, like today’s media users,
were always connected to each other. Today’s technologies also threaten
notions of individuality by reversing the historical order and making us
appendages to them. The algorithms and probabilities that increasingly govern
our lives threaten our notions of the distinct agential subject by breaking each of
us up into so many regression variables. Where industrialization made us feel
like cogs in a machine, today’s technologies reduce us to disembodied digitized
data.

Present trends
We are entering a period of great uncertainty due to exponential growth in
species extinctions, population growth, and computer processing speed. All three
of these variables, after a long period of modest growth, are now entering a near
vertical phase. This is akin to how compound interest in a retirement account
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ideally works. While initial growth is modest, after a number of years interest paid
begins to earn more interest itself, and explosive growth can eventually result.
Alternately, exponential growth is described in the fable about the traveler who
made a wager with a king over a chess game. If the traveler won, the king
agreed to pay him an amount of rice that started with one grain, and doubled for
every square on the chessboard. When the man eventually won the game, the
rice owed was tallied up in the following manner: one grain for the first square,
two for the second, four for the third, and so on. The total for the eighth square
was 128 grains. While the growth in rice was modest at first, by the final chess
square the total rice owed was over 18 quintillion grains. Human population,
species extinctions, and computer processing power have all been growing at an
exponential rate. Importantly, all three have entered a phase of explosive growth,
much as the rice owed begins to grow more quickly after square 58. As these
lines become more vertical it becomes more difficult to predict what the future
brings. This verticality is akin to being in a state of free-fall. Other life forms,
including many humans, have already hit the ground and met their doom. As the
rest of us fall, some panic, others are in denial, and still others are trying to put
parachutes together.
Moore’s Law predicts that computer processing power will double every
two years, and has been roughly accurate since it was hypothesized in 1965.
While computer capabilities grew modestly in the sixties and seventies, by 1996
IBM’s Deep Blue defeated world champion Gary Kasparov at chess. In 2011,
IBM’s Watson bested Jeopardy champions Ken Jennings and Brad Rutter. These
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milestones could be the square 58 of automation. Once relegated to routine
tasks, computers, robots and software are increasingly able to perform
sophisticated non-routine tasks. Martin Ford (2015) notes that demand for
lawyers and pharmacists has fallen as discovery software takes the place of
junior attorneys, and robots take over most pharmacy tasks (Introduction, para.
24). In healthcare, software is increasingly able to perform the task of
radiologists, among others, and Watson (of Jeopardy fame) is proving to be an
adept diagnostician. Even the teaching profession is seeing encroachment, as
essay grading algorithms get better each day, and massively open online
courses (MOOC’s) allow for a virtually unlimited number of students to be taught
by one teacher.
In the past, technological advances have offset job destruction through the
creation of new jobs. When the blacksmiths were laid off, they could find new
employment in the automotive industry. Many economists expect this trend to
continue, but for no other reason than that it has become a trend. The fall in the
labor force participation rate since 2007 (to its present lowest point in over 30
years) suggests that the trend may have already ended, and that the loss of jobs
to technological disruption may no longer be offset by gains in new industries.
The list of what computers and robots are unable to do is steadily and inexorably
getting shorter. As machines do a larger share of the work needed, our present
economic system will shunt larger portions of income to capital, at the expense of
labor. In other words, the owners of the machines will benefit at the cost of the
former laborers whose jobs have become obsolete. It is possible that this too has
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already begun, as labor’s share of income has been falling since the 80’s, while
that of capital has been steadily rising. In addition, income inequality has been
steadily rising for over thirty years. We face the impending extinction of the
middle class in America as a result of these developments, to be replaced by a
technocratic plutocracy. Ford (2015) writes that, “robots, machine learning
algorithms, and other forms of automation are gradually going to consume much
of the base of the job skills pyramid. And because artificial intelligence
applications are poised to increasingly encroach on more skilled occupations,
even the safe area at the top of the pyramid is likely to contract over time” (p.
252). Disturbingly, this suggests that even if the quality of education improves,
good paying jobs are becoming increasingly scarce. As a result, we are already
seeing credential inflation, such that people with college degrees are taking jobs
for which a degree is not required at all. These developments are most dire for
marginalized groups who are already often at an educational disadvantage, due
to discrimination, lower socioeconomic levels, troubled inner city schools, etc.
Jobs worked today by African Americans with high school diplomas could be
worked tomorrow by college-educated whites. Though the squeeze will be felt by
nearly everyone, as usual those at the bottom will feel it most keenly. Aside from
the vast social and economic upheavals such developments might entail, the
question of how we will spend our time becomes more important. As Voltaire
(trans. 2005) wrote, “Work keeps at bay three great evils: boredom, vice, and
need” (Chapter 30). In a world in which most people are without work or
substantial income, what will we do?
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Another rising trend, species extinctions, is tied to climate change, habitat
destruction, nutrient depletion of the soil, pollution, and other human causes,
such that geologists refer to the present mass extinction as the Anthropocene. In
her book, “The Sixth Extinction”, Elizabeth Kolbert (2014) notes, “It is estimated
that one-third of all reef-building corals, a third of all freshwater mollusks, a third
of sharks and rays, a quarter of all mammals, a fifth of all reptiles, and a sixth of
all birds are headed toward oblivion” (p. 17). While the exponential growth in the
human population is a primary driver of the decline in biodiversity, it is also a
function of technological advance. It is not just the growth in the human
population, but also the advances in technologies that enable us to take ever
more from the earth and saddle nature (including ourselves and especially our
children) with more of the dangerous byproducts of our consumption. Today’s
young people are entering a world in which biodiversity is in free fall, the planet is
steadily becoming less hospitable to life, and the population threatens to exceed
the earth’s carrying capacity (some estimates suggest that we have already
exceeded it). As with the advances in automation, these environmental trends
are not reversible in the short run, and seem likely to lead to significant societal
challenges in the future.

Barycentric Pedagogy
The barycenter is the center of mass of bodies orbiting one another. The
moon does not technically orbit the earth. Rather, earth and moon orbit a
barycenter that is several thousand kilometers from the earth’s center. Notably,
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centrifugal forces of the earth’s movement around the barycenter are part of what
causes our tides. The planets pull the sun this way and that as they orbit the
barycenter of the solar system. When a body orbits a much more massive body,
the barycenter is located near the center of the more massive body. The earth,
for example, exerts very little pull on the sun. Conversely, the barycenter of Pluto
and its largest moon Charon (which is about half the size of Pluto) lies well
outside of Pluto such that both planetoid and moon orbit a point in between the
two.
A barycentric pedagogy views (post)human bodies as being analogous to
heavenly bodies. Some mixture of knowledge, skills, and abilities in each person
is comparable to mass in this analogy, such that those with more of that mixture
exert more “gravitational pull”. As with planets, stars, and moons, proximity also
influences the pull between people. Importantly, there is no strict distinction
between student and teacher. Rather, we are each both student and teacher to
varying degrees and depending on the context.
Consider Ranciere’s (1991) explanation of the principle of explication: “It is
[superior] intelligence that allows the master to transmit his knowledge by
adapting it to the intellectual capacities of the student and allows him to verify
that the student has satisfactorily understood what he learned” (p. 7). Explication
has long been thought to be an essential component of education. Such
pedagogy is oriented in one direction only, directed from the teacher/sun to the
students/planets. This sort of pedagogy is unrealizable in reality, much as the
assumption that the planets orbit a fixed star betrays a faulty understanding of
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basic physics. As with gravity, education never flows exclusively one way. Even
in the case of our solar system, Jupiter exerts sufficient gravitational force on the
sun that their shared barycenter lies outside of the sun’s radius. Even if my
knowledge in some area is unmatched, I cannot teach someone else anything of
significance without them teaching me in turn. Even Pluto exerts some pull on the
sun. Foucault (1977) argues that power is everywhere, that it, “is not exercised
simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests
them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them,
just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them”
(Chapter 1, para. 25). As such, it is never solely possessed by any one individual
or structure. As with Foucalt’s conception of power, the barycentric pedagogy is
distributed among individuals, structures, objects and others. It is to some extent
self-organizing and maintaining, and is therefore not simply created and used by
a single teacher. Walter Isaacson, in his book “The Innovators: How a Group of
Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution” (2014), identified
a number of partnerships that proved fecund ground for innovation, including Ada
Lovelace & Charles Babbage. While Babbage conceived the Analytical Engine, a
precursor to the computer, Lovelace was able to see and to explain to others
what Babbage’s machine could do, and she glimpsed in it much of what modern
computers eventually became. This dynamic can be seen more recently in the
collaboration of Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs, in which the former generated
new ideas and the latter envisioned possibilities for their end use. People
capable of working in groups in which individuals complement one another like
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this can foster innovation. Isaacson also notes the fruitfulness of, “pairing
visionaries, who can generate ideas, with operating managers, who can execute
them” (Chapter 12, section 3, para. 9). All of this illustrates a need for an
emphasis on collaboration in education. In terms of resisting technocracy, for one
example, fruitful collaborations between practical, engineer-minded students and
artistic, theory-minded ones should be nurtured.
Recognizing the importance of contributions of those who are different
from us is of benefit aside from fostering innovation, as it illustrates the limits of
individualism. As a society, we are presently hobbled by such individualist
sentiments. The prevailing neoliberal ideology emphasizes individual
accomplishment while demonizing collective endeavors such as unions and
governments. To see the benefits of working collaboratively is to recognize
individual limits, to see the wisdom in the contributions of those who are different,
and to foster a more collective mindset. Our present technologies allow us, more
than ever before, to control whom we interact with. As such, we typically
associate with others in whom we recognize ourselves. In high school, artists
group themselves with artists, nerds with nerds, jocks with jocks, etc. Schools
often exacerbate such self-sorting by further grouping like-minded students in
pathways, tracks, diploma types, etc., as well as by age. Students thus tracked
might complete high school without sharing a single class with an alternately
tracked student of the same grade. Posthumans live in echo chambers, and life
in these chambers makes us prone to behaviors that bring harm to ourselves and
other life systems. New information gets filtered as it enters one’s bubble so as to
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be more palatable. Consider partisan news outlets for an obvious example of
this, as different networks present the same events in different lights, which
frequently leads to the drawing of different conclusions. By closing ourselves off
from different perspectives, we foster ignorance and fear. Teachers can work to
resist such groupings to the extent they are able, by selective grouping in the
classroom, requesting mixed-group classes, fostering collaboration between
classes, and others. However, the pervasiveness of the systemic groupings,
combined with the urge many of us feel to associate with like-minded people, can
make such teacher efforts an uphill battle.
The barycentric pedagogy need not be limited to the binary system of two
(post)humans. Any interconnected group of (post)humans will do, from small
groups all the way up to societies and beyond. Individual Wikipedia pages are
good examples of large groups of teacher/learners. As teachers, page editors
each inform the methods of instruction, debating not only what content goes on
the page, but how that content is presented. On the page for former Australia
Prime Minister Julia Gillard, for example, an edit war sprang up over the topic of
religion. While Gillard has expressed that she does not believe in God, the fight
arose over whether to label her religion as “atheist”, “none”, or to remove the
religion bullet from Gillard’s information box altogether. This fight was thus
essentially pedagogical in nature, because while the content was not in dispute,
its framing was. There is an easily perceptible truth in the notion that we are each
both teacher and learner. The old adage that the student must take ownership of
their learning is noteworthy here, and can be interpreted as a requirement for
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learners to in some measure be teachers also. This is reflected in the Confucius’
Analects: “When I have presented one corner of a subject to any one, and he
cannot from it learn the other three, I do not repeat my lesson” (Book 7, Chapter
8). Confucius here explicitly requires the students to partially teach themselves.
There is a reflexivity in influence between the conscious and the
unconscious mind. Consciousness is akin to a control center receiving briefings
composed by the unconscious, and based on sense data. Conscious decisions
are based on these “briefings”. Conscious attention, for example to a task
involving learning, can subsequently alter the subconscious. Consciously seeking
out political views that align with one’s own can affect the briefings sent by the
unconscious mind. We can unconsciously come to see the world through a “lens”
that reinforces our political views in this manner. Comparable reflexivity in
influence is apparent between the brain and the body. Each exerts some
measure of influence over the other, such that a healthy body makes for a
healthier brain, and vice versa. Of course, there is no strict distinction between
conscious/unconscious or mind/body, and so it is no great leap to assert that
learning, when it occurs, is distributed between mind (both conscious and
unconscious) and body. Learning involves changes in synaptic connections in
the brain, and thus has a physical component. These changes in the brain can
affect future action of the body, which can in turn further influence the brain.
Taking a cybernetic view, a feedback loop of information between a system’s
parts is a prerequisite for system learning.

170
Using this same cybernetic framework, learning can also be said to occur
between (post)humans and their environments. Bateson (1972) writes, “The total
self-corrective unit which processes information, or, as I say, ‘thinks’ and ‘acts’
and ‘decides,’ is a system whose boundaries do not at all coincide with the
boundaries of either the body or of what is popularly called the ‘self’ or
‘consciousness’…The network is not bound by the skin but includes all external
pathways along which information can travel…” (p. 319). A person learning to
serve a tennis ball is part of a system that includes her body, racket, ball, court,
wind, and perhaps a peer or coach. Learning and pedagogy are both distributed
throughout this system. All parts of the system make contributions both to
learning and the method by which learning takes place.
That learning takes place through a distributed system including humans
and non-humans is particularly clear in the game “Tetris”. This video game
consists of manipulating falling puzzle pieces (by adjusting lateral movement
and/or rotating the pieces ninety degrees) such that they nest into the pieces
below. Kirsh and Maglio (1994) took notice of the habit by players of this game to
rotate blocks through all configurations on the screen as they played. In other
words, rather than thinking about the best position for the block to be in, and then
rotating to that position, players would cycle through all possible positions on the
screen before deciding the best one. The authors write, “…certain cognitive and
perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing
actions in the world than by performing computational actions in the head alone.
We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of
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this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve
cognition” (p. 513). The cognitive task in this case was outsourced to the
environment of the game. Acting on the environment in order to improve
cognition is referred to by Kirsh and Maglio as “epistemic action”.
When playing chess on the computer, I have found that my game
improves if my tangible chessboard is nearby. I can game out various courses of
action on the tangible board much more easily and quickly than I am capable of
doing otherwise. The chessboard and my mind together form a learning system.
Other aspects of thought are distributed as well. Daniel Wegner (1991) coined
the phrase “transactive memory” to denote “a shared system for encoding,
storing, and retrieving information” (p. 923). He found that relationship partners
share the task of storing memories, and that their combined transactive memory
is therefore greater than the memory of one partner alone. This notion has also
been used to explain the Internet’s effect on memory formation. We are much
less likely to remember information that is readily available online, as we offload
memories to our computers. Knowing that we can access the memories online
leads us to devote less space in our own heads for memory storage.
Asserting that this barycentric pedagogy is distributed between people is
perhaps more intuitively persuasive than the idea that pedagogy is also
immanent in other forms of life and even non-living objects. However, a few
examples should illustrate how our environment teaches us, and hence
contributes to pedagogy. When learning how to serve a tennis ball, the racket
becomes assimilated into the bodily system of the learner in undeniable ways.
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The player’s brain treats the racket as an extension of the body, and is eventually
able to know how far the racket extends into space without requiring visual or
tactile feedback. The diameter, string tension, grip, etc. all shape the method by
which learning takes place. Consider also the impact on pedagogy by
educational media. Regardless of the content of the textbook, and hence of the
curriculum, the book itself shapes the method of learning. As McLuhan (1964)
has noted, the written word emphasizes sequentiality, uniformity, and continuity.
Hence, objects within the learning system always contribute in some measure to
pedagogy.
Let me review the features of the barycentric pedagogy thus far. First is
the assertion that entities are simultaneously teachers and learners.
Problematizing the teacher/learner distinction is analogous to the posthumanist
effort to muddle the boundary between human and animal. Recognizing our own
animality is a step towards a reflexivity of influence between “us” and “them”. It is
an acknowledgement of connection, and an assertion of kinship. Such muddling
is intended to shake us loose from the belief in the rightness of human rule over
nature. In much the same way, barycentric pedagogy runs counter to
conceptions of learning as a one-way flow of influence between a designated
teacher and their students, instead focusing on their kinship as neither entirely
teacher nor learner, but both. In the barycentric analogy, a teacher/learner’s
“mass” is the combination of knowledge, skills, and/or abilities that that entity
brings to the system. Greater mass results in greater gravitational pull, but all
entities have mass and thus exert some pull. Therefore, all entities in the learning
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system shape the method by which education takes place. In other words,
barycentric pedagogy is both distributed and reflexive throughout a system that
may include any of the following: consciousness, unconsciousness, bodies,
technologies, the environment, objects, and other (post)humans. In certain
systems, a single entity may exert substantially more “gravitational” pull than the
other entities, exerting more pedagogical influence than the other bodies in the
system. In schools, teachers generally possess significantly more knowledge in
their content areas than their students, and as such exert more pedagogical
influence. Inanimate objects also can exert more pedagogical influence on their
users than the users exert on them. A rifle in the hands of a soldier in basic
training is an example of this. A final characteristic of barycentric pedagogy is it’s
cyclical nature. Teacher/learners cycle between rounds of feedback/sharing and
rounds of productive inquiry.
The barycentric pedagogy is in itself not so much a prescription for action
as it is a reality we must face. Unlike other methods of teaching, it varies widely
depending on the context, and is never under the full control of any one entity. It
is immanent in all life systems and the objects to which they are connected.
Drawing heavily from posthumanist and cybernetic theories, a this pedagogy
problematizes notions of individuality and autonomy. We all exert influence on
one another, even as others’ influence is always exerted upon us. Following
Foucault, we recognize the distributed nature of power. Also, this pedagogy owes
much to John Dewey, who recognized the need for a happy middle between
student-centered and teacher-centered education. Further, Dewey (1938) wrote
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of a “principle of interaction” which he understood to be a prerequisite for
experience. This principle, “assigns equal rights to both factors in experience—
objective and internal conditions. Any normal experience is an interplay of these
two sets of conditions” (Chapter 3, para. 20). Experience for Dewey was thus
always distributed between internal and external.

Barycentric Pedagogies In Full Fruition
We are all biotic components (and ourselves assemblages of
components) of larger systems that carry out various functions. Our education
system must be judged overall as having only limited success in its stated
function. However, thriving educational systems do exist in which the barycentric
pedagogy is on full display. These systems have been identified by a variety of
names which nevertheless appear to all refer to the same general thing. In the
following paragraphs I will review relevant literature on these educational
systems that exhibit barycentric pedagogy.
In “Collective Intelligence” (1997) Pierre Levy posits a number of
“anthropological spaces” that have organized human activity and thought. The
nomadic space of totems, lineage, myths, and rites was followed by the territorial
space, a product of writing, geography and cartography. The territorial space
made the rise of the state possible. The Industrial Revolution brought the
commodity space, with its economy of statistical and material goods. Today, the
knowledge space is, according to Levy, usurping the commodity space as the
primary organizer of human endeavors. In this space, human qualities are more
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important than capital or the state, which were primary foci of previous spaces.
Identity in the knowledge space is for Levy a function of skill, nomadic
cooperation and continuous hybridization, rather than socioeconomic status or
lineage.
Where groups in previously dominant anthropological spaces could be
designated as organic (based on family relations/lineage) or centrally organized
(i.e. by the state), groups in the knowledge space are self-organized. Such
communities, which he refers to as “molecular groups”, exhibit all of the
characteristics of a barycentric pedagogy. Molecular groups are for Levy,
“…collective intelligences that…continuously refine their skills, and attempt to
enhance their individual qualities indefinitely” (p. 53). Such groups allow for direct
democracy, which fits nicely with the notion in barycentric pedagogy that all
bodies have gravity, or some measure of influence. Levy writes, “…the members
of a molecular community communicate laterally, reciprocally, outside categories
and hierarchies, folding and refolding, weaving and reweaving…” (p. 55). By
reciprocally I believe Levy means at least in part that all members of the group
are both speakers and listeners, teachers and learners.
In “The Anti-Education Era” (2013) James Gee examines the educational
attributes of what he calls “affinity spaces”, which have much in common with the
molecular groups above. Affinity spaces, often but not exclusively found online,
join people with some shared interest together, often of widely varying levels of
knowledge and/or mastery of said interest. Admission is generally open, and
participation voluntary. Learners take responsibility for their own education, and

176
proceed at their own pace. At their best, such spaces make no distinctions of
race, gender, culture, rank, intelligence, etc. Instead, the worth of each member’s
contributions are judged on their merits as determined by the group as a whole.
The curricula of these spaces are constantly evolving, and often tailored to the
learners. Individuals will visit these spaces seeking answers to questions, putting
work up for display and/or critique, answering the questions of others, correcting
inaccuracies, etc. That visitors to these spaces come voluntarily is a significant
component to their success. Ranciere notes that, “…one can teach what one
doesn’t know if the student is emancipated, that is to say, if he is obliged to use
his own intelligence” (p. 15). In other words, the motivated student can learn
even from the ignorant. Importantly, affinity spaces are not typically or even
primarily the only places where learning occurs under these curricula. Instead
learners alternately visit such spaces sporadically, in between engaging in the
endeavor/hobby/passion. The learning that takes place is distributed between the
affinity space and the learner’s engagement in the endeavor.
Such spaces are for Gee examples of, “synchronized intelligence. Multiple
tools, different types of people, and diverse skill sets are networked in ways that
make everyone smarter and make the space itself a form of emergent
intelligence. The sum is more than its parts; the collective is smarter than the
smartest person in it” (Ch. 20, para. 13). Importantly, the author specifies that
affinity spaces include people of all ages, skills and interest and ability levels.
Further, he writes, “In an affinity space, leadership and status are flexible. People
sometimes lead and mentor; sometimes they follow and are mentored. There are
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no fixed bosses and teachers, though people acknowledge different paths to
mastery and know where people are on them (Ch. 20, para. 13). In these spaces,
people take responsibility for their own educations. At the same time, as their
efforts spring from interest and/or passion, there is no clear line between work
and play.
In “Rethinking Education in the Age of Technology” (2009), Alan Collins
and Richard Halverson explore what they call “communities of interest” (COIs).
These communities are contrasted with “communities of place” (COPs) that are
based on geographic location. While churches and schools are COPs, COIs can
connect people regardless of their location. For examples of COIs, the authors
list scientific societies, teacher unions, orchid fanciers, and rock musician fan
clubs. As hubs for communication, the authors argue that COPs are being
usurped by COIs. The authors note that information technologies are not a
prerequisite for COIs, but that they aid greatly in making them possible. Collins
and Halverson lead their book off with an exploration of the one-room
schoolhouse of the past, and note that students learned from and taught each
other in groups within the room. As with Gee’s affinity spaces, the ages of
learners was mixed. As such, they argue that the one room schoolhouse was
closer to the COI ideal than most schools of today.
The shift from communities that are place-based to those that are interestbased does not bode well for schools, Collins and Halverson note, as education
occurs where communication occurs. They write, “The virtue of communities of
kids with shared passions is that they can take place without any involvement of
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schools…Because the online communities tap into children’s passions, they
should be self-sustaining, and the community will encourage children to learn
deeply about a subject they care about” (p. 124). Another virtue the authors
identify in communities of interest is that assessment is embedded throughout
one’s engagement in the community. This is contrasted with the periodic
assessment and grading in schools. They write, “By embedding assessment into
the ongoing learning process, it takes much of the onus off making mistakes” (p.
99). Failure in such a setting functions primarily as feedback to drive future
corrections. Instead of grades, which can be stigmatized, COIs offer constructive
critique. A common focus on improvement by all, rather than competition, is a
driving function of COIs. By removing the stigma of failure, collectives such as
these can foster lifelong learning.
Though the terminology varies, the system described by these authors is
essentially the same. What is created in each of these spaces is a mind of minds,
in which the total is greater than the sum of its parts. Failure at the individual
level is an essential part of the learning process, as it functions as feedback.
Engaging in these groups typically occurs in cyclical fashion, such that a member
will visit the space temporarily, before leaving it to work directly on the passion or
interest, and then returning back later to share results and/or seek feedback.
Though the impacts of some contributions are greater than others, everyone is
capable of contributing. Pedagogy is not determined by a lone teacher, but is
immanent in the system.
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In addition to the examples provided by Collins and Halverson above,
there are a number of popular locations for these spaces online. Social media in
particular offer the potentiality for such spaces. Suppose you have an interest in
woodworking. You could search YouTube for woodworking videos. It is likely that
you will notice some regular contributors whose videos you particularly enjoy, so
you subscribe to them. As you attempt new tasks, you watch videos addressing
those tasks. You work a bit, watch a video, work a bit more, watch a bit more,
etc. You post comments, questions, and critiques below videos, and may give
videos a thumbs-up or thumbs-down. As your own skills improve, you begin
posting videos as well, and gaining your own subscribers. In part, you are
teaching yourself, but YouTube contributors teach you as well. The YouTube
format, consisting of videos, comments, up/down votes, view counts, etc., all
contribute to the method by which you learn (i.e. pedagogy). You receive
feedback in the form of answers to questions you’ve posted in comments,
comparing your work to the work done in videos, up or downvotes, and
responses to the videos you post. By participating in comment threads, posting
videos, and even asking questions, you teach others. The YouTube example is
just one of many. Facebook groups and pages offer many of the same
affordances, as do electronic message boards such as Reddit. I follow educators
and curriculum theorists on Twitter, and have learned much through my time in
that space. However, all of the same functionalities that make barycentric
pedagogy possible online can be generated without electronics. Communities of
place and communities of interest need not be mutually exclusive. Book clubs,
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writing groups and yoga studios are all affinity spaces. However, areas with
smaller populations tend to have less variety in this regard. My current home in
Savannah, Georgia has philosophy, ballroom dance, and poetry clubs (among
many others) that are open to the public, while my much smaller home town of
Cordele has none of those.

Danger: Barycentric Pedagogy Is An Engine, But Doesn’t Point the Way
Even when learning occurs through intelligent collectives, such learning
might be harmful to the life systems to which the learners are connected. Recall
the two proposed primary educational goals from earlier in this chapter: fostering
lifelong learning (and thereby offering opportunities for dignity outside of the
market system), and habituating self-control and restraint in technology use. The
barycentric pedagogy can help accomplish the former, but is of little aid in the
latter two. Using the word “growth” as synonymous with “learning”, Dewey (1938)
writes, “growth is not enough; we must also specify the direction in which growth
takes place, the end towards which it tends (p. Ch. 3, para. 8). The child can be
passionate about the game they play on their tablet, and devote hours upon
hours towards improving their skill at it. A thief can be passionate about stealing,
and seek to become a better thief. So, while some measure of passion or interest
is a prerequisite for learning, consideration must be made regarding where that
passion is directed. There must, then, be a consideration of curriculum, in
addition to pedagogy.
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Danger: Bubbles
While the benefits of a barycentric pedagogy are significant, this method
of education is not without potential drawbacks. A goal of this pedagogy is to
foster passion in some area, but passion can lead to tunnel vision. People can
become so consumed by their passions that they neglect other considerations.
The artist obsessed with perfecting her craft may disregard her family, friends,
environment, her own body, etc. Communities of interest can function as
“bubbles” in this way, separating members from the outside world. Matters of
social justice may merit little consideration by the dedicated pianist, chess player,
distance runner, etc. People who become passionate about politics frequently
join groups sympathetic to their views. Information entering the bubble from the
outside gets shaped as it enters, so that it is more readily digestible by the group.
Fox News originally presented the shooting of nine members of the Emanuel
A.M.E. Church in Charleston as a religious attack, while other networks included
race as a potentially motivating factor (the sole factor, as it later was discovered).
Interest groups often actively prohibit dissemination of information not related to
the topic of interest, such that message boards or Internet groups might have
rules against discussing politics, for example.
As part of the Narcissistic urge, humans exhibit homophily, or an attraction
to those like us. In Neolithic bands, early humans were closely attached to a
group of others varying widely in age, appearance, etc. Any member of a
foraging group had access to any other member. From the advent of agriculture
on, we have developed both more tools and more advanced tools for controlling
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who we associate with. From the private dwelling with walls and a door we have
progressed to fully customizable social networks online. From the choice of
which church to attend, we have progressed to explicitly deciding who will and
who will not communicate with us. As such, we are able to indulge our
homophilic urges in much the same way technological advances now allow us to
gorge ourselves on sugary fattening foods. Like the sweet tooth I inherited from
my ancestors, the homophilic urge must have served an evolutionary purpose.
Perhaps, amid such a diverse group in the Neolithic band, homophilia drove
individuals to work to see themselves in others not immediately perceived as
similar. Perhaps this urge made us work to shape others in our image, and us in
theirs. Like the sugar craving, this urge can now be satisfied with hardly any work
at all, which is surely to our detriment. The ability to join others of like mind and
appearance has resulted in fewer bridges between disparate groups. It has led to
the increased partisanship in politics, and helps explain why racism, sexism,
homophobia, etc. persist. Social groups increasingly form echo chambers in
which suspicion of outsiders is shared, and incoming information is colored by
the dogmatism of the group.
By both facilitating social bubbles and fundamentally (and constantly)
changing how we interact, 21st Century technologies challenge notions of
individual identity. Being posthuman means that we are a new species. More
than that, it means we are always a new species, as technological advances
change what it means to be posthuman. It means that we have no distinct
identity, because our changing cyborg bodies rob us of the foundation needed to
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foster a stable one. This is evident at the generational level as well, as children
today have no new music genres or hobbies to call their own. Gardner and Davis
(2013) argue that generations are increasingly becoming defined by the
dominant technology at the time-the “Computer Generation”, the “Cell Phone
Generation”, etc. Mastering this ever (and more speedily) changing techno-scape
takes up a larger and larger amount of the time of young people. Though senses
are extended in the posthuman to allow for more frequent contact with a larger
number of people, the net effect of our communication technologies seems to be
a step towards Narcissism. Technology is used to associate more closely with
like-minded people, such as school cliques (through Twitter, Instagram, etc.) and
groups of people with common interests (Reddit, Youtube, etc.). Rather than
functioning as a tool to enable people to get to know strangers, networked
computers often function as mirrors, something you look at to get an idea of who
you are. The effect is often to create a bubble for people, one that furnishes a
worldview, a frame through which to process outside events. As such groups are
of people who are often similar to one another, they are prone to fostering
misogyny, racism, homophobia, religious intolerance, etc., and frequently leave
people susceptible to confirmation bias. Frat houses, gamer culture, athletics,
and hip-hop, for just a few examples, offer bubbles that isolate these groups from
those who are different. Each of the affinity groups listed, it should be noted,
struggle with misogyny and homophobia. Bubbles do not just pose this risk for
privileged groups. Historically marginalized groups can also fail to see the
outside world clearly when they communicate only within their groups. That being
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said, those with the most access to the technologies are positioned to cause the
most harm to others. Other groups and life systems tend to suffer when the
dominant groups become separated or distinguished from the rest. Our bubbles
blind us from the suffering of others, including that suffering which we ourselves
cause. The “haves,” virtually and tangibly walled off from the “have-nots,” are free
to seek to perpetuate their privilege without being reminded that that is what they
are doing.
Communication technology, though it extends the ability to make contact,
also frequently allows users to control who they have contact with. This ability to
serve as gatekeeper is ultimately an extension of our beliefs regarding private
property that originated during the Paleolithic Revolution. The ability to cut off
contact with whomever one chooses is generally viewed as a right we enjoy,
much like our “right” to own property. Foraging humans, living an existence for
which they were evolved, had no conception of private property. The primary
method of severing contact with another was to leave the foraging band, or to
compel them to leave, and neither of these options were likely to have been
commonly pursued. More commonly, foraging humans worked through their
differences by necessity. Today, we are gatekeepers of social contacts not just
online, but also in our dwellings, through our televisions, and on our phones. We
decide individually, to a greater extent than any humans before us, whom we
allow to communicate with us, and whom we do not. We create insulated bubbles
that are exceedingly comfortable within, but we become increasingly fearful and
suspicious of events outside.
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If agriculture and the written word made us individuals, computermediated social networks make us tribes. These, however, are not the tribes of
the foragers or hunter-gatherers. Instead of facing pressure to “make it work” in
one’s present group, as foragers certainly did, posthumans are presented with
innumerable groups from which to choose, with very little external pressure to
stay in them. People choose the groups in which they see themselves, and are
attached to groups to the degree to which this is so. This process of choosing
one’s social groups is in many ways the same as an individual choosing books.
Books often serve as mirrors, of a sort. People choose the mirrors in which they
see themselves reflected in a way that gives them pleasure. For some, this
involves adventure stories in which readers can assume the viewpoint of the
hero. Others look in self-help or psychology books for a more realistic reflection
of who they are. Of course, books are generally both mirrors and windows, and
many use books as windows through which to look beyond themselves. Fiction
might generally serve as a mirror while non-fiction functions as a window, but this
is by no means always the case. Books allow the creation of primitive social
networks, in which communication is generally one-way, from writer to readers.
By comparison, computer mediated social networks are a mass of
interconnections with two-way communication, but the selection and identification
process is essentially the same.
What is at issue here, chiefly, is the power to serve as gatekeeper for
one’s own social interactions. This is a tool we are not evolutionarily prepared to
use. Of course, this power is not exactly a new one. From the advent of
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agriculture (and hence private property) on, we have had actual gates, as well as
doors, walls, etc., that we have used to control whom we interact with. During the
Neolithic Revolution we developed an appetite for navel gazing that persists to
this day, one that is greatly facilitated by computer networks. We are Narcissus
writ large; even when we move our mirrors follow us around, tempting us. Teens,
already prone to Narcissism, possess in the cell phone the ultimate mirror. A
study conducted by Panek, Nardis, and Konrath (2013) suggests that more
Narcissistic people tend to post on social networking sites more often. Getting a
“like” or “retweet” from a peer (who is often similar in terms of socioeconomic
status, culture, etc.) is not so different from admiring one’s reflection in a mirror.
One thinks of Facetime, Skype, or some other video chat software of the like, in
which the ability to talk with someone else is complicated by the appearance of a
small square on the screen showing your own face as you speak. These images
of ourselves are distracting, constantly drawing our gazes away from our
conversers. A Skype conversation, in this way, is a synecdoche for posthuman
life: our ability to communicate with others is hampered by our own gaze looking
back at us.

Difficulty: Hard To Get Going
Kentaro Toyama (2015) has outlined what he refers to as the “Law of
Amplification” in regards to technology. He writes, “Like a lever, technology
amplifies people’s capacities in the direction of their intentions. A computer
allows its user to perform desired knowledge tasks in a way that is faster, easier,
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or more powerful than the user could without technology. But how much faster,
more easily, and more powerfully is in some proportion to the user’s capacity” (p.
29). With regard to the barycentric pedagogy, this Law implies that the existence
of the affinity space itself is not enough to guarantee learning. Though the
structures facilitating communication are helpful, they are only useful insofar as
they are populated by passionate group members. I have learned this the hard
way, as my offer to sponsor a Kung Fu cinema club at the high school where I
teach has thus far yet to be taken up, despite offering a space to meet, a large
selection of vintage films, and a sponsor with a wealth of knowledge on the topic.
Further, enlisting people in a group is no guarantee of their future engagement in
it. People must find there way into meaningful engagement within affinity spaces
by their own motivation. As Toyama points out, the structure can amplify and
facilitate teaching and learning, but only through a passionate and engaged
human element.
If affinity spaces are so rewarding for the people who visit them, this begs
the question of why they do not receive more visitors. Though determining the
number of people who are actively engaged in affinity spaces would be
impossible, it seems likely that many, if not most, people do not commonly visit
them. Ironically, it is the very technology that allows so many communities of
interest to exist that pulls people away from those spaces. At the same time as
information technologies facilitate the existence of affinity spaces, they provide
tempting opportunities for escapism. Collins and Halverson (2009) note that,
“Kids today spend over 6 hours per day interacting with television, video games,
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the Internet, instant messaging, email, and other media. This is more time than
they spend in school or with friends, and almost as much time as they spend
sleeping” (p. 113). Video games and other forms of entertainment are becoming
ever more immersive. Google, Facebook, Samsung, Microsoft and other tech
giants are presently investing heavily in augmented reality and virtual reality
technologies. Increases in computing power make virtual worlds more realistic by
the year. Streaming media services allow for instant access to huge libraries of
multimedia content at low cost. All of these aspects and others function as pull
factors for escapism. At the same time, push factors exist that make the “real”
world a less alluring place. The automation of labor must surely fall in this
category, as it reduces the amount of pride one has in their work. The decline in
social mobility commensurate with the rise in income inequality might also push
one into escapism. In a system in which the game is rigged, players are more
likely to lose and hence more likely to seek solace elsewhere. Importantly,
escapism today is a form of disembodiment, which is problematic for a number of
reasons. Perhaps most vitally, this sort of escapism leads one to neglect one’s
body and the life systems to which it is connected. This can (and has) led to a
general decline in health of human bodies and their environments. There is a
relinquishment of autonomy, a sort of zombification in escapism that is the polar
opposite of the humanist emphasis on individual freedom. One is never fully
independent, and even in escapism their actions (or lack of actions) affect others.
As such, providing people with computers not only is insufficient to get them
involved in affinity spaces, it might actually hamper learning.
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A final difficulty of barycentric pedagogy is that it is in many ways more
difficult to implement than more traditional teaching methods. Indeed, in the
model examples used thus far, this method of learning comes about as a result
of self-organization by learners. Because it relies on passionate engagement,
anyone hoping to give rise to a vibrant affinity space must often first engender
passion in the learners. This can be difficult, especially if the subject holds no
initial appeal to the proposed group members. Writing of his version of
progressive education, Dewey (1938) notes: “the road of the new education is
not an easier one to follow than the old road but a more strenuous and difficult
one. …The greatest danger that attends its future is, I believe, the idea that it is
an easy way to follow, so easy that its course may be improvised, if not in an
impromptu fashion, at least almost from day to day or from week to week” (Ch. 8,
para. 2). This same danger applies to those seeking to implement aspects of a
barycentric pedagogy. That this form of education is immanent in and springing
from all parts of the system is not to imply that it is easy. Schoolteachers seeking
to implement this pedagogy have an especially difficult path to travel. The
educational system in which they are situated is in many ways at cross-purposes
with barycentric pedagogy. Members of what the teacher hopes to turn into an
affinity space are frequently there compulsorily. Grades and the threat of falling
behind serve to stigmatize failure rather than using it as a source of constructive
feedback. However, the difficulty of implementing barycentric pedagogy must not
be taken as sufficient reason to avoid the attempt, just as the relative ease of
didactic instruction is not sufficient for its continued use.
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Conclusion
In the preceding pages, I have attempted to take a comprehensive view of
education in light of posthumanist theory. The first two chapters dealt with the
proposition that we are posthuman. The autonomous individual human and the
mind/body duality were problematized as our inescapable connections with other
life systems, technologies, and entities were explored. The legacy of humanism
has been one preoccupied with matters of distinction between mind and body,
human and savage, humans and nature, etc., while posthumanism in some ways
seeks to “balance the scales”-problematizing those distinctions by exposing
connections. In addition to this work of blurring boundaries, posthumanism
emphasizes life forms in flux. We are born with urges to distinguish this from that,
to sort things into fixed categories, and to ascribe permanence to the things we
name. Though often useful, especially in an evolutionary/species-survival sense,
succumbing to these urges can leave us with an inaccurate view of the world and
our place in it. In truth, distinctions are often lines drawn in the sand, categories
are not fixed, and nothing is permanent. Further, beliefs in distinction (mind/body,
human/savage, human/nature, etc.) and permanence (of the human as a
species, for example) can and have resulted in harm to the life systems to which
posthumans are connected. Distinction is often tied to oppression, as difference
allows for claims of superiority. Hence the “mind” is greater than the “body”, the
“human” greater than the “savage” and/or “nature”, etc.
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I proposed in chapter three a number of broad educational goals meant to
mitigate the dangers of such distinctions. Awareness was one of these, and it
applies particularly to an awareness of our connections to other life systems,
people, and technologies. This educational goal emphasizes the idea that we are
not autonomous individuals but are unavoidably tied to other life systems, such
that our fates are inexorably tied to that of our neighbors. Such awareness
makes a second posthumanist goal for education more likely, that of the exercise
of restraint, particularly in regards to our technology use. Finally, the
posthumanist emphasis on flux is reflected in the educational goal of
engendering lifelong learners. Constant change (in terms of who we are, our
environments, our tools, etc.) implies the need for constant education, and this is
especially true today, as the pace of technological and environmental change
quickens.
From the broad educational goals of chapter three, I sought in chapter four
to derive a number of curricular imperatives. Critical media literacy was posited
as a response to the ubiquity of 21st century media, and the growing role it plays
in our lives. These media challenge our notions of autonomy and identity while
they often enable technocrats to exert undue influence on our thoughts and
actions. The humanist belief in individual autonomy is dangerous today, as it
blinds people to this influence. Critical cultural studies was put forth as another
posthumanist curricular imperative. Just as our connections with our media can
be fruitfully explored, so too can our connections with other cultures. The
humanist notions of fixed categories are under critique here, including the
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human/savage distinction. Today we face strong temptations to enter “bubbles”,
groups of like-minded people who are often similar to ourselves in thought and
appearance. These bubbles can lead to feelings of superiority, suspicion,
resentfulness, and others towards those in other groups. Critical cultural studies
is vital then for allowing us to become acquainted with the perspectives of those
in other bubbles, and to counter our urges to withdraw into the safety and
isolation of our bubbles. Educational goals of awareness and restraint inform a
third curricular imperative, a focus on and recognition of embodiment. The false
but widely accepted mind/body distinction has led to the common view that the
body is little more than an outdated functionary of the mind. The embodiment
imperative seeks to challenge this view by exposing the falsity of the mind/body
distinction, and emphasizing the reflexive relationship between our thoughts and
our bodies. As our bodies become increasingly displaced in the market system
by computers and automata, the urge to discount or dismiss the body becomes
stronger. We discount our bodies at our own peril, however, as our bodies have a
direct and significant impact on our minds (to the point that, as has previously
been noted, there is no clear distinction between the two). A final curricular
imperative of ecoliteracy was proposed in much the same spirit as that of
embodiment. We are unavoidably tied to the life systems of which we are
constituent parts much as our minds are tied to our bodies. Just as technology
has led us to discount our bodies, so has it led us to discount the rest of the
natural world. The one-way conversation technology has facilitated between
humans and nature has led not only to much environmental harm, but poses
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substantial threats to our own continued existence. Once again we face a rather
posthumanist task in seeking to blur the distinction between humans and nature,
recognizing that humans are themselves a part of nature, and are quite
dependent on her for our continued survival. These four imperatives: critical
media studies, critical cultural studies, embodiment, and ecoliteracy, work
together to further the broad educational goals of awareness, restraint and
lifelong learning, as they apply these goals to four realms of connections. We are
connected to our technologies, other people, our bodies, and our environments,
and posthumanism seeks to emphasize these connections while dismantling the
autonomous human subject.
In the present chapter, the idea of sorting people into the categories
“teacher” and “learner” has been critiqued as we, in posthumanist fashion, have
observed unavoidable connections between the two. We are each both teachers
and learners, often simultaneously. This does not mean that each person is
always an equal mixture of the two, in fact one is almost always more in one
camp than the other (though which camp we are in and to what degree both are
in a constant state of flux). Here, education is proposed as a process that
includes the (post)human but is not encompassed by her. Nor is education
limited to a binary system of teacher and learner. Instead, education is distributed
between teacher/learners, technologies, bodies and environments. I have
proposed a name for this method of education, barycentric pedagogy, to illustrate
the reflexivity of influence that occurs between bodies (living and non) in this
educational system. This form of pedagogy has been shown to be already on

194
display in affinity spaces, areas (some physical, others in cyberspace) in which
people with similar interests gather to share, learn, appreciate, and show off.
Finally, though the barycentric pedagogy seems to avoid many of the pitfalls of
pedagogies commonly practiced in schools today (including rigidly delineated
subjects, didactic instruction, tracking, etc.), it is not without its own pitfalls.
Perhaps the most dangerous of these is that the affordances of affinity spaces
allow one to get lost in the pursuit of one’s passions. They can serve as the
“bubbles” warned of in chapter four, areas one can escape to for comfort. As
such, this method of teaching must be tempered by the posthumanist goals and
curricular imperatives outlined previously. It is often worthwhile to chase our
passions, but it is also vital that we be nudged out of our comfort zones from time
to time.
An opportunity for further scholarship raised in this work is that of the role
of school in light of the educational goals and curricular imperatives previously
outlined. Much remains to be done in laying the groundwork for a barycentric
pedagogy. Today’s schools are too often a reflection of 19th and 20th Century
media, focused on linearity, memorization, sequence, etc. We need schools
oriented around the new media. Specifically, a balance must be struck between
fostering knowledge spaces and keeping those spaces from becoming echo
chambers. There is an opportunity with schooling, too infrequently realized, to
provide marginalized groups with access to and education in the use of media
otherwise unavailable to them. Schooling can help to level the playing field in this
way, and scholarship could consider how schools might best accomplish this
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leveling. Also, more scholarship might beneficially be devoted towards
consideration of barycentric pedagogies in action. This would involve close study
of affinity spaces within our new media, such as those that spring up on Internet
message boards, blogs, social networking sites, and others.
Posthumanism’s path forward is in some ways unclear, as environmental
destruction and technological advance are both proceeding at a lightning pace.
However, the preceding pages have hopefully suggested a number of directions
future scholarship might beneficially take. One of these lies in continuing to
explore links between posthumanism and other theories. We could look
especially at Haraway’s work linking posthumanism and feminism as a guide
here. We are all posthuman and we are all component parts of larger entities.
These tenets of posthumanism can continue to be explored in light of other
theories more specific or localized in their perspective. Perhaps in this way new
or stronger connections might be formed between theories and groups, and
localized perspectives might increasingly acknowledge and inform more global
environmental and technological concerns.
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